

The Politics of Boundaries

AND

Tendencies in International Relations

VOL. I.

ANALYSIS OF POST-WAR WORLD FORCES

BY

Dr. Benoy Kumar Sarkar, M. A. (Cal.), *Vidya-vaibhava* (Benares),
Dr. Geog. h. c. (Teheran), Department of Economics, Calcutta
University, Hon. Professor of Economics and sometime
Rector, College of Engineering and Technology, Jadab-
pur, Calcutta, *Gastprofessor an der Tech. Hoch-*
schule, Munich (1930-31), Member, Institut Inter-
national de Sociologie, Institut Oriental
(Prague), Comitato Italiano sulla Popola-
zione (Rome), Royal Asiatic Society
(Shanghai), Société d' Economie
Politique (Paris), Royal Eco-
nomie Society (London)
Correspondent,
American Sociol-
ogical
Review.

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To the Spirit of

KAUTILYA,

philosopher, statesman, energist,

who organised for Young India of old the cult of
vijigishu (aspirant to conquest)

AND

to the memory of

HEM CHANDRA BANERJI,

poet, patriot, idealist,

whose message in Bengali has taught the Young
India of to-day as follows:—

“Take thee to the ocean’s deeps;
And crowns of mountains scramble bold;
Planets of the universe
Ransacked be merciless;
Tempests and meteors,
Flame of lightning fierce.
Grasp, man, audacious-firm,
Venture, then, on life’s work!”

This little study in foreign affairs
is respectfully dedicated
as a contribution to the analysis of
vishva-shakti (world-forces).

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

For the second edition it has not been considered worth while to bring the different chapters up to date in material. The reasons are obvious. The book does not attempt to be an historical study of political facts but an analysis of political forces, internal and external. The interpretations, based as they are on the facts of a definite period, the post-war years (1919-1925), are valid so far as the data in question are concerned. For subsequent periods the interpretations are to be seen in a new volume ready for the press.

The present publication is to be taken as one of a series comprising the following works:

1. *The Science of History and the Hope of Mankind* (London, 1912, Madras, 1930).
2. *The Futurism of Young Asia* (Berlin, 1922).
3. *The Political Institutions and Theories of the Hindus* (Leipzig, 1922).
4. *The Politics of Boundaries and Tendencies in International Relations* (Calcutta, first edition, 1926):
5. *The Political Philosophies Since 1905* (Madras, 1928, 1938).

The first publication is an essay on the doctrine of *vishva-shakti* (world-forces) as the key to the making and remaking of states. In the second volume there is an extensive discussion of the relations between

East and West, historical and psychological. The problems of China and Iran (Persia) have been dealt with at length and the beginnings of New Asia placed in the sociological background. The third volume is a comparative study of old conditions in India and the Western world both as regards constitutional and administrative experience as well as political concept.

In the fourth volume, i.e. the present work, is given an analytical treatment of *vishva-shakti* with reference to the actual developments of a particular period. This analysis of international relations as well as internal transformations may be taken as a realistic contribution to the new science of *Geopolitik*. Finally, the fifth work furnishes an objective survey of contemporary ideologies, both Eastern and Western, in the perspective of current history.

Political science has been approached from five different angles in these five volumes. While each is complete in itself the five works constitute a single complex of studies in politics, ancient and modern, as well as theoretical and applied.

Benoy Kumar Sarkar.

Calcutta,
June, 1938.

PREFACE.

I

The present publication is a companion and complement to the larger volume entitled *Economic Development: Snapshots of World-Movements in Commerce, Economic Legislation, Industrialism and Technical Education* that is being published simultaneously at Madras. The object here is to isolate the political background of the economic changes as far as possible and treat it in an independent manner.

The first chapter which gives the title to this book is a study in the philosophy of *vishva-shakti* (world-forces) dealt with in the *Science of History and the Hope of Mankind* (London, 1912). The chapter on "The Eternal Chinese Question" is a supplement to the six chapters on "Revolutions in China" which form Part III of the *Futurism of Young Asia* (Leipzig, 1922). The other papers seek to carry on the story concluded in the essay on "Leavings of the Great War" published in the same volume. The entire work is, besides, psychologically affiliated to the ideas in the paper on "The Foreign Policy of Young India" belonging to the *Futurism*.

The chief sources of information for the news-essays are the great dailies in French, German and Italian. For the treatises on finance, banking, commercial policy, professional education, agricultural

progress, welfare work, growth of industries etc. a bibliography has been inserted in *Economic Development*.

Most of these papers appeared in *Forward* (Calcutta). A few have been published in the *Forum*, the *Modern Review* and the *Hindustan Review*, all belonging likewise to Calcutta.

II

Capital has grown to be international. So also has labour. The means of communication and transportation have been facilitating the movements of these forces. Agricultural depression in one part of the world makes itself therefore felt in another part by unemployment or a change in the bank-rate. To-day the world is one unified system of economic agencies, and "world-economy" happens to be a fact of contemporary culture exactly as "national economy," "town economy," or "village economy" were facts in other epochs of human development. Prices, wages and even the standard of living have been tending to move towards a more or less uniform level which naturally is set by the more progressive peoples.

In these days of world-economy it is getting more and more difficult to draw a line between political and economic phenomena. The days of tribal, religious, racial and linguistic factors as formative agencies in politics are fairly over. Politics to-day, be they internal and constitutional or foreign and

international, have grown into different aspects of the interplay of economic forces, no matter whether hunger or greed.

Of the laws and statutes passed by the post-war parliaments of the world perhaps more than seventy-five per cent belong to the domain of agriculture, manufacture and commerce in their manifold branches. The largest amount of business conducted by governments is economic.

Never was the economic interpretation of history, understood in its elastic sense, more a reality than at the present moment. None but the economic experts with their programs of development for the masses and welfare for the nations are competent to tackle the contemporary problems of politics nor organize effective political parties and spiritualize the peoples with soul-enfranchising ideals.

Not less powerful, on the other hand, is the bearing of political creed and political tactics on the economic developments of our own times. It is the character of the predominant parties that determines the economic legislation of nations and the fortunes of millions.

The state has grown into the greatest dynamo of material well-being.

Nobody can at the present moment function as an economist without at the same time being a politician. And in order to discharge one's duties as an economist one has to begin by capturing the

state, i.e. commanding or controlling the constitution and directing the foreign policy.

To-day it is almost an anachronism even to ask the question as to the "proper functions" of a state. Socialism is but the first postulate in public thinking. It is agreed that the state will interfere here and there and everywhere.

The influence of economic agents on political (i.e. constitutional and international) happenings will be apparent in every chapter that is being offered here. Likewise have the internal and diplomatic developments of the state left their impress on the movements of the economic man as described in the other publication, namely, *Economic Development*. Besides, by indicating in the footnotes of each volume the references to the other the mutual bearings of economic and political events have been kept in the foreground.

III.

A few remarks in regard to the political theories prevailing in the international *milieu* may not here be out of place.

The Grotian theory of external sovereignty on which the international law of the modern world is based is slowly but steadily undergoing a silent transformation. The projects and accomplishments of the Hague Conferences of the pre-war decades as well as the political activities of the Geneva League of Nations have served undoubtedly to introduce a

new element in every state, which although not yet very prominent is not without significance on its internal constitution and politics.

The facts of "intervention" from the outside have now to be assimilated to the concept of sovereign territorial jurisdiction. A seemingly "medieval" order of phenomena, as it happens to be, this demands a new futuristic reconstruction of the problem of external sovereignty in a world that is the farthest removed, however, from the medieval absence of nationality and lack of territorial independence.

From the internal side, also, sovereignty is no longer secure on its Austinian basis. The claims of the lesser corporations, the guilds, the trade unions, the soviets, the local bodies, the religious associations, the academies and so forth as semi-sovereign institutions are encroaching upon the dominion of the larger corporation, the state. The theory of sovereignty has to take cognizance of the gradually diminishing role of the omnipotent state and reconstruct constitutional law on novel foundations.

One word more. The old India, doctrine of *mandala* (sphere of influence or interest in international relations, interstatal complex) counsels the *vijigishu* (aspirant to conquest) to study the five *prakritis* (essential elements) of his state as well as those of the enemies, allies and neutrals. To this category of five essentials belong the ministry, the territory, the fortresses (including fortified cities), finance and army.

The diplomat or student of foreign affairs to-day, in spite of the complexities of contemporary mankind, does not have to busy himself with anything more or less than comprehended in this pentad. The world seems to have changed very little,—in form if not in substance, indeed. Or, at any rate, the logical apparatus of international diplomacy and the machinery of thinking in regard to the philosophy of foreign politics remain the same as in the days of our old Kautilya.

BENOY KUMAR SARKAR.

BOLZANO, ITALY,

14 April, 1925.

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THE POLITICS OF BOUNDARIES

AND

- - - TENDENCIES IN - - -

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

CHAPTER I

THE POLITICS OF BOUNDARIES.

MAP-MAKING.

One of the most profound vital urges in human life has ever consisted in the effort to make boundaries. The making and remaking of the frontiers is perhaps the greatest single item that has been pushing the world's history on monumental scale since mankind began to live in groups.

The landmarks in this cosmic evolution are constituted by wars and treaties and the manufacture of maps. Map-making is an order of creation in which the soul of man has had a continuous

source of inspiration and delight since the Pharaohs lived and fought.

The nineteenth century phase of this creative endeavour in the field of frontiers has enriched the vocabulary of the world with a new term embodying, as it seems to do, a new ideology. Since Kosciusko, Kossuth, Mazzini, and Bismarck, the boundary-makers and creators of "historical geography"—i.e. the manufacturers of maps, have learned to use the word "nation." The "nationality" principle, whatever it may mean, has become current coin in the human phraseology.

THE EUROPEAN FRONTIERS OF 1918.

The war of 1914-1918 was fought not only over the question of dominion in Asia and Africa, but so far as Europe is concerned, also over the problem of "nationalities." The map-makers of Versailles are credited with having manufactured "nationality-states," Tchecho-Slovakia, Poland and so forth in Central and South-Eastern Europe.

Nor has Eastern Europe remained an

exception to the sway of this great *élan de la vie*. The Russian revolution with its Bolshevistic creed of self-determination (November, 1917) has given a fillip to the play of centrifugal forces among the Fins, Esthonians, Letts, Lithuanians on the Baltic and the Little Russians (Ruthenians) or Ukrainians of the Dnieper Valley that had been held together like a house of cards in a promiscuous medley by the Czar of all the Russias.

BOUNDARY-MAKING IN ASIA.

The nationality-problem in boundary-making represents no longer a mere European phase of the world-development. The events and movements that have been taking place on the Chinese theatre of human operations raise issues more fundamental than seem to have been consciously grasped and formulated in the political creed of Young China. These are none other than considerations as to the attributes of a sovereign state, or from a slightly different

angle of vision, the essentials of a nationality.

What are the territorial (geographico-economic) limits of a nation? What is the human (demographic or anthropographic) basis of the state? These are the problems that are being unconsciously attacked by the leaders of the Chinese revolutions, counter-revolutions, and civil wars.

The same questions are abroad all over Asia. The nationality-problem or map-making remains the moot-problem for the brain of entire Young Asia. It has been called up by the partition of Asian-Turkey accomplished by the Great War consisting, as it did, in the alleged liberations of Arabia and Mesopotamia. The problem is still perhaps dormant in Persia and Afghanistan. But longstanding discontents in Egypt, India and South-Eastern Asia constitute so many different sparks from the same fire.

NATIONALITY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE.

Nationality is a very young phenomenon both as a concept and as a fact.

Consequently a good deal of vague thinking is still associated with it not only in the East but also in the West.

Nationality as interpreted by the political philosophers of the nineteenth century is not the same as the nationalities actually realized in modern times. The theoretical ideal embodies itself in such formulae as "One language, one state," or "One race, one state," or, more vaguely, "One culture, one state." As a matter of fact, however, neither in the nineteenth century nor ever on earth since the days of Memphis and Nineveh has this metaphysical concept been realized in practice.

History knows only "states". Diplomats and politicians also know only states. But patriots, philosophers and poets talk of nations.

Much of the present-day muddle in political thinking is due to the ignoring of this great discrepancy between the speculation of modern theorists and the practice evolved in actual history. The

political mind of the whole world is consciously or unconsciously "sicklied o'er" with the abstract idealism of Fichte, Hegel, Mazzini and John Stuart Mill. It has fought shy of the effort to square the theory with the facts of concrete political experience. Rather, the old dogma of the race-state or the language-state has acquired a fresh lease of life under the Reconstruction of Versailles.

And yet the so-called "nation-states" that one sees on the new map of Europe* are not nation-states at all in the sense in which one is taught to understand the term nation. Yugoslavia, Tchecho-Slovakia, Poland, each of these states is poly-glot and multi-racial, in other words, an old Austria-Hungary in miniature.

Whether these "nations" serve in the long run to "Balkanize" Europe at every nook and corner or turn out to be so many nuclei of "Helvetization" remains yet to be seen. Not the least disturbing factor

* Cf. *infra* (The Little Entente), Chapter III. Also, the chapter on "Leavings of the Great War" in the present author's *Futurism of Young Asia* (Leipzig, 1922).

in the political *milieu* is furnished by the fact that twenty million German men and women, about a third of the entire German-speaking population, has been distributed right and left among a dozen or so old and new states of Europe to give birth to a "German irredenta" in every so-called nation-state.

CULTURE NOT THE BASIS OF NATIONALITY.

The great need of the hour is the emancipation of the theory of nationality, on the one hand, from the mystical associations forced upon it by the ardour of patriots and idealists, and, on the other, from the clean-cut logicality or comprehensiveness injected into it by political thinkers and philosophers. A realistic philosophy of the state is to be sought, first, in order to counteract the "romantic" conception of nationalism *as a cult*, with which the world is familiar through "Young Germany" and "Young Italy"; and, secondly, to explain the territorial boundaries and demographic extent of the

states that have been and are. Such a philosophy is in high request for the solution of problems that have appeared both in the East and in the West.

In the first place, the attempt to associate "culture," "culture-ideals" and so forth with nationality can only make "confusion worse confounded." By the objective test and statistically considered, life's "ideals" have been the same the world over and almost all the ages through. In spite of the diversities of manifestation these ideals can be grouped under a single slogan, *viz.*, the advancement of the happiness of human beings.

Moreover, with the progress of exact sciences and technology the physical barriers are being daily set at naught. The tunnels, canals and bridges, understood both literally and metaphorically, are compelling the cultural institutions of the world to tend towards a closer and closer uniformity in the different quarters of the globe. The boundaries of nationality, *i.e.*, the physical and racial limits of the state have therefore to be

determined and interpreted on altogether new foundations.

In the second place, there has hardly ever been nor is there to-day an ethnic or cultural unit that can function as a self-sufficient economic entity. The ever-increasing commercial intercourse of nations (the "*Weltwirtschaft*" or "world-economy") has been rendering such a system of self-sufficient units less and less probable.

Then there are the considerations of military, naval and aerial defence which belong to the problem of the so-called "scientific frontiers." The formation of composite or heterogeneous political organisms has thereby become almost a practical necessity. The more or less simple, *i.e.*, homogeneous character of insular states, *e.g.* Great Britain, is but an exception that proves the rule. It is mainly from the stand-point of military and strategic necessity that one can understand why millions of Germans have been given away in subjection to neighbours on all sides.

NATION AND STATE.

The problem of nationality remains then up till to-day a problem of the state. While ascertaining the foundations of nations one should therefore have to grapple with the question, "what is the basis of the state?"

This question, apparently simple, has to be looked in the face and the modern mind has to proceed to answer it in an absolutely secular spirit, *i.e.*, unburdened of the traditional sanctity attached to the dignity of political phenomena. Are there no characteristics that are, pragmatically speaking, common to the Pharaonic nationalities, the empires of the Assurs, the Maurya, Gupta, Tang, Mogul and Manchu imperial systems, and the states of Europe from the epochs of "insolent Greece and haughty Rome" down to the Sovietic manufacture of maps and the Versailles reconstruction of frontiers as well as the colonial empires among the subject races of the world? There *are*, and these constitute the soul of the state,

or for that matter, the nation, denuded of its multifarious trappings.

THE NATURE OF THE STATE.

In the first place, the state is not a "natural" organism as has been taught in the school rooms for nearly a whole century. It is a voluntary association, an artificial corporation, an institution consciously created or "manufactured" like, say, the Standard Oil Company of New York or the University of Oxford.

The state is one of the many products of man's creative will and intelligence. Metaphorically speaking, its genesis, expansion, contraction and dissolution may represent indeed the different reactions of the mystical *élan vital* of a social group to the stimuli of its *milieu*. But still one can make it as well as unmake it. It is a mechanical conglomeration of domestic units, clan-communities, socio-economic trusts, *groupements professionnels*, partnerships, etc.

No innate motive force impels a race, language, religion or *Kultur* to embody

itself in a statal organization such as would be its own characteristic expression. The disappearance of the state is therefore not tantamount to the disappearance of the people. The state may come and the state may go but the people go on for ever, and may live on to create new partnerships or states according to the needs of the hour. The same culture may flourish under different states, while the same state may be associated with different culture-systems.

Secondly, once this elementary fact is grasped we are inevitably led to the corollary that the sole origin and *rationale* of the state or the nation have to be sought in the will of the people to agree to its formation. The agreement, however, may be tacit or express. It may be self-determined as in a free corporation, or forced as in a subject race or *irredenta*.

But as in the relations between capital and labour the agreement between the employer and the employed is supposed by "legal fiction" to be free and voluntary on both sides whereas in actuality the

the economic conditions of the labourer inevitably prevent him from functioning as a free person, so by a sort of legal fiction one has to regard the subject races of the world or the "minorities" or *irredentas* as voluntarily agreeing to accept the powers that be.

In any case an idea of contract or compact* is psychologically involved in every state or nation although it may not always happen to be present as a historical fact, and although it may often be difficult to trace contractual relations in the crude anthropological beginnings of states.

Thirdly, the state may be formally run in the name of the One, or it may be so camouflaged as to seem to be the institution of the Many. But in the last analysis it is the Few that make and boss the state even in "communist" republics.

* Independence and sovereignty must, however, be regarded as "limited" as a matter of course; for the same contract that brings a state into being can create also a system of international law, arbitration commissions, a League of Nations and such other institutions of positive public law.

Fourthly, the might of the sword is the only guarantee of the existence of the nation or state. A people may create the state with borrowed culture like the ancient Romans, the Turks and the modern Japanese, but the sword must be its own.

The sword-less state or nation is a contradiction in terms. An unarmed region is a buffer like Siam or Afghanistan, a "sphere of influence" like China, a "mandated" territory, a protectorate, a dependency, and what not. It can figure on the map only as the land of dehumanized slaves not to be counted in the category of human beings.

Finally, the boundaries, extent and human compositions of states depend, therefore, on blood and iron, *i.e.*, on wars and on the deliberate treaties of peace, *Zollvereins*, traffic-walls, etc. Every treaty is, from the nature of the case, provisional, and so are the boundaries of nations. Not until challenged by some neighbour the frontiers remain what they are.

These are in almost every instance

but temporary arrangements brought about by "scraps of paper," and each state or nation has to be on the look out to keeping its own gun-powder dry. The boundaries of states or nations have in any event no natural and necessary connection with the frontiers of culture, language, religion or race.

Even the more powerful geographical barriers may be overruled by mechanical inventions, should the collective will of the people care to do so. There is thus no mystical absoluteness or inalienability to the limits of the state. The "scientific frontiers" may advance or recede with every generation according to the dynamics of inter-social existence. The only architect of the world's historical geography from epoch to epoch is the *shakti-yoga* or energism of man.

THE BIRTH OF NATIONS.

From an inductive study of the nationalities old and new, oriental and occidental, one is then in a position to define the objective foundations of the

state. The first formative force is the will or consent of the people, the plebiscite, silent or declared. The second agency that operates in the birth of nations is the force of arms, the power of offence and defence in open war.

The state comes into existence, first, because certain men and women are determined to create it, and secondly because they are in a position to maintain it against all odds. In regard to offence and defence the nation-makers or manufacturers of states have to see to it that not only the military-naval-aerial equipments are adequate but also that financially, industrially and economically the staying-power of the people during war is up to the mark.

Historically speaking, nations are born in wars and wars only. Genetically, therefore, nationality is in essence a militaristic concept. If there be any spirituality associated with nationalism it is the spirituality of war or the categorical imperative of *Kshatriyaism*.

Nationality thus postulates, as a

matter of course, the *milieu* of a conflict of rivals to brow-beat one another as in a Kautilyan *mandala* (sphere of states). The being of the nation depends on a condition of the *matsya-nyaya* (logic of the fish) and on a thorough-going "preparedness" of the *vijigisu* (the aspirant) against thousand and one eventualities.*

THE POSITIVE THEORY OF NATION-MAKING.

If the state be a voluntary partnership as the historic experience of mankind proves it to be, considerations of race, language, religion, etc., are robbed of any special significance. For, the sole consideration would be the deliberate and conscious agreement of the members of the group, corporation, etc., whatever be the colour, creed or tongue. A state, conceived according to this non-mystical and positive theory, is postulated to be complex or heterogeneous and does not necessarily have to be intolerant of the rights

* See "The Theory of International Relations in Hindu Political Philosophy" in the present author's *Political Institutions and Theories of the Hindus* (Leipzig, 1922).

and interests of the "minorities" since these might be safeguarded in the compact or agreement itself.

Nor is the question of the minimum human strength of a nation, *i.e.*, the smallest amount of population necessary to create a state, a very weighty one according to the theory of the state as an artificial manufacture. The chief question is the preparedness or capacity of the state to meet in an effective manner the aggression of enemies. It may be three millions, thirteen millions, thirty millions or even three hundred millions. Nay, it may be so small as a band of pirates organized for robbery on the high seas or for carrying on guerilla warfare on land.

There is a state *in posse*, an embryonic nation, whenever and wherever the *status quo* of the powers that be is challenged by a group of armed human beings. To be extreme, the positive theory of nation-making would assert that even a single revolutionary militant, by his sheer existence happens to be the nucleus of a new state or nation.

THE CASE OF TCHECHO-SLOVAKIA.

A verification of this aspect of the theory has been met with during the Great War in certain actions of the allies prompted as they were by considerations of military necessity. In August-September 1918 the twelve million Tchechs and Slovaks of Bohemia were recognized by Great Britain, France and the United States as an independent unit, although during that period the territory of these races existed solely in the hearts of the people and in the visions of about 100,000 "exiled" soldiers on the Volga and in Siberia.

As soon as rebels, no matter who or what they be, can create the interest of some powerful neighbour or neighbours the manufacture of a new state may be said to be already on the anvil. The traditional, mystical theory of nationalism would fail to account for such a phenomenon.

It would be impossible to maintain that Tchecho-slovakia, as constituted to-

day, the "land of seven languages" and half a dozen minorities, is a nation-state in the idealistic Mazzinian sense. Tchecho-slovakia has been manufactured not because the Tchechs and the Slovaks, the two "senior partners" of the new political complex, have much in common with one another in "soul" affairs or with the German and other minorities but because the Central Powers had somehow—by hook or by crook—to be crushed by their sworn enemies and because certain states had to be created against mutilated Germany and Austria.

The birth of Tchecho-slovakia agrees, therefore, quite well with the new theory of nationalism and nation-making that is adumbrated here. This as well as the other new states of Europe embody fresh illustrations of the principle that it is only through foreign intrigue and diplomatic assistance that subject races, whether united in language, race, religion, etc., or not, can throw off the yoke of hated aliens. Unity or no unity, a nation can be born,

should it suit the "conjuncture of circumstances."*

NOT UNITY BUT INDEPENDENCE.

Nationality, then, is not the concrete expression of a cult or culture or race or language, or of the Hegelian "spirit" or "genius" of a people. It is the physical (territorial and human) embodiment of political freedom, maintained by military and economic strength. The problem of nation-making is nothing but the problem of establishing a sovereign will in territorial terms, *i.e.*, giving sovereignty "a local habitation and a name."

Not unity, but independence is the distinctive feature of a national existence. The nation may thus represent one race or many. It may speak one language or it may be polyglot. It may be a uni-cultural or a multicultural organism. To an artificial corporation brought into being by the fiat of human creativeness, homogeneity of racial or linguistic interests is not

* See the present author's *Science of History and the Hope of Mankind* (London, 1912).

necessarily a source of strength, nor is heterogeneity a special weakness.

POLITICAL ENGINEERING.

The problems of "applied nationalism" are therefore clear. The practical statesman or the manufacturer of nations need not reflect too much on the historic traditions or the sentimental unities. The positive theory of the state would advise him to study principally, first, such of the lands and waters, mines and forests, *i.e.*, the economic resources, as can be conveniently made into a unit, and secondly, such of the men and women, families and communities as choose to bring a free and independent organism into existence. The fundamental logic of nation-manufacture is that implied in prudence and expediency.

The will to create a state and the ability to protect and develop it are the sole items in the methodology of statesmanship. As much of the earth's area and of the human mass as can be organized effectively in a separate entity along

the lines of least resistance should be regarded as the basis of the state. The sole guidance is furnished by the safe principle, familiar in economics, namely, "as much as the market will bear."

The state may consist of the heterogeneous elements, should they desire to be so organized. Or, the nation may have to renounce a section of the dearer and nearer relationships if that were necessary for the preservation of independence.

That is why Great Britain had to swallow the separation of the U. S. That is why not even the most pronounced chauvinists of France dare attempt annexing the French-speaking provinces of Belgium and Switzerland. That is why Italy would think hundred times before waging war against Switzerland on account of the Swiss-Italian Canton Tessin.

In political engineering even a tiny nucleus of sturdy independence is infinitely superior to a mammoth hotch-potch of golden servility. "Safety first" is a more reasonable rule in politics than

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romantic enthusiasm for one's "nationals," linguistic affiliations and cultural colonies. In nation-making and sovereignty the Hesiodic paradox still holds good, which says that the "part is greater than the whole."

CHAPTER II

THE RUHR-RHINE-SAAR COMPLEX.

THE NEW GERMANY AND KEMAL PASHA.

From Manila to Morocco,—the entire East has been spiritualized by the Turkish successes under Kemal Pasha. Their influence on Young Germany has been no less vital (October 1922).

For four years since the armistice, the diary of the German mind was an unmitigated record of despondence and despair. Submission to the dictates of the victors was the only philosophy of official life.

The assassinations of "moderates" and submissionists such as Erzberger and Rathenau who, however, were no less sincere servants of their Fatherland than were their murderers who are believed to have come from the ranks of "extremists" and militarists, indeed pointed to powerful under-currents in German society. No doubts were left in *Entente* circles as

to the strength of Germany's will to vengeance upon the event of 1918. But all the same during 1921-1922 the world was almost convinced that the Wirth Administration had brought the German politics of non-resistance and passive obedience to the *nadir* of national depression.

A reaction had to come in Germany's public and folk psychology. It waited for a push from the outside world. The *milieu* was opportune. Far off in Asia,—at Angora—there was being operated a dynamo of active and victorious opposition to the same catastrophe of 1918 which had kept German mentality in chains.

During the last quarter of 1922 Germany began, therefore, to think in some such manner as the following: "Well, if it has been possible for Kemal Pasha to challenge the *Entente* and for the Young Turk to call the Treaty of Sevres off, why should it not be equally possible for Germany to reduce the Treaty of Versailles to a dead letter?" These musings, however, were not always loud, *i.e.*, not often to be encountered in the press and on the

platform; because Germany, subject as she is to *Entente* control, like other enslaved nations whose mouths are gagged, dare not speak out or think aloud on questions of life and death.

But, the impact of this new Kemalistic energism on the men and women of Germany did not fail to make itself felt. The result was the inauguration of the industrial-financial-national ministry under Cuno,—a government that is prepared to vindicate the people's honour against the conquerors' overtures.

PASSIVE RESISTANCE IN THE RUHR VALLEY.

The year 1923 has opened for Germany with the spirit of resistance such as was absolutely unknown in her dealings with the *Entente* since her acceptance of defeat and humiliation. The German mind seems to be united in the decision that submissionism is no longer to play any part in Germany's relations with the nations that have overpowered her in arms.

Cuno, the government and the nation

are all bent upon offering resistance. But what kind of resistance? Here also a hint has come to Germany from Asia.

The new spirit is manifest in the manner in which the working men, engineers, governors and intellectuals of the Ruhr regions have been practising the martyrdom of *satyāgraha* and *hartāl* almost to the very letter of Gandhism. Imprisonments, expulsions, tortures and executions that are being inflicted upon the Germans of this section of the Rhineland, constitute the "credit" by which Germany is seeking to have a part of the notoriety liquidated which the *Entente* had propagated about her throughout the world during the war.

These sacrifices form a portion of the price Germany must have to pay willingly before she can be rehabilitated in international confidence. On the other hand, the neurotic sympathy of the "neutrals" with the fortunes of the *Entente*, which were alleged to be identical with those of democracy and civilization, can partially be got rid of only through some such

sufferings of Germany as are being thrust upon her from the other side.

In any case, Germany is behaving like a nation that is apparently armless or disarmed. That she is not willing to display arms is at any rate quite clear.

India has advertized the idea both in theory and practice that there is only one kind of resistance possible in a condition of armlessness. Passive resistance is the method not only of an unarmed people in the East but also of every race and class in the world that happens to be in the same predicament. That is why even under the very nose of Hindenburg and Tirpitz *der passive Widerstand* should have become a household word in Germany to-day.

THE LITTLE GERMANIES.

The tactics of non-military resistance by which Germany is attempting to prevent if possible, the foreign subjugation of the Ruhr Basin, will form a new chapter in Europe's international affairs. In the meantime it is interesting to watch the

happenings in two other sections of the Rhineland,* the main valley and the Saar Basin, which had to be surrendered to the foreigners during the period of Germany's greatest despondency and pessimism without even a word of protest.

The separation of the Rhineland from the rest of Germany, this is in one word the goal towards which the affairs in Central Europe have been tending. A Frenchified German territory or a part of Germany under French administration is the consummation that is being looked for in the *Realpolitik* of Eur-American statesmanship.

France with a declining population, which at present is about 40,000,000, is in perpetual dread of her colossal neighbour whose 65,000,000 may any time combine with the 6,000,000 Germans of Austria. In French estimation there is to be no peace in Europe until the Germanic peoples are divided up into different

* See the chapter on Six Years of "Allied" Economic Policy in the present author's *Economic Development* (Madras, 1925).

mutually conflicting nationalities and are left to be every day menaced by a ring of hostile races around them.

The weakening of Germany in territory, population and economic resources such as France is seeking to consummate is by no means disagreeable to the empire-builders and trade interests of Great Britain. As for the new danger that is likely to arise from the French hegemony over Europe, it may be successfully counteracted, so think the British statesmen, by playing off the states against one another.

The larger the *number* of states on the continent, the more convenient is it for the operation of the English doctrine of the "balance of power". The creation of small nationalities such as Poland, the Baltic states (Finland, Esthonia, Lettland and Lithuania), Hungary, and the states like Tchecho-Slovakia and Jugo-Slavia, which together with Rumania have formed the "Little Entente", has but suited the traditional British policy quite well.

Indeed the joint Anglo-French pur-

pose of creating territorial barriers between the Germanic peoples and Russia on the one side as well as Asia on the other, has been successfully realized through the Great War. The partition of Germany into little Germanies, for instance, Rhineland, Bavaria and Prussia, that is now being pushed by France, has, therefore, behind it the backing of virtually entire British diplomacy, commerce and imperialism.

In India we are used to studying the *historical* problem as to how several generations ago a free land was converted into a dependency. The same process has been going on before our eyes at the present moment in Rhineland. This region is a laboratory for the investigation of the steps which lead cumulatively to foreign subjection.

All students of slavery and of "half-way houses" to slavery will, therefore take interest in the working of the "customs frontier" on the Rhine. The economic and social consequences that have already manifested themselves may

be taken to be some of the preliminary changes that are necessary in every fundamental redistribution.

The treatment of the Saar is an object lesson in "colonialism." The "allied" commission has expelled most of the higher German officials, and replaced them by immigrants, chiefly Frenchmen. The homogeneity of the civil service has thus been brought to an end.

The German officials, on the other hand, have been severely punished for the crime of remembering that they are Germans and of working on behalf of Germany.

The new civil service, which, as has been stated, is under the influence of France, has displayed great colonising activity.

Existing legislation was modified by the decree of Aug. 2, 1922, and the category of "inhabitants of the Saar Basin" possessing specific political rights has been created, contrary to the terms of the

Peace Treaty. The French troops have remained in the region. A French gendarmerie has been established. Spying is rampant.

The French officials seek by all means in their power to favour the immigration of non-Germans. The French currency has been gradually introduced; at present it is in use in all government undertakings—*i.e.*, in the public administration, the railways and the postal service. The administration has also sought to make use of the prevailing housing difficulties in order to favour those persons of the Germanic race who are known to be pro-French, and to render life more difficult for the bulk of the German population.

The primary schools have been gallicised by means of Government decrees. The teachers have either been forced to aid in carrying out this policy, or else have been replaced by French teachers. The civil service has been carrying on an extensive propaganda in favour of French culture.

THE SOCIOLOGY OF COLONIALISM.

"Humanly speaking," there is no difference between the two European peoples, the French and the Germans, in "race," religion, culture and character. But the treatment that Germany as the halfway house to a dependency or a colony has been receiving at the hands of France as the "superior race" is absolutely identical with what Asians and Africans have been used to obtaining from Eur-Americans. The Asians of Korea also have exactly the same life and conditions under their foreign rulers, the Asians of Japan. All this treatment is a corollary to colonialism and aliendom.

Subjection is subjection,—no matter in what quarter of the globe it is consummated and by whom. The sociology of foreign rule and slavery is uniform all the world over. Among the Westerns as well as among the Easterns,—and certainly also in the relations between the Easterns and the Westerns—the old Kautilyan doctrine has universal validity,

viz. that under foreign rule the country is not treated as one's own land but exploited merely as an article of commerce.

CHAPTER III

A NEWS-LETTER ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE FINANCE OF DEFLATION.

Inflation as a financial tactic has become the order of the day in Central Europe. It seems even to have captured for some time the imagination of certain British statesmen as a weapon against unemployment. It is therefore interesting to observe that the opposite policy of "deflation" should have been in operation in one of the Balkan states, the not yet very well-known Jugoslavia.

The present Finance Minister, Dr. Stojadinowitsch, has entered upon a policy of rigid control over the note press and the sharpest restrictions in regard to the mobilization of credit. Money has consequently become scarce, perhaps too scarce for the exigencies of daily economic life, as the opponents of the present regime are inclined to think.

But by restricting the amount of money in circulation Dr. Stojadinowitsch believes he can counteract the tendency of the people to invest their wealth in foreign currencies. This tendency, says he, has been the cause of the low value of the Jugoslavian dinar on the international exchange. As soon as the demand for foreign monies decreases the dinar is automatically likely to rise, according to the theory of the deflationist.

The diminution in the amount of money is, however, being severely criticized by bankers and industrialists. For one thing, the measure has compelled the government to have recourse to new taxes and enhancement of the tariff,—steps disagreeable on any account. The Finance Minister is, besides, thoroughly opposed to asking for any more debts from the National Bank.

The economic consequences of deflation have made themselves felt in other directions as well. Old enterprises are being compelled to consume their capital

for current outlays. Capital has not been forthcoming for new investments.

The minister has therefore been forced to the next step, namely, the raising of the dinar in terms of foreign monies. Thus, whether it be inflation or deflation, the post-war money-market has to witness almost everywhere the throwing overboard of the *laissez faire* and the introduction of artificial rates of exchange.*

THE FREE ZONE AT GENEVA.

The Swiss people has been touched to the quick by the treatment it has recently received at the hands of France in regard to a question of great economic importance for Switzerland. In 1815 and 1816 the Swiss and French republics had entered into a treaty by which the citizens of the districts of Haute-Savoie and Gex, although French subjects, were to have commercial transactions with Geneva, the Swiss city on the French border, without

* *Vide* the chapter on "The Methodology of Research in Economics" in Sarkar's *Economic Development*.

customs duties of any sort. This zone of "free trade" really assured to Switzerland an economic command over a part of French territory and thus, strictly speaking, partially deprived France of her sovereignty over her own lands. In order to do away with this anomalous situation the French Government has been for the last few years exchanging notes with the Swiss republic. But suddenly on the 10th of November (1923) without waiting for the final decision Poincare has ordered the customs boundary of France to be brought up to the political. At the very gates of Geneva, therefore, French officials are now busy examining transit, charging duties, and enforcing licenses.

The discussions have given rise to much bad blood on both sides. The *Temps* of Paris did not hesitate to remark on the "pretensions of the little Swiss." On the Swiss side, again, even those who during the long years of the war and since have championed the French cause against the German, such, for instance, as constitute the clientele of the *Journal de*

Geneve have lost face and are commenting on the "breach of treaty" perpetrated by France. Entire Switzerland has become exasperated, especially since a referendum was invoked in order to declare the voice of the people. The question does not seem yet to be closed. Further developments are expected. A court of arbitration is likely to be summoned.

AN INTERESTING FEATURE IN FOREIGN TRADE.

In India we have been used since the close of the war to the spectacle of a foreign trade in which the amount in terms of *money* is higher although in *quantity* lower than that previous to the war. In Holland, as we understand from Van Der Veer, correspondent of the *Telegraaf* (Amsterdam), the situation is just the reverse.

In 1920 Holland imported 276 million Zentner (1 zr.=100 lbs.). In 1922 the figure rose to 388 millions. The exports

for the corresponding years were 84 millions and 138 millions. But the money values fell all along the line. In 1920 the prices of imports totalled 3,335 million guildens (1 gn.=1 Re.) but in 1922 fell down to 2,027 millions. Similarly the exports were priced at 1,701 millions in 1920 but only at 1,222 millions in 1922.

The trade is evidently very brisk. Only the prices have become cheaper. The cost of living has therefore gone down. And Dutch capital instead of seeking foreign markets as it used to do before the war is being absorbed in the enterprises at home. Conditions of labour are also satisfactory. For some time the factories had been observing the 45 hour week. Recently the working men have agreed to a higher, the 48-hour week, the maximum fixed by international labour legislation. A great part of Holland's post-war prosperity is certainly due to the comparative absence of competition from the German side.

THE ANTI-BOLSHEVIK TRIAL AT LAUSANNE.

The trial of Conradi, the Swiss citizen, who had assassinated the Soviet-Russian minister Vorowsky at Lausanne, has come to a close with the verdict of "not guilty". Five members of the jury declared against Conradi and only four for him. But the local law of Lausanne demands a majority of two-thirds when the accused is to be convicted.

In the course of the proceedings the counsel for defence raked up the atrocities alleged to have been committed by the Soviet Government on the Swiss men and women in Russia. But as the assassination was accomplished on Swiss soil by a private Swiss on a Russian citizen, who as a person was not responsible for the measures of his government, several Swiss journals of high standing are of opinion that the murderer should not have been left unpunished by a Swiss court of justice. The *National Zeitung* of Basel, one of the oldest Swiss dailies, goes so far as to say that "one of the most regrettable

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errors has been committed at Lausanne and that the 16th of November (1923), the date on which the judgment was delivered, is to be regarded as a black day in the annals of Swiss justice."

THE BALTIC STATES.

The development of the new republics on the Baltic Sea, provinces of the old Russian Empire, is being watched with great interest in West-European diplomatic circles. Lettland and Esthonia have recently entered into defensive alliance, which, according to the correspondent of the *Journal de Geneve*, portends to be of profound significance in international relations. The political pact arranged previously at Warsaw, the Polish capital, has thus been strengthened. Poland can depend upon the friendship of these states in its hostility to Lithuania.

The Foreign Minister of Lettland, M. Meierovics, has expressly declared that the possibility of an agreement with Lithuania is out of the question until this

latter has finally settled its terms with Poland. The political strengthening of Poland acquires an world-importance from the fact that as a strong buffer between Russia and Germany its rise and growth constitute some of the subjects of common solicitude for great powers like England and France.

THE LITTLE ENTENTE.

The "Balkanization" of Europe to which the Great War has contributed by creating a number of small sovereign nationalities* in Central Europe may be said to be more or less counteracted, economically as well as politically, by a combination which is being described as the "little Entente." To this "community of interests" belong Tchechoslovakia, Rumania and Jugoslavia. Born or expanded out of the old Austro-Hungarian monarchy, these three states are generally

* *Vide* "Lessons from the New States" and "New Land-laws in Central and South-Eastern Europe" in *Economic Development*.

speaking oriented to the Germanic republics as well as their war-time allies in a hostile manner.

Some time ago there was held at Sinaia in Rumania a conference of these states in order to discuss problems of common policy. Attempts were being made to organize a united front against Hungary. But, says a German writer from Bucharest in the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* (Berlin) that from the standpoint of political psychology a common course of action is not easy to realize.

The arch-enemy of Hungary is Tchechoslovakia, the northern neighbour. In the first place, the Hungarians can any moment declare for a monarchy and restore the Hapsburgs. But the Hapsburg House has earned nothing but hatred from the Tchechs in all their past history. In the second place, the Slovaks, who together with Tchechs, have given the name to the new republic, happen to be more friendly at heart to their race-brethren, the Hungarians, than to the Tchechs themselves.

In the third place, the Tchechs are committed to the republican form of government which they are determined to save from contamination with the royalistic Hungarians. It is interesting to observe that the people in Rumania and Jugoslavia, although fraternizing with Tchechoslovakia in foreign policy, simply because of the monarchical forms of government feel "spiritually" akin to the Hungarians.

In Jugoslavia the bone of contention with Hungary lies in another direction. Croatia forms the debatable ground between these two states. It belongs to Jugoslavia as a result of the War. But the Croatians themselves feel like helots within Jugoslavian kingdom. Curiously, however, they do not seem to be friendly to Hungary either. In any case, the Croatians have begun the movement for "home rule"; and as long as it continues the Hungarians can exploit this item of weakness on the side of their rivals, the Serbians, who form the preponderating element in Jugoslavia.

So far as Rumania is concerned, the tendency seems further to seek in Hungary an ally against the common race-enemy, the Slavs of Russia. In Rumanian estimation the sympathies of Poland also can be enlisted in the same task.

The Magyars, themselves, the people of Hungary, have reason however to be inimical to all the three. Territories over which their mother-tongue is spoken have been given away by the peace-treaty to the three neighbours. Hungary can not have peace as long as the valuable Siebenburgen belongs to Rumania, Croatia to Jugoslavia, and Slovakia to Tchechoslovakia. Economically also, Hungary has been robbed of all means of subsistence. There are no forests worth mentioning as resources for the production of wealth. The land is poor in mines and coal deposits. Industries hardly exist.

The development of the country can proceed almost as on a clean slate, and this only if foreign loans be forthcoming. But it is just against this foreign help for Hungary that the little Entente has been

concentrating its energies for some long time.

The little Entente in Central Europe is however but the offspring of the great Entente in the Western. And the tug of war that is being played between British and French politics, commerce and finance casts its daily shadow on the fortunes of these little states in the Balkans.

For the moment Rumania's voice has carried the day. The League of Nations and the Reparation Commission have been studying the situation, as is announced in the *Temps* of Paris; and Hungary is going to get a loan on lines more or less similar to those which have placed Austria on her feet. In the success of the Rumanian voice the French politicians are reading the victory of Great Britain. It is well known that the English people command not only the culture of Rumania through its queen, an English princess, but also its policy, both home and foreign, through numerous industrial and banking undertakings

which are calculated to fortify the British position on the Black Sea i.e., against Russia on the one side and Turkey on the other.

SOCIAL INSURANCE IN SWITZERLAND.

The bureau of economics of the Swiss federal government at Bern has just published a voluminous report on insurance against old age, sickness and death. For a population of about 3,800,000 as the Swiss are, the government would need 79 million francs (i.e. about 4,7 crores of rupees) in order to carry the whole scheme through. As a preliminary measure steps are being taken to render immediate help to persons who are past 65 and have no or inadequate sources of livelihood. Persons whose yearly income falls below 800 francs (Rs. 480) have been deemed worthy of state support. The number of such "public charges" is estimated to be 50,000, as one learns from the *Neue Zurcher Zeitung* of Zurich.

The social importance of this development* can be understood only when one tries to visualize in India an area of three districts inhabited, as on the average they happen to be, by about forty lakhs of people. Among this population one is to imagine that there are only fifty thousand "old" men each of whom independently earns less than five hundred rupees a year who, therefore, are considered poor enough by the government to deserve a total public charity of 14 million francs (=87 lakhs of rupees). Indians would encounter here in the first place, an absolutely new standard of life, comfort, health and efficiency, and in the second place, a thoroughly revolutionary—should one call it socialistic or communistic?—conception of the "functions of the state."

* See the chapters on "Legislation on Insurance" and "A Cross-Section of Swiss Economics" in *Economic Development*.

CHAPTER IV

EUROPE THROUGH FRENCH EYES.

BRITISH FINANCE.

The *Societe d'Economie Politique* of Paris, the leading association of French economists, has recently had for its subject of discussion the monetary problems and labour question of Great Britain. The present industrial crisis in England, characterized as it is by unemployment figuring at $1\frac{1}{4}$ million, is generally considered among English people to be due to the policy pursued by the British government during the last four years with a view to the restoration of credit. According to French economists, this view is wrong.

During the war Great Britain like all other countries had recourse to inflation. The banks issued enormous credits. As a consequence living became dear. Speculation was active. Creditors were

ruined to the profit of the debtors. There was unrest among the working classes and to a certain extent also a diminution in the productivity of the concerns. The situation forced a policy of deflation.

Along with deflation came budget retrenchments. The floating debt was reduced by conversion into long-term loans. The issue of currency notes was limited. The Bank of England raised the rate of discount while at the same time the amount of deposits in the banks diminished. While this policy was being practised there was no opposition, not even a protest, so to speak, on the side of publicists. But as soon as the crisis appeared, the deflation began to be condemned as the source of all evil, said M. Guebhard, the main speaker at the association.

But, have deflation and retrenchment harmed England in any way? According to Guebhard, the fall in prices began in England long before the financial deflation was inaugurated. From 525 in March 1920, the index number fell to 231 in December of the same year. But deflation

began with 1921, and so cannot be said to have originated the cheaping of the cost of the living.

Can deflation be held responsible for the unemployment? No, answers Guebhard. Why do the British goods fail to capture the foreign markets? One main reason, says he, is that the British government is artificially continuing to keep the wages at a very high level such as was reached during the war period of inflation. It is these high wages that render British prices almost prohibitive for the foreign market.

According to Guebhard, it is not desirable for England to have recourse to inflation as has been suggested in one form or another by prominent English theorists and statesmen, for it can only lead to the same crisis as in 1920 or even worse. The wages should be allowed to *seek their natural level* and become lower. And the financial policy should continue in the direction of retrenchment etc., such as has been in operation since the end of 1920.

Professor Colson of the *Conservatoire*

des Arts et Metiers (Technical College) of Paris said: "Unemployment in England has been aggravated by the artificial obstacles created by the Government. The war which caused a great wastage in wealth should have been followed by a period of greater activity and less consumption on the part of men. But throughout the world an entirely opposite policy has been followed. The working classes are now being endowed with a higher standard of life and shorter hours of work. The adaptation of wages and prices to the 'scientific' levels has thus been consciously retarded."

"In England the protectionist measure as embodied in the Anti-dumping and Safeguarding of British Industries Acts," said Colson further, "have contributed unduly to raise the cost of living and also the rates of wages. Exports therefore have tended to diminish. To remedy the present state of affairs there should be more production and less consumption. And with this end in view all artificial restrictions should be abolished."

THE GERMAN CROWN PRINCE.

At the last Congress of the *Ligue des Droits de l'Homme* (Society of the Rights of Man), the celebrated French historian, Professor Aulard, who is well-known for having played the role of an idealist in public life as a contributor to *Justice*, has declared his views on the Franco-German situation in the following manner: "I am not a follower of Poincare," says he, "but that France has every reason to suspect Germany's intentions and plans one can safely conclude from the fact that even three Socialist ministers of the German republic have permitted the Crown Prince to return to Germany. What does this mean? German Government has asserted that the return has been permitted on purely humane grounds, as if one could ignore the political consequences of such a step!"

In *Depeche de Toulouse* Professor Aulard has expressed himself more clearly on the subject. According to him the return of the Crown Prince can very well

be the prelude to a restoration of monarchy and to the next step, the war of revenge. The German Government has assured the world that the Crown Prince has renounced his claims to the throne. Conceding that he would remember his act of renunciation, what is there to prevent him from being used as the hope and instrument of thousands of soldiers, officers and others who are out of employment and to whom the adventure of restoration is a veritable means of livelihood?—asks Aulard. Then, again, one may say that the Crown Prince personally is a mediocre man and happens to be unpopular in any case. But one should remember that the people of Germany in 1923 are not what they were in the autumn of 1918. The flight of the Hohenzollerns, from their homeland at the most critical turn of its history had made them into objects of hatred. The republican form of government was pounced upon as something which would bring peace and happiness to the country. But the experience of the last five years has, we are told, dis-

illusioned the Germans of the blessings of a republic. They are to-day psychologically prepared to forget the sins of the Hohenzollerns and accept anybody who as leader would promise to save the people from hunger and cold.

The fall of the mark and the consequent rise of prices, in other words, the higher cost of living has totally demoralized the German nation, says Aulard. The working classes and the trade-unions have lost their power on society, both economic and moral. Even in 1922, according to the French historian, nobody in Germany could dare suggest or wish the return of the Hohenzollerns, for the nationalists, the imperialists of the right wing knew that the "left," the labour parties, would not tolerate it. But in the course of a year the "right" have won considerable ground in public life. German atmosphere to-day is fearfully nationalistic.

Who is responsible for the growth in strength of the nationalists in Germany? asks Aulard. "The French Government,"

is his reply. In his estimation the occupation of the Ruhr was the greatest strategic blunder. It has led to the weakening of the working-class organizations in Germany and raked up all the worst anti-French sentiments and prejudices in every section of the German people, thereby giving a fresh lease to the propaganda and party of the nationalists. "If we had not marched into the Ruhr," as the article in the *Depeche* goes on, "the Crown Prince could not have come back to Germany, and the German nationalists could not have become almost the dictators of German politics." Aulard had always opposed the French action in the Ruhr, even while it was being contemplated.

THE EXPANSION OF ITALY.

In French journals Mussolini's foreign politics are being characterised as "*chicanes internationales*" (international chicanery). The *Matin* of Paris considers it highly impertinent that Italy should have demanded a seat at the conference

on Tangier which took place a few days ago in London between England, France and Spain. Not less preposterous in French thought is Mussolini's demand that even in regard to the economic discussions over the Ruhr, Italy should have a place.

In regard to Switzerland France has become unpopular by cancelling the free trade zone in the neighbourhood of Geneva. Italy, says the French journal, is trying to cajole herself into Swiss favour by offering a bit of Italian territory, the city of Vado, as free hinterground for Savonne.

These little chicaneries, we are to understand, are but tantamount to pin-pricks administered to France by Italy. But all these acquire a general significance when one takes into account the Corfu enterprise against Greece and the Adriatic policy of Mussolini which is a menace to Jugoslavia and a standing challenge to France. Add to all this the recent manifestations of "friendship" and "cultural intimacy" between the Spanish and Italian peoples on the occasion of the visit of the

King and Queen of Spain to Italy. In this connection, the *El Debate* of Madrid is cited by the *Matin* to indicate that behind the theatrical fraternizing and *rapprochement* the Italians and Spaniards are remembering the secret treaty of 1887 which is alleged to have been inspired by Bismarck as a measure having for its object the isolation of France.

During the last fourteen months Mussolini has succeeded with his "iron fist" in bringing financial and political order into being at home. He is now looking abroad. The Mediterranean, and together with it the North African, question is naturally the first and the foremost. The *debut* was made at Corfu, which although ostensibly directed against Greece has served to open the eyes of the Powers. With Spain he assures himself of the Western key as well as of the base in the Balearic Isles.

In order to be sure of the eastern gates—the "Porte," the Black Sea, Mussolini is now going to confer a *de jure* political recognition on Soviet Russia. Altogether

the politics of Fascistical expansion have compelled French politicians to be up and doing. The King of Yugoslavia has suddenly had a tooth to attend to for which a visit to the Paris dentists became an absolute necessity. For, France has once again to face the question : How can she effectively counteract the impending isolation ?

CHAPTER V.

EVOLUTION OF THE ANGORA TURK.

THE ABOLITION OF THE CALIPHATE.

Another surprise has been sprung upon the world by the New Turk. The facts are well known. On the 4th of March (1924) the National Assembly of Angora has deposed the Caliph and abolished the Caliphate. The ministry of religious affairs has also been suppressed and its functions transferred to a bureau of the premier. The Turkish republic has at the same time taken the most hasty steps to relieve Constantinople of every member, male and female of the Caliph's family. Thirty-two princes and thirty-nine princesses have had to share the fate of the Caliph. A new cabinet has been instituted in keeping with the policy of these reforms.

The European press is amazed over the incidents and watching the developments in the Moslem world. But those

who have followed with care the intellectual make-up of the Angora statesmen were not unprepared for this latest achievement of Young Turkey.

The New Turk has come to business in an all-comprehensive spirit. This is why Professor Mustafa Nermi of Constantinople writing on the establishment of the republic in Turkey in the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* (Berlin) has ventured to make the following statement: "The influences which the new republic have set in operation in Asia and Africa are much greater than what the French revolution did for Europe. The races of Asia and Africa have come to realise that their freedom lies in their own hands. From this standpoint the Turkish revolution is a significant landmark in the life of oppressed nationalities."

THE CRIMEAN WAR AND MODERNISM.

The present abolition of the Caliphate like the previous abolition of the Sultanate is the crowning step in the modernization

which has been slowly but steadily attacking Turkish life since the Crimean War of 1855. In European and American estimation all these items would indeed indicate but so many stages in the spiritual conquest of the East by the West. And Turkey no less than Japan is honest enough to admit this without camouflage. Perhaps rightly described, it should be called the overthrow of the medieval by the modern.

What the Opium War was to China, what the Bombardment of Shimonoseki by the European and American navies was to Japan, what the Battle of Mohammerah was to Persia, what the so-called Sepoy Mutiny was to India, that was the Crimean War to Turkey. Each of those events of the middle of the nineteenth century (1848-57) registered the fall of Old Asia before the might of a new spirituality. And that spirituality was none other than the force operating the alleged materialism of Eur-America incorporated as it had been in the industrial revolution since the employment of the steam engine in

manufacture and transportation (c 1776). In those defeats and failures lay the beginnings of Young Asia,—an Asia determined to master the new spirit and to demonstrate to mankind that the edge of the Damascus blade has not been dulled for good."

"Awake, O Turks!"

It was during the days of the Crimean War that there arose in Turkey something like a popular agitation in public affairs. According to Nermi, Turkish life was not yet ripe for a clear-cut "public opinion." But the storm and stress could not in any case fail to be watched by the Sultan's court. The monarch, however, knew how to play upon the feelings of the people by referring to glorious military exploits of their forefathers far and near. The result was that loyalty to the monarchical form of Government was not shaken among the leaders of Turkey even under the unspeakable maladministration of Sultan Abdul Hamid. At the revolution of 1908 the Young Turk accepted therefore the

postulate of a "constitutional" monarchy as a matter of course.

In the celebrated poem "Awake, O Turks!" by Mehmed Emin we touch this phase in the evolution of Turkish politics. A conquering monarchy almost on the lines of the legendary patriarchs of Central Asia was the ideal along which the mind of the people was being trained. That the people also are to participate in the government of the country was hardly if at all thought of in those days. It was the imperialistic designs of the European powers bent as they were upon the partition and annexation of Turkey that forced democracy upon the Turkish intellectuals and patriots. The problem of people *vs.* crown thus came upon Turkey almost as an accident.

The monarchs indeed tried to introduce reforms on the western model in order to strengthen their position in the state. But these reforms were eclipsed by the medieval-partriarchal institutions which constituted the foundations of Osmanic culture. The sultans failed to

contribute to their Empire what Peter the Great accomplished for Russia in the line of westernization. While the European monarchies were advancing step by step in cultural and economic development there is not a single institution of any worth, says Nermi, which might be pointed to as the handiwork of the Osmons. And why did the Osmons fail? Simply because in all their reform schemes they looked primarily to their dynastic interests. The advancement of the fatherland lay outside the sphere of their intention and energy. Ultimately they succeeded only in leading the country in to financial muddle and bankruptcy such as entailed all sorts of foreign control and complications.

THE LAST DAYS OF THE SULTANATE (1908-1922.)

The revolution of 1908 was addressed to a particular internal problem. But the parliamentary constitution established by the Young Turk was in itself not capable

of solving the foreign difficulties. The Balkan Wars proved to be too strong for the new democracy and served but to divert the sympathies of the people once more towards the monarchy. The alliance of Turkey with the Hohenzollerns and Habsburgs during the Great War gave an additional impulse to the strengthening of the Sultanate.

Anti-monarchical enthusiasm of the Turks ran high, however, with the fall of the Czar in Russia (1917) and the failure of the Turkish and Central-European armies (1918). The Bolshevik revolution also did not fail to impress the Young Turk very deeply. But the last straw that broke the camel's back was the indifference of the Sultan in regard to the people's interests in connection with the peace-treaty which was signed at Paris. Sevres (1920) proved to be the grave of the Turkish monarchy.

The Meaning of Angora.

In order to do away with the old order of things the most important problem for

the patriots of New Turkey was to get their nation purged of the atmosphere and tradition associated with Constantinople. No decision has been more weighty than the one which sought to declare the authority of the "eternal city" null and void in every sense and establish an altogether new centre of influence at an absolutely raw and more or less unknown spot. The transfer of the central Government to Angora acquires thus more than a mere theatrical significance.

The government of Angora under Kemal Pasha succeeded in undoing by its military successes the unpatriotic actions of the Sultan's court at Constantinople. The internal rebellions were crushed. The French were compelled to realize the limits of their ambition on the southern border. Finally came the Greeks to taste a bit of the new might. Angora's efforts were crowned with the evacuation of Thrace by Greece and the establishment of real Turkish sovereignty over Constantinople (October, 1922).

Naturally the most important limb of

the state was no longer the puppet monarch at the old capital but the new organ of popular government, the National Assembly at Angora. And as ill luck would have it, the last Sultan was at this very moment of glory for his land and people signing a treaty of protectorate with England. What else could the Young Turk do with such a man except give him the liberty to enjoy sea voyage on an English man of war with permission never to return to his native country (November, 1922)?

The monarchy was abolished. But the Caliphate remained. It was however made elective. In another year Angora was declared to be the capital and the republic formally announced (October, 1923). And now comes the decision that the Caliphate also is to go. The Caliph has had to leave Turkey as peremptorily as the Greek king a few months ago his own territory.

Thus comes to a close the chapter of Western Asian history which began with the establishment of the Union and Pro-

gress Party whose activities since 1908 have had aroused mingled feelings of appreciation and misapprehension in the widest circles of mankind in the East and the West. The Angora Turk begins with a clean slate. And the first words he has chosen to inscribe on it are "democratic" and "secular."

CHAPTER VI.

THE RACE FOR RUSSIA.

MUSSOLINI'S PROMISE TO THE SOVIETS.

Early next month (March 1924) an international *Messe* (exhibition) is going to be held at Vienna. An important section is to be given over to the Russian interests.

Ever since Mussolini announced to the Italian Parliament last December that he would recognize Soviet Russia as a *de jure* state and that he was expecting some substantial concessions for the industries and shipping interests of Italy in return there has been started in Western Europe a regular race as to which of the powers is to capture the Russian trade first and as far as possible monopolize it for some long time to come.

The bankers of Vienna have for quite a while been serving as sponsors for Russia in the money market of Central Europe. The industrial heads of Germany, for

instance the Borsing Co., the railway magnates of Berlin, are already on the fair way to commence operations in the Bolshevik republic.

The death of Lenin is not being interpreted in Western European financial circles as of any special political or economic significance. The tendency is to treat Russia as a normal land so far as things can be said to have attained a normal level since the end of the war.

RUSSIAN IMPORTS AND EXPORTS.

The Russian experts of the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* (Berlin) have collected some fresh information in regard to the developments of Russia's foreign trade. We are told on the authority of the Soviet official organ, the *Ekonomitscheskaja Schisn* (of Moscow), that metals and machines constituted 37·7 per cent. of Russian imports during 1922-23. The next item in importance, raw material for textile industry, accounted for 18·2 per cent. Chemicals and fuels came up to 11·6 and 9·1 per cent. respectively.

During the same period Russia sent abroad food stuffs which constituted 38·4 per cent. of the entire export. Raw materials and semi-manufactured goods together made up about 60 per cent.

For the first time since the war has Russia appeared on the European market as supplier of corn. The lion's share has come to Great Britain.

ENGINEERING WORKS.

Last summer there were in Russia 26 electrical works in operation employing 14·983 working men. These are grouped under 4 trusts, says the *Berichte aus den neuen Staaten* (Vienna).

Soviet Russia is financially sound enough to venture on town-planning and engineering exploits. The city of Moscow is going to have an underground railway. The Soviet government has taken up the matter with the engineers of Berlin.

The air-line between Moscow and Nishni-Novgorod has been in operation

since last summer as well as the line Moscow-Nikolajewsk. There are several projects before the "Dobroljot" air navigation company, says the *Iswestia* of Moscow, including three lines in Central Asia and two in Kirgis. The most ambitious plan contemplates reaching Vladivostock from Petrograd in 56 hours, the railway journey demanding, as it does, 8 days. The strength of the air-fleet consists at present of 22 German ships (Junkers Co.) and 2 English machines.

TAXATION.

As is well known, the industries are very heavily taxed in Russia. In 1923 the total industrial production was estimated at 1,100,000 gold rubles. Of this sum the government's share comprises 28,000 as income tax, 108,000 as excise, 8,000 as fees, and 45,000 as customs, i.e., altogether 17 per cent of the value. To this has to be added another 3 per cent as local rates. One-fifth of the entire production of industries belongs thus to the state.

BANKING DEVELOPMENTS.

One aspect of the economic reconstruction in Russia has not failed to arrest the attention of recent visitors. It is said that the number of savings banks has been monthly on the increase. The first savings bank of the Soviet republic was opened in February 1923. From 813 in February the number of persons who have taken advantage of this institute has grown in seven months to 29,644. During the same period the amount of savings collected has risen from 26,385 to 1,665,070 gold rubles.

Another important item in Russia's public finance has called for notice in a correspondent's article in the *Neue Zuercher Zeitung* (Zuerich). The capital of the State Bank of Russia founded early in 1923 has been raised from time to time until by December it rose to 50 million gold rubles. This bank issues a new money known as Tscherwonez which is covered by gold deposits to the extent of 25 per cent. The Tscherwonez is equi-

valent to 10 gold rubles of 1913 (=Rs. 15). While the paper ruble continues still to be the legal tender, the Tscherwonez fluctuates in a fixed ratio with all foreign monies. A "stable" currency has thus been in operation in Soviet Russia for a longer period than in Germany.

PROF. GIDE'S REPORT.

Professor Charles Gide, the well-known economist of France has come back from a study trip to Moscow and reports in the *Quotidien* (Paris) that the "co-operatives" have proved to be the most helpful factors in Russia. He congratulates himself on the fact that the principle of co-operation in economic enterprises which has all along been a life-blood to him, although not very well established in his *patrie* has been serviceable in the Soviet-land in its misfortunes.

Gide has admitted to a Swiss interviewer from Basel that when "one compares the condition of the Russian peasants and working men to-day, with what it was under the Czars one is bound

to concede that the improvement under the Soviet regime is remarkable". The official leaning of France towards the Russian side is therefore already apparent in the writings of the *Petit Parisien* (Paris).*

* For the development of the later phases in Russian economic life with special reference to labour see *L'évolution des conditions du travail dans la Russie des Soviets* (Geneva 1924) published by the Bureau International du Travail (International Labour Bureau). *Vide* also the chapters on Russian Economics in *Economic Development*. The civil, marriage and family laws may be seen in Patouillet's *Les Codes de la Russie Soviétique* (Paris 1925). *Russlands Neue Wirtschaftspolitik* (Leipzig, 1924) by Fuckner and *Russlands Friedens und Handels verträge* (Leipzig, 1924) by Freund are useful in a study of economic and commercial policies.

CHAPTER VII.

RE-ACTIONARY TENDENCIES IN EUROPEAN PUBLIC LIFE.

ANGLO-AMERICAN LOAN TO FRANCE.

The fall of the French franc has been arrested to the extreme surprise of the businessmen both in France and abroad, as one understands from the *Journee Industrielle* (Paris). One might naturally suspect if the extraordinary fiscal measures involving, as they do, the all-round raise of taxation by 20 per cent and so forth would at all be necessary.

The situation has been saved by an Anglo-American loan. The Morgan Bank of New York took the lead in helping France out of the crisis. To a French journalist, Mr. Pierpont Morgan is said to have expressed his views on the French difficulties in the following manner: "As we saw with what great confidence the French people was defending itself against

the offensive on the franc and instead of imitating bad examples (German) was prepared to undergo every possible sacrifice we felt we must respect this nation exactly as once before we felt compelled to honour its heroism in war. We have only proved that financial people, howsoever egoistic they may be condemned to be, know when to do their duty."

In other words, France continues to enjoy the friendship, hard-headed as it must be, of "high finance" among the late comrades in war. The occasion has thus furnished an index to the success which Poincaré's foreign policy has been able to maintain. The repercussion of this Anglo-American loan on the home-politics of France is unquestionable.*

At the *Chambre des deputes* Poincaré was challenged by Herriot with the following statement: "The improvement in the rate of exchange has no connection with

* The financial situation of France has been discussed in "Sidelights on the Economics of Reparations" in *Economic Development*.

the fiscal measure which is being carried out by the Government". The retort from Poincaré's side was immediate, as follows : "Yes, but without this measure the loan would not have been forthcoming." Morgan's reference to "every possible sacrifice" and French self-confidence in the face of the offensive against the franc certainly points to this. The result is that Poincaré's party, *i.e.*, the French nationalists are almost sure of a triumphant victory at the coming elections.

The success of "nationalism" spells in these days a recrudescence of dictatorship and the eclipse of democracy. Anti-democratic tendencies are indeed in the air throughout Europe. During the coming summer three European parliaments are to be renewed, in France, in Italy and in Germany, and a Swiss writer in the *Neue Zuercher Zeitung* fears that, so far as the near future at any rate is concerned, the prophecy of Professor Oswald Spengler in his widely circulated book, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* (The Downfall of the West), is going to be

fulfilled. According to Spengler, Western civilization is now ripe for despotism and negation of democracy.

MUSSOLINI'S ORATION AGAINST DEMOCRACY.

While a nationatist election is being considered to be almost a certainty in France, Mussolini has come forward without "buts" and "ifs" in a public utterance. "Liberal" Italian journals like the *Corriere della Sera* of Milan are giving more than ordinary importance to it by refusing to comment on it, and Giolitti's *Stampa* of Turin by not daring to condemn it. The occasion was the anniversary of the founding of the Fascists as a political party.

Speaking at Costanzi Theatre (Rome) before 4,000 Fascist mayors who came from all over Italy to attend the ceremonies Mussolini declared himself categorically against Amendola and the ex-minister Di Cessaro, both leaders of the democratic party. Among other things he said: "The postulates of democracy were good enough for the nineteenth

century. They must now be replaced by the principles of the *national state*. I am anti-democrat because I am convinced that most of the evils which have befallen Italy and which would have brought the country to the verge of ruin are to be ascribed to democracy and democratic scepticism". Swiss observers report that Mussolini must have had his Machiavelli before him while preparing this tirade against democracy.

HITLER AND LUDENDORFF ADMIRER BY THE PROSECUTION E.

Movements in Germany are tending in the same direction. The dissolution of the *Reichstag* has thrown the land into the turmoil of a general election in which one thing that comes prominently to the notice of persons used to the American two-party and the British three-party (?) system is the multiplicity of groups and *Fraktionen* as they are called, each with its programme and organ. But the socialists and democrats are almost sure that the German republic, although enjoying as it

does the constitution of Weimar (1919), "the most democratic constitution" of the world on paper, is waiting to be bossed this time by the nationalists, and curiously enough, their adjutants, the communists. The nationalist party has at its head Dr. Helfferich, a theorist on money and finance, who played a prominent rôle in Germany during the war and before.

A feeler has already been thrown out by the German people. The trial of the nationalist Hitler and General Ludendorff at Munich has ended in their being legally condemned to 8 and 2 years respectively. But the atmosphere of the prosecution is apparent from the fact that the state advocate even while condemning the accused did not hesitate to express his admiration for the character of Hitler.

And in regard to Ludendorff the conviction ended with words like the following: "Even where he violated the law of the land he has shown himself to be a true man and a brave soldier. His reputation as General remains unshaken. He placed himself at the head of the movement

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although he was not unaware of the possibility of its failure, solely because as a real man and a brave soldier he wanted to be the first to be struck by the bullet. It is Ludendorff's selfless devotion to the cause of the German people that is responsible for his participation in what in any case is a crime of the highest order."

In socialist and democratic papers the punishments are being considered to be too low since the crime was treason. The *vossische Zeitung* of Berlin remarks;—"Never had criminals charged with high treason and armed war against the constituted authorities been so sweetly and lovingly treated as Hitler & Co., by the Court of Munich." According to the '*Vorwaerts*' the organ of official socialism (Berlin) the convictions are high enough for Munich, the nucleus as it is of nationalistic propaganda, although they set a premium by all means on treason.

But the nationalist organ of Berlin, the *Lokal Anzeiger*, would have nothing to do with a court which punishes Luden-

dorff. In the estimation of this daily it is nothing short of a "shame for the German nation," a "German tragedy" that "a German court of justice should have pronounced through German lips a sentence such as that passed on Ludendorff."

CHAPTER VIII

EUROPE'S REACTIONS TO NEW TURKEY.

THE EX-CALIPH AND INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS.

As ex-Caliph Abdul Mejid has issued a proclamation to the Mussalmans of the world in order to right the wrong done him by the National Assembly of Angora. The *Temps*, of Paris, wonders if it is agreeable for Swiss Republic to undertake the responsibilities involved in the political propaganda which he proposes to carry on as the guest of a neutral State.

The *Neue Zuercher Zeitung*, of Zuerich, complains that Abdul Mejid by violating the right of asylum granted to him as a private gentleman is likely to create unpleasant situations for Switzerland such as may lead to European complications.

The *Temps* cites texts from the Koran as well as from learned Islamic jurists in

order to indicate that Abdul Mejid's appeal can hardly possess any legal value. The kind of council which he wants to convoke is said to be unwarranted by the tradition of Islam.

The French daily believes that what the National Assembly has decided, *viz.*, that the powers of the Caliph henceforth rest in that popular body itself is an accomplished fact.

In the meantime King Hussein of Arabia, who in the French estimation is but an "English creature", has already been elected Caliph. The *Temps* remarks: "The election is inadmissible. The Koran as interpreted by Maderidi and Ali, well respected in India, says that the Commander of the Faith cannot be a person who lives in a land that is subject to non-Muhammedan authority."

The *Journal de Geneve* asks:—"But is the post of the Caliph really vacant? Abdul Mejid himself declares that his deposition is unconstitutional, that he has never abdicated and that he is to-day as ever before the Caliph of the Mussalmans."

According to this Swiss organ, the British Government "although it pretends to remain neutral" is quite interested in the events. The election of King Hussein to the Caliphate suits the British game nicely. For Great Britain finds in it the means of repairing the several damages it has suffered in the East.

THE PROS AND CONS OF PAN-ISLAM.

Reports from Constantinople in the French Press state that the abolition of the Caliphate had become a "constitutional necessity" in the eyes of the nationalists. The presence of Ottoman princes, no matter under what name, has been considered by Ismet Pasha to be dangerous to the "future of the republic." There are more radical elements in the Assembly, who like Shukry Bey of Smyrna, free thinkers as they are, intend to carry matters to the furthest limits in respect of secularization and modernization.

The representatives from Angora are said to have declared that the Caliphate has never rendered any good to Turkey

but has only served to divert the attention of the people from genuine national interests to the "wild goose chase" of Pan-Islam. The New Turkey should in their opinion bid good bye to that misleading policy by which the Turks were being taught to fraternize with peoples with whom there was no affinity of race or sentiment. From now on the Turks are to devote their energies to themselves.

The Italian papers have published a communication from Lloyd George in which it is said that the secularization of politics among the Mussalmans is likely to change the character of Islam. A new energy and a fresh lease of life for the peoples professing this faith are expected to be the consequences.

The "unspeakable Turk" of Anglo-American Jingoism seems in any case to be quite an agreeable creature with British Liberals. The abolition of the Caliphate appears to suit well the political philosophies of organs like the *New Statesman* and the *Nation*.

For, is not this step calculated to

promote the breach in the Moslem world which has begun with the overthrow of the Sultanate? They are congratulating themselves, further, on the ground that the united front presented by the Mussalmans of India in their co-operation with the Hindus is likely to be impaired by the controversy that is sure to be quite exciting on the questions as to the new form of the Caliphate and its new seat.

TURKEY AND GERMANY.

The Turks had been comrades to Germans during the war against the British Empire. But later, while it was mainly the French support that is alleged to have enabled Kemal Pasha to browbeat Great Britain in Greece, German public opinion could hardly enthuse itself over the situation. France cannot be tolerated by the Germans under any circumstances, even though she should help their old allies.

Now, however, that the Angora Government has come out openly with its thoroughly non-theocratic policy not only

the Moslem institutions of theology but the French *écoles* as well are to disappear. Turkish atmosphere, freed presumably as it appears to be from an extra dose of *la civilisation française*, is once more becoming congenial in German estimation. And it is at this stage that an exchange of diplomatic establishments between Angora and Berlin has taken place.

It is necessary to remember that of all the Asian races it is the Turks that occupy the greatest attention of the European men of letters and publicists in a systematic and serious way. The barometer of public opinion in Europe is very sensitive to the happenings in Turkey, even more so than to those in Japan. Every incident in the developments of the Young Turk is watched, criticised, appreciated or condemned by the continental Press in the most zealous manner. And on practically every item connected with Turkey the different European nations and parties are bound to differ, oriented as each happens to be to its own perspective of "larger view-points."

THE MOSUL QUESTION IN FRANCE.

European journalism on "recent" affairs in Turkey is very interesting from this angle of vision. Let us take Lausanne.

Neither Great Britain nor France has yet ratified the Treaty of Lausanne. Some time ago the *Temps*, the *Matin* and other French organs were pressing their Government to ratify it as soon as possible. To counteract this pressure on Government and public opinion the *Echo de Paris* published an article from M. Pertinaux.

"It is only those politicians of France who pursue Anglophobia in a most blind manner," said Pertinaux, "that have led our Government into a policy of weakness in regard to Turkey. And they are still harping on the same string. They believe that England will have to settle the question of Mosul by the 24th of April and it is therefore according to them very desirable that Turkey should be helped by France in this connection in such a

manner that French interests be safeguarded against an eventual British preponderance."

But in the estimation of Pertinaux, these Anglophobes forget that England is not bound to decide the Mosul issue within a fixed period of time, and that should any difficulties ultimately arise the problems may come up before the League of Nations, an institution not much liked by the Turks. In any case, according to the *Echo de Paris*, it is Angora and not Britain that has to face an *impasse* at the present moment. Should France now proceed aggressively to extend support to the Turks against a suspected British upper hand, she would, in the opinion of this journal, only be exhibiting another proof of her international weakness.

THE IMPOTENCE OF EUROPE.

This aspect of the French view is shared by the Swiss *Journal de Geneve*. According to this organ, an "eternal shame for Europe" is embodied in the concessions which the year 1923 has con-

ferred on the Angora Turks through the Lausanne Conference. It is curious, says the leading journal of French Switzerland, that the English who from beginning to end were anti-Turk should have finally won the Turks over to their side, while France who during the proceedings of the Conference was all along friendly to Angora should have obtained hardly any concession from the New Turk. Through British help the Young Turk is said to have got almost whatever he wanted. He has therefore served to assure in exchange the triumph of Great Britain over France in Near Eastern diplomacy.

Nothing exhibits the "appalling impotence of contemporary Europe," says the Geneva journal, more than the fact that the great powers, masters as they happened to be of the Bosphorus and the Sea of Marmora by their navies and possessing command as they did over Constantinople and other Turkish cities without which the new Angora Government could hardly subsist any longer, should still have "submitted to the

demands of a petty nation of some eight millions exhausted and ruined by ten years of war."

ISMET PASHA'S "DESPOTISM".

In regard to the overthrow of the Sultanate, another recent event, a French-Swiss journalist wrote that Angora had excited the worst anti-Angora feelings among the Mussalmans of the world. The "*mussulmans hindous*," i.e., the Mussalmans of India (*hindou* is synonym for Indian in French) were described as having been the most vehement in their protest against the conduct of Angora. Their open letter to Kemal Pasha demanded, it was alleged, the restoration of all authority to the successor of the late Caliph.

The agitation from the side of the "Hindu Mussalmans" found, it was said further, echo in numerous circles of Turkey itself both among the masses who in spite of the revolution are still clinging to their old faith as well as among the

elite, especially of Constantinople, who did not see much good in parting with the old Ottoman traditions. The fact that several prominent journals of the old Turkish capital have actually had the courage to publish the Indian protest lends colour to the contention of the Swiss writer.

What, one was asked to note, did Ismet Pasha, late foreign minister and at present the first Commissar of the people, who posed as the champion of democracy at Lausanne, done in regard to the situation that arose? He induced the National Assembly of Angora to depute an extraordinary tribunal charged with the mission of extirpating all those elements that appear "in his eyes" to be dangerous to the "future of the republic." Further, he had several officials arrested who were alleged to have been interested in the restoration of the old order. In the Assembly itself he engaged his followers to repulse every move from the liberal side that might thwart his autocratic measures. Ismet Pasha, one was to understand, was

verily behaving as a proper ally of the Bolshevik Russians.

A FRENCH AUTHOR ON TURKISH CHARACTER.

Such Europeans as are oriented to Turkey in an unfriendly manner are, therefore, reading with great satisfaction the book entitled '*Le drame oriental d'Athene à Angora* (The Oriental Drama from Athens to Angora) recently published in Paris. The author, M. Bertrand Bareilles, passes in France for an historian of authority on the problems of the Near East. His judgments in regard to the Turkish character are being endorsed by people who believe that Ismet and Kemal are, so to say," out-sultaning the Sultan in the arbitrary rule, brutality and tyranny perpetrated by the present dictatorial regime."

"Conscious of her decadence and impotent to react," says Bareilles, "Turkey reveals herself spasmodically in and through the efforts of war-vitality which, once they are calmed, leaves her more enervated. All her history is to be

found in these crises of exaltation followed by fatal depression."

ADMINISTRATIVE AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS.

All the same, a Swiss correspondent reports from Constantinople that the new regime has been making "satisfactory" progress on the administrative side. Most of the important questions bearing on the constitution are said to have been solved. Only some of the powers of the Assembly remain yet to be defined.

In this connection it is interesting to observe that M. Sureya Bey, an energetic deputy of distinction, has proposed that a Council of State be created as a body authorized to examine and approve or reject, with the statement of reasons, whatever the Assembly may happen to decide. The Council is to be constituted on the basis of one member per 100,000 inhabitants, *i.e.*, to be composed altogether of 80 members, and is to function, if created, for twenty years.

Hostile propaganda in Europe and America notwithstanding, the Angora

Government should appear to have been enjoying, as one gathers from the report, the confidence of international finance with vengeance. Financiers are said to be flooding the economic department of the young republic with projects of "development" that extend from agricultural improvement and mining to electrification, aviation, and what not. Angora has grown into a veritable dumping-ground for the surplus wealth of all nations.

Among the members of the National Assembly there happen to be however a number of "technical experts" who are shrewd enough to judge as to which offers of capital and proposals of economic development are discussable in the best interests of Turkey and which constitute mere idealism. The tendency seems at present to be sceptical and cautious, at any rate thoroughly critical, so far as the legion of foreign projects are concerned. But, the cry is: "Still they come". Evidently Angora is a sound business proposition in the estimation of "high finance."

CHAPTER IX.

THE RISING TIDE OF GERMAN NATIONALISM.

ACQUITTAL OF LUDENDORFF.

It has been announced a few days ago that in the trial of Ludendorff, Hitler and other nationalists of Bavaria the public prosecutor found them guilty of high treason. Each was condemned to several years of imprisonment according to the gravity of the part played in the abortive revolution of Nov. 8, 1923.

The final judgment is telegraphed by Wolff's Agency to have been delivered to-day by the Court of Munich. The sentence reads in part as follows: "Ludendorff is acquitted. The expenses of the trial will be borne by the state."

Hitler and his leading companions get a fine of 200 marks and nothing more serious than practically a mere internment for six months. The sentence provides at

the same time for an eventual imprisonment for five years.

Such is "German justice," says the *Neue Zuercher Zeitung* which remembers how heavy were the punishments inflicted by the same Court on persons who had dared only to write and speak against the nationalists. That Ludendorff, the war-minister of Hitler's provisional government, should have been acquitted is a travesty of justice, says this Swiss daily, and betrays the cowardice of the judge to come out openly and say that this "demi-god of the Germans has really committed a treason."

The whole morning street processions with national songs are reported to have characterized the city of Munich. The court was surrounded by throngs of people who shouted "*Heil*" (nationalist greeting among comrades indicating glory, victory, good luck etc.) for Ludendorff and others.

Ludendorff spoke to the court as follows: "I consider my acquittal to be a shame for the uniform and insignia that

I am resolved upon accomplishing it some day."

Hitler's peroration is thus worded : "The event of Nov. 8, 1923 has not miscarried. Don't you see the signs of the times? The German nation has grown bolder and is surging like a high tide battered by storms. Our army has been growing from hour to hour and we are hoping to-day as ever that the hour of the great action will come. You may condemn us to be guilty but the judgment of God will tear your sentence to pieces and declare us free."

THE MESSAGE OF LUDENDORFF.

Ludendorff also had the chance to speak. He said : "I am proud that I am by the side of these men and that their fate also is to be mine. On 22 March 1909 began my fight for the nation. But I have been always misunderstood. My plan for compulsory conscription was rejected. During the war I demanded of my countrymen greater and greater sacrifices for the honour and fame of our

fatherland. But neither the authorities nor the people were ready to respond to that call. Then came the tragedy."

The situation since 1918 is described by Ludendorff in the following words: "Only in popular movements have I come across men that are prepared to serve the fatherland. Had this popular (national) spirit not permeated the widest circles of the people in the country the situation would have been far worse than that caused by the last war."

Ludendorff then spoke out his message to Germany: "If the national movement is not fulfilled," said he, "then we are lost for ever. We are experiencing another Versailles that is more calamitous than the other Versailles. Listen to my voice, hear in it the cry of the German soul for freedom."

GERMAN NATIONALISM *vs.* ENTENTE.

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of the industrialists of Germany under the auspices of the *Reichs-verband der deutschen Industrie* (Federation of German industries). The present chancellor of the German republic, Dr. Marx, was one of the speakers.*

Dr. Marx is reported to have said in part as follows: "Germany cannot but follow the politics of fulfilling the treaty of Versailles. How is it possible to think of a war of revenge? With walking sticks in our hands we cannot march against tanks and heavy artillery."

While the present administration thus does not seem to be following pacifism except as a matter of expediency it is found to be too docile by Dr. Helfferich, the leader of the nationalists and organizer of the opposition against the Marx-Stresemann regime. To a representative of the *Tribuna* of Rome Helfferich has declared that since August 11 (1923) the foreign

* The chapter on "Germany from Within" in *Economic Development* presents the positive background of the political happenings.

politics of the republic have been the most deplorable.

"The present government," said he, "has made too many sacrifices to France. There is a limit to the concessions we are ready to make. Germany, although disarmed, is not helpless. We have more than one card to play and we are also in a position to dictate our terms."

The Italian journal reports likewise that Helfferich expects the nationalist party to be preponderant in the coming elections. The nationalists will see to it, further, it is said, that "Germany be delivered from the absurd economic doctrines of Karl Marx."

It is to the atmosphere of this rising tide of German nationalism that the *Entente* has been orienting itself. The *Temps* considers it unnecessary to waste words with the Germans and advises the *Entente* to establish without delay the proposed military control over Germany.

CHAPTER X

THE SUCCESSORS OF POINCARE.

As in England and Germany the elections in France also have failed to ease the constitutional and political crisis. The orientation of parties indeed has changed and new men are appearing on the political stage. But the complexities, both internal and external, remain as ever, for the days of decisive majority are no more. The French cabinet no less than the German is going to be built up like the British on the compromise and higgling between party leaders.

ITALIAN OPINION.

Poincaré of course is to be off. But, says the *Popolo d'Italia* (Rome), the Fascist organ, "One need not expect any great change in French politics. In England, for instance, has anything new happened since Ramsay-Macdonald came into power? The French statesmen must

likewise have to act not so much according to their program and electioneering shibboleths as according to the actual conditions of the day."

According to the "liberal" daily of Milan, the *Corriere della sera* which *en passant* may be compared to the *Berliner Tageblatt*, the *Frankfurter Zeitung* and the *Manchester Guardian* in its general features, the change in *personnel* at Paris is bound to influence European developments to a considerable extent. The same view is shared by the *Stampa* of Turin, the organ of Sanator Giolitti, an opponent of Mussolini's.

POLITICAL PARTIES IN FRANCE.

It has to be noted that in the new *Chambre des deputes* the party of "right" will continue to be almost as strong numerically as all the parties of the "left" put together. The ruling 267 members of the left will have to face the "opposition" of 254 members of the *bloc national*. In addition there are the 19 royalists and 24 communists, these latter have succeeded

in almost doubling themselves during the recent campaign.

The names of the parties in France are almost misnomers. In reality they are misnomers everywhere. One understands hardly anything as to the methods or aims of the French political *groupements* from the name alone.

In the parliament of 1919 which has been reigning these five years the so-called "right" consisted of 186 members of the "republican and democratic entente", and 65 "left republicans". These made up the "national block".

The ruling coalition in the new *Chambre* will comprise 127 "radicals and radical-socialists", 39 "socialist-republicans", and 101 socialists. And these three groups constitute the so-called "left".

THE DEMANDS OF SOCIALISTS.

On what conditions are the socialists prepared to help organizing the government of the left block? There are two prominent tendencies among 101 socialists

One is represented by Paul Boncour, whose thesis has just been published in *Petit Parisien*.

According to Boncour the destiny of the new *Chambre* lies in the hands of the socialists. He would therefore influence the Socialist party to actively participate in the cabinet. But there is one condition on which he is prepared to co-operate with the other two groups of the left. And this is that about 50 per cent of the ministerial portfolios be entrusted to the socialists.

This standpoint is violently opposed by Leon Blum. He would have nothing to do with the proposed coalition of all the lefts. According to Blum the socialists should concentrate their energy for the next chance when like Ramsay-Macdonald they would be in a position to command the preponderating voice in cabinet-making.

The greatest extremism that French publicists of influence can conceive of to-day is to be found, it seems, in the political philosophy of the British labour ministry. The voice of the 24 communists

may for the present be left out of consideration.

THE COALITION.

In any case the "socialists" as such have not yet been able to capture the leading strings at the *Elysée*. They appear hardly to be in evidence. The men of the hour are those belonging to the other two hyphenated socialist or socialist-qualified parties, namely the "radicals and radical-socialists" (shortly, radicals) and the "socialist-republicans". Herriot is the most prominent of the former group, and of the latter the most talked-of and influential man is Painlevé.

Blum, Boncour, Herriot and Painlevé, all have had up till now only one item in common. They were all opposed to Poincaré. On questions of foreign policy they may continue still to be united at many points. But in internal affairs the greatest differences separate the socialists from the so-called radicals.

The *Journal des Débates*, an organ of the "nationalist block" says: "The radi-

cals have always championed the national interests of France" and asks: "How will it be possible for them to co-operate with the socialists, who are as a rule internationalists?" The nationalist *Temps* believes that the absence of common interests between the groups can hardly fail to shatter the new coalition. In any event, according to both these dailies, no appreciable change is likely to make itself felt in the general politics of France under the new government.

HERRIOT THE "RADICAL".

There are shrewd suspicions circulated in the *Quotidien* a journal of the left, to the effect that Herriot has already been won by Poincaré to his own viewpoints in public finance and foreign politics. Herriot has therefore been compelled to make a clean breast of his intentions.

To some of the journalists, says the Paris correspondent of the *Neue Zuercher Zeitung* (Zuerich), Herriot has declared in part as follows: "I am not a man for the republican concentration. I am going to

keep to my election-program, the program which has led us to victory. I wish the socialists should co-operate with us. Should they, however, stay away, I am going to form a homogeneous cabinet of the radicals. In any case, an association with the left wing of the national block is out of the question."

FINANCIAL MEASURES.

But all the same, the nationalist *Liberté* is in a position to announce that the financial measures of the Poincaré regime will be kept in tact by the incoming power. Both Herriot and Poincaré have declared to the press that the fate of the Franc is a subject with which nobody can afford to play, and that the balancing of the budget would occupy as great attention on his part as on that of Poincaré.

The socialists find themselves on this question at daggers drawn with the radicals. The *Paris Soir* and other left papers have been presenting the socialist demand to the effect that the raise of taxation by

20 per cent. which was sanctioned by Poincaré must be called off.

The radicals have not yet made any precise statements. But their hints are enough to set the foreign financial circles at rest. The franc is not oscillating, for the dollar-world feels assured that the Poincaré legislation would not be materially tampered with by the powers that be.

THE RUSSIAN QUESTION.

The question of the *de jure* recognition of Soviet Russia had been a strong point with Herriot as leader of the opposition against Poincaré, in and out of the Chamber. He travelled in Russia in order to study the conditions over there at first hand and has written extensively in the journals in order to educate French public opinion in favour of the Bolshevik federation. "Peace" with Russia figured at the head of the program of his foreign policy which he placed before the electors in the columns of the *Quotidien*.

But the journalists are surprised that since the elections Herriot has been talk-

ing hardly anything of the Soviets. In his declarations to the *Matin* one hears on the contrary, much about France's relations with Great Britain, Italy and America.

To a correspondent of the *Petit Parisien*, who wanted some definite statement in regard to Russia, Herriot has merely the following vague sentiments to give out. "We shall be very reasonable," said he. "We shall display good faith and we expect others also to display good faith. We cannot afford to be naive in our dealings with other nations."

THE FRENCH ARMY.

Herriot will then watch how Russia behaves and serve but to continue the general trend of Franco-Russian politics such as it was under Poincaré. The military laws and arrangements of France are also to be kept entire, as understands the *Journal de Genève*. Herriot insists on the necessity of keeping France armed and adapting his policy to that of the other nations. And as for reparations he is getting ready to work with indomitable

energy for "national revindications." Altogether, Herriot & Co. will not function as bad custodians of the mantle of Poincaré.

PAINLEVÉ'S INTERNATIONAL REPUTATION.

Among the new men on the political stage of France none is more well known abroad than Painlevé. He is one of the greatest mathematicians of the world and was elected to the *Académie des sciences* while quite young. He has played some part in international especially Asian affairs. A French deputation to China was headed by Painlevé several years ago and his sympathy with Chinese aspirations is appreciated by young China. It was his initiative, again, that enabled the intellectuals of France to invite the German scientist Einstein to Paris and thus restore, however haltingly it might be, the cultural intercourse with Germany.

Painlevé is not a novice in cabinet. He had been president of the ministry during the war in 1917 and had functioned also as war-minister. In a recently pub-

lished book Painlevé claims that had it not been for his own discrimination and personal appreciation neither General Petain nor General Foch would have succeeded in coming to the forefront in the army. Painlevé's name is popular among the soldiers.

AN ENEMY OF SOCIALISTS AND NATIONALISTS.

But so far as socialists are concerned there is much less support to be expected from them for Painlevé than for Herriot. The ministry of 1917 found its greatest enemy in the socialist camp. And it was through the daily attacks of Sembat, the socialist leader, that the Painlevé cabinet fell.

In regard to Germany, Painlevé is known to be a friend of the "democratic" elements and bitter enemy of the "nationalists." The *Matin* publishes the following statement of Painlevé: "WE must accomplish an act of humanity, but it is not to be an act of weakness. We must allow German democracy to get above water; but it is also necessary that

Germany's good will respond to ours. Berlin should have no false ideas about our attitude. If Germany does not care to understand this, it is so much the worse for herself."

GOOD WILL OR FORCE FOR GERMANY.

To a correspondent of the *Neue Zuercher Zeitung*, Painlevé has said in part as follows: "We do not demand from Germany more than the minimum of reparations. This however can be realised only when the German democrats employ their maximum strength in order to repair the devastated regions of France. But if the nationalists would choose to hinder the efforts of the workers for peace then Europe will have to witness another epoch of confusion leading to the politics of force and sanctions."

The legacy of Poincaré bids fair to be carefully looked after by his successors.*

* See the chapter on "Sidelights on the Economics of Reparations" in *Economic Development*.

CHAPTER XI.

THE NEW REICHSTAG.

On May 27th (1924) the second Reichstag of the German republic commenced its sittings under striking circumstances. The entrances as well as environs of the house of parliament were carefully guarded by the police. The streets and parks were crowded with spectators. Film operators were busy photographing the members as they entered the building, as well as the scenes outside. The police kept guard inside as well. Every seat was occupied by the members and visitors. Among these latter might be counted the diplomatic representatives of different nations. Journalists also presented a formidable body.

The parliament met but there was no "government". On the eve of the opening, the Marx Cabinet had resigned. So the new Reichstag came into the house without a ministry. A rare phenomenon in

parliamentary history, indicating once more how young German public life happens to be in constitutional matters.

COMMUNISM SELF-CONCIOUS.

Not less noteworthy are the incidents which marked the inauguration. Scarcely had Herr Bock, the octogenarian Socialist from Gotha, as "president of the Old," an institution comparable to the Japanese "*Genro*" in certain particulars, uttered the words: "I declare the Reichstag open" than the communists broke out in unison: "Set the prisoners free!" The cry was repeated for quite a few minutes and could hardly be drowned by the bell of the helpless chairman.

Suddenly came a communist up to the speaker's platform and declared: "The Communist members of the Reichstag who are still in prison must be released at once in order that they may take part in the proceedings of the assembly". The confusion was immense.

It was with great difficulty that the chairman succeeded in restoring order and

delivering the opening speech. As the names of the members were being called out another series of outbursts from the communist side served as comments on each. The name of young Prince Bismarck evoked the following cry: "Woe, that you are the grandson!" When General Ludendorff's turn came the house presented the spectacle of a pandemonium in noise. The "great admiral" Von Tirpitz was whistled out. Insulting hand-claps greeted the names of many a non-communist member.

The communists were restless all the while and as soon as the reading of the names was over they sent four of their orators to the pulpit in order to discuss without delay their immediate demands. But they were opposed by the "social-democrat" Dittmann and the "centrist" Fehrenbach who proposed that the constitution of the directorate should by all means be the first item of business. The communists had to give way.

But again as the agenda for the next day came in for discussion a communist

speaker interrupted the proceedings with an eloquent speech which he brought to a close with three *Hoch* (High, *i.e.*, Long live) cheers for the political prisoners. A warm response from the whole communist party greeted this initiative.

This was not all. The crowning event of the opening ceremony was the singing of the hymn of the proletariat, the war-song of the working men composed for the "Third International," the Bolshevik world-labour organization with headquarters at Moscow.

This proved to be a mighty challenge to the "right" wing of the Reichstag. And so the nationalists replied to communism with their own patriotic song, *Deutschland, Deutschland ueber alles* (Germany, Germany above all).

In German dailies the proceedings of the first day of the new Reichstag are being sarcastically characterized as *Der Saenger Krieg auf der Wartburg*. The reference is to the mediæval "battles" between the *Minnesingers* (minstrels), one of the most famous of which took place at

Wartburg in Thuringen. The fights of the *Kaviwallas* in Bengali musical tradition have not yet been forgotten in India.

THE RELATIVE STRENGTH OF THE PARTIES.

Evidently the most cantankerous element in the new German parliament is that furnished by the communist members. They can venture to be audacious because they form no negligible quantity. Of the 29 million men and women who came to the polls to exercise their franchise as many as nearly $3\frac{3}{4}$ millions have openly dared vote for the communists. The result is that communism as a political force is represented on the Reichstag by 62 persons.

To-day the communists are the fourth great power in Germany's political life. They are numerically almost equal to the "centrists" and constitute, proportionally speaking, two-thirds of the might embodied in either of the two most powerful groups, namely, the "social-democrats" and the *Deutsch-national* (German-nationalists). These two parties are

almost equal in number each being represented on the house by about 100 members. Neither, however, embodies more than 21 per cent., of the entire assembly.

Nobody will therefore be surprised that the communists are so conscious of their strength. This self-consciousness can be properly estimated only when one remembers that in the parliament of 1920 which came to a close in early spring there were only 15 communists and that they were backed in the country by an electoral force composed of not more than 600,000 persons. The gain in four or five years is tremendous, registering double the growth that communism has exhibited in the almost simultaneously elected French *Chambre des Deputes*. The world can now realize how powerfully the Russian ideal has been able to attack the German mind.

This is one side of the shield. The other side is equally interesting. While "extremism" in socio-economic and socio-political philosophy, such as bolshevism,

communism or Leninism is, has gained fourfold in half a decade, the loss on the part of German "moderatism" in the same field is too great to be overlooked. For the "social-democrats," or as they are usually known, the socialists have lost 66 places during the same period, being reduced to almost two-thirds of their previous numerical position. The 'democrats' also, who in 1920 were 39 in number have dwindled to 28 in the present campaign.

The consciousness of growth in strength is then going to be no mean factor in the methods and tactics of the German communists while they orient themselves to the other "liberal" parties that in their estimation are but decadent relics of good old days. The international significance of this fact is clear. Leninists are congratulating themselves that their message has found a firm footing in the hearts of nearly 3½ million men and women of Central Europe, a number as large as almost the entire population of Switzerland. And naturally from this landmark

quaintance with the political statistics. In cities like Bologna and Florence—in Central Italy—not more than 76 per cent. of the registered votes came to the polls while in Milan (North Italy) the percentage was 72.

At Rome, however, only 57 per cent. took part in the elections and not more than 56 per cent. made use of their suffrage at Genoa, the greatest port of Italy. Naples, the largest of all Italian cities, registers such a low activity as 23 per cent. This, however, is still a considerable improvement on previous occasions since this South Italian port has never known more than 25 per cent. of its authorised persons make use of their franchise.

These are actual facts of Italian political psychology. It is only when one remembers these figures that one understands the extreme statement that not more than one fortieth of the population to a little over two in every hundred is politically minded.

POLITICAL PARTIES.

The position of the Fascists as a group in the perspective of the Italian people is thus clear. Now, since the constitutional crisis has driven the opposition or oppositions into virtual silence for the time being it is worth while to ascertain how much these non-Fascists or anti-Fascists really mean in Italy's collective life. It is necessary to have an idea of the relative strength of the political parties.

Italian public life as that of Germany and other countries on the continent is the stage on which a number of conflicting groups pays its part. The very names are significant. Beginning with the nationalists, who as Fascists happen to be leading the show, there are the social democrats, maximalists (maximal-socialists), *popolari*, communists, democrats, liberals, republicans (*Mazziniano*), dissident-fascists and peasants.

The list is perhaps not as lengthy as in Germany with its two dozen names. As Indian public life has been growing

more and more in pluralism and heterogeneity so also the fine shades of distinction that divide the European parties from one another on economic and constitutional issues do not seem to be any longer mere words.

But the Italian *popolari* is a new name. It describes the party of the Catholics and thus possesses a religious bearing. The *popolari* was represented on the last parliament by 100 members and would thus appear to be quite an influential society.

MOFUSSIL POLITICS.

Amendola, the champion of democracy and official leader of the opposition, has never been tired of repeating in his *Mondo* as well as in public utterances that the very law on which the elections were held is illegal. The elections were, besides, conducted in a most lawless manner almost at the point of the bayonet, as every foreign reporter communicated it at the time to the press of his land.

But, at any rate there are certain

figures which tell their own tale. In some of the mofussil towns, for instance, at Bologna while the Fascists obtained 28,463 votes, the maximalists 5,823, united socialists 4,645, communists 1,792, popolari 2,548 and republicans 738. In Venice, on the other hand, 35,446 persons went in for the nationalists, 13,227 for the popolari, 10,433 for the maximalists, 7,850 for the united socialists, 6,205, for the communists, 3,128 for social democrats, and 1,735 for republicans.

In other words, so far as public life in Italy happens to be vocal, while at Bologna the nationalists are stronger than all the other parties combined; the situation at Venice is quite the contrary.

ANTI-FASCIST CENTRES.

As anti-Fascist or in any case as non-Fascist centre Genoa repeats the story of Venice. And, at Milan the overwhelming majority belongs to the opposition.

The Fascists could get only 58,000 votes in this Manchester, so to say, of Italy, i.e. not more than one-third of the

total votes polled. The united socialists with 45,500, maximalists with 20,700 and communists with 8,300 represent here the might of labour. Then there are the popolari with 12,150 and the democrats with 1,780 votes. In the richest city of Italy, the very centre of her industries and commerce, the Fascists command the least influence as an open political group.

A MIRACLE.

When all the facts are taken into consideration one feels that nothing short of a miracle has been accomplished by Mussolini. No human being was, indeed, more audacious than the Fascist premier when he dared declare in so many words: "Hands in the pockets is a good watch-word for us to-day."

This is cocksurism or self-confidence run mad. Mussolini is not to be unnerved even by the country-wide popular fury over the alleged Fascist murder of Matteotti, the socialist member of parliament, nor over the present militia-legislation.

ECONOMIC RENAISSANCE.

What is the secret of Mussolini's strength? every lay mortal, nay, every successful diplomat of world reputation is asking. A Swiss reporter writing in the *Journal de Geneve* explains it, let us say, partly at any rate, by the *renaissance economique et financiere* which has been brought about by the iron hand of Mussolini in two years.*

In the industrial world strikes occur now, only few and far between. An impetus has been given to foreign trade. Exports, especially those meant for America, a good pay-master, have been exceeding the imports. Then there is the tariff policy leading to the reduction of customs duties. Mussolini has concluded favourable trade-treaties with those countries from which Italy has to import the necessaries of daily life as well as raw materials for industries and manures for agriculture.

* c.f. "The Transition in Italy to an Industrial State" in *Economic Development*.

Measures against profiteering and so forth have served to lower the price-level considerably. Cost of living is cheaper to-day in Italy than anywhere else in Europe. The rates of salary for ministerial officers and clerks have been raised. There prevails a good deal of contentment among the lower middle classes. Their deposits in the savings banks have been weekly on the increase.

Finally Mussolini's retrenchments have, as is well known, scored a record. By strict enforcement of the measures of economy the budget has been almost equalized. For 1923-1924 there is a deficit of only 623 million lire whereas the previous deficit ran up to 2 milliards and 616 millions.

SENATOR ALBERTINI'S VIEW.

To what extent this "economic interpretation" will explain the foundations of Mussolini's power sceptics may choose to dispute. But armed with such solid achievements as he is, Mussolini can

afford to throw the following challenge, as he has done, to Italian public life.

"The opposition parties," said he in a sarcastic tone, "can accomplish only one thing. As they are two years behind the times they can but bring Italy back to where she was in the summer of 1922."

This banter has to be swallowed by the entire opposition without a word. But still there are not wanting journals, for instance, the *Corriere della Sera* which came out with the criticism that never in the history of Italy since 1860 was the political situation more regrettable than it is to-day.

In this great daily of Milan the editor, a veteran statesman of the liberal group, says that external order may exist even in a prison house but this does not indicate that the prisoners are in an orderly frame of mind. "True order," writes this politician moderate as he is compared to Amendola, "is like good health. One enjoys it without being able to prove it eloquently."

According to Albertini true order

cannot exist in Italy as long as there is a party militia and as long as the fundamental tenets of the constitution are defied by a coercive press law. The *Italian Mail* (Florence) believes that the situation cannot last. Italians are a long suffering race but their history gives evidences of periodical outbursts against the persons who had extraordinary notions of their own importance.

CHAPTER XV.

THE ETERNAL CHINESE QUESTION *

SOVIET RUSSIA AND CHINA.

There is civil war in China once more and, as usual, on constitutional questions. This time the situation is grave enough to invite "talks" among the great powers in regard to intervention. Curiously enough, the only power that seems to stand by China's case against foreign intervention is Russia, the state whose enmity to the Chinese people was never less cruel than that of the nations whom she condemns to-day.

But perhaps the soul of Russia has been purged through the fire-baptism of Bolshevik philosophy. And so it has suited the leaders of the Soviet Federation of Russian Republics to challenge the right of the four "bourgeois" imperialistic

* The present chapter is to be taken along with the six chapters on "Revolutions in China" in *The Futurism of Young Asia* (Leipzig, 1922)..

states, viz., Great Britain, France, the United States and Japan to interfere in the politics of China and the Far Eastern Seas.

CHINA, ROMANTIC AND REAL.

Neither civil war nor foreign intervention is however a new thing in Chinese politics. These are some of the "eternal questions" with which every student of international law is familiar. But unfortunately, as a rule, people dare not look facts in the face and hesitate to call a spade a spade.

So far as China is concerned, the romantic idealism popularised by the writings of Bertrand Russell and John Dewey in English-speaking lands and by Rudolf Eucken and Keyserling in the Germanistic world has served but to propagate among the alleged friends and lovers of the Chinese people a false orientation in regard to the actualities. But the *Realpolitik* has to be faced to-day or to-morrow, romanticism notwithstanding.

PROFESSOR GOODNOW ON THE RIGHT OF
FOREIGN CONTROL.

In 1915 the American professor, Dr. Goodnow, as adviser to President Yuan Shikai of the Chinese Republic, submitted a memorandum of governmental systems. One of the reasons why he considered the restoration of monarchy desirable for China is that otherwise disorder would prevail in the country. And

“It is ***becoming less and less likely that countries will be permitted to work out their own salvation through disorder and revolution, as may have been the case during the past century with some of the South American countries. Under modern conditions countries must devise some method of government under which peace will be maintained or they will have to submit to foreign control.” (*Journal of the American Asiatic Association*, November, 1915.)

This is a mercilessly frank statement, and the point of view would seem inhuman to Young China and to those of its

idealistic friends who desire to see the Powers let the Far East alone. But this is only a scientific conclusion from the lessons of diplomatic history.

Writers on international law assert indeed that nations have every right to work out their destiny in their own way, or as the phrase has become current in the literature on politics during and since the Great War, they have the right of "self-determination". But the rights of rebels, revolutionaries and secessionists, on the one hand, and those of foreign intervention in an independent state, on the other, are some of the other eternal questions that are left to the practical statesmen and the *vishva-shakti* or world-forces, i.e., the conjuncture of circumstances, to solve.

Now foreign intervention in the internal affairs of a state "to the point of actual destruction of its political independence" is neither to be the special misfortune of republican China nor an iniquity to be perpetrated for the first time in Chinese history. The question of

the *form of government* for China is thus not specially affected by this danger.

INTERVENTION AS A POLITICAL METHOD IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE.

During the Middle Ages no European State could be called really sovereign even within its territorial limit. The Pope had the right to interfere in the local civics of Christendom, and his cardinals, legates and pardoners enjoyed "extra-territoriality" everywhere. Matrimonial relations and religious sympathies dictated, moreover, the foreign policies of rulers.

The ruler himself was in law but a landlord among landlords. The same landlord could in those days own manors and serfs under more than one king. A baron in one state could be king in another. The cities could form alliances among themselves, or with the feudal lords against kings, or with the kings against the feudal lords.

The Hanseatic League gave laws to the kings of Denmark and Sweden.

Each of the Italian city-states was divided between the imperial Ghibellin and the Papal-Guelph factions, so that both the German Emperor and the Pope freely took part in the intrigues of the little republics of Italy. Intervention was thus the very essence of the system of feudalistic politics in Catholic Europe.*

FROM WESTPHALIA TO THE MONROE DOCTRINE.

The peace of Westphalia (1648) is regarded as the first landmark of modernism in the conception of sovereignty. But even since then the independence of States has been infringed upon by the Powers on innumerable occasions. To-day the ostensible object of intervention is the maintenance of peace in the "backward countries" in the interest of foreign

* The "interventions" practised by the Geneva League of Nations belong to an entirely different category and must be sharply distinguished from the medieval phenomena and the survivals of medievalism. National independence is not violated by the League's activities. But all the same the theories of sovereignty and international law are in for revision.

commerce and investments. At other times the pretext has been self-preservation, enforcement of a legal right, prevention of atrocities, considerations of humanity and so forth.

The death of Charles II of Spain in 1700 was an incitement to Louis XIV to interfere on behalf of his grandson Philip as a candidate for the foreign throne. The Spanish succession could not thus remain a mere Spanish question; it brought on a world-war in which the real issues were the expansion of commerce and the balance of power. The notorious partitions of Poland (1772, 1793, 1795) are the standing monuments of the Powers' right to intervention in a territory of political turmoil.

The partition of France, also, became a question of practical politics in 1793 under conditions similar to those of present-day China. Austria, Bavaria, England, Russia, Spain and Sardinia were to have obtained slices of French territory and left France a harmless third-class power.

In 1808 Napoleon ordered that Prussia should not keep an army of more than 40,000 men. The Holy Alliance (1815) was an open alliance organized for intervention. The Monroe Doctrine (1823), as a publicly announced defence against intervention, came into being on the assumption that the right to intervention was a fact.

AMERICAN INTERVENTIONS IN THE LATIN STATES.

By the "Ostend Manifesto" of 1854 the United States declared the right to seize Cuba by force, should Spain be reluctant to sell it. America's intervention in the war (1898) between Spain and Cuba is an infringement of the rights of independent states, as also her notoriously hasty recognition of Panama as a republic (1903) in the midst of its secession disputes with Colombia.

FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN PERSIA.

During the birth-throes of the New

Persia (1906-1909),* again, the constitutional or nationalist party has been constantly thwarted by the intrigues of Europeans with the Shah and his courtiers. The Anglo-Russian convention of 1907 defined to their own satisfaction the spheres of influence of the two foreign powers, and was followed by their joint demands on the Medjlis (national parliament) to obey the Shah (1908). The destruction of the first Medjlis was consummated by the Shah with the "Cossack brigade" commanded by a Russian Colonel.

Then came the virtual annexation of the fertile province of Azarbaijan in North-East Persia by Russia on the all-too familiar pretext of safeguarding foreign interests during the second Persian revolution (1909) that eventuated in the deposition of Mohammed Ali. One must also mention the British ultimatum of October 16, 1910, which demanded the policing of the roads in Southern Persia

* See the chapter on "Persia and the Persian Gulf (1906-1919)" in *The Futurism of Young Asia* (Leipzig, 1922).

by the Government of India at the expense of the Persian Customs Department.

THE "INTEGRITY OF TURKEY."

Last but not least, the intervention of Christian states whether individually or in concert in the Ottoman Empire was the most universally accepted article of faith among statesmen. The "integrity of Turkey," however, was indeed an asset of the British empire against Russian advance and was therefore solemnly announced at the end of the Crimean War (1856).

But the powers have still found occasions to interfere with Turkish rule in Crete, Armenia and Syria. The Berlin Congress (1878) virtually legalized and legitimized the international administration of the problem of internal reforms in Turkey. And it was the demand for European mediation in the administration of Macedonia that exasperated the Young Turks into the second Balkan War (1912).

SELF-DETERMINATION *vs.* INTERVENTION.

And to crown all, the last war was brought about directly by the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, compliance with which would have implied the regular intervention of Austria-Hungary in Serbian administration. Can it not be affirmed, then, without being too cynical that "self-direction" or independence is the exception, and intervention, the rule in the history of international relations?

IMPERIAL CHINA IN INTERNATIONAL LAW.

It is only in the perspective of all these world-developments in diplomatic intercourse that the problem of China can be intelligently grasped. To treat China as an exception in international relations would appear to be as great a fallacy as to regard Chinese civilization, social institutions, philosophy, arts and so forth as something peculiarly Chinese or distinctively Oriental.

We shall first discuss the "external" sovereignty of China, *i.e.*, her relative

position and prestige with regard to other independent Powers. In 1842 the Opium War deprived China of Hong-Kong. In 1859 Russia wrested from her 800 square miles north of the Amur River, the territory south-east of the Khingan Mountains, the Russian maritime province, and Vladivostok, and in 1871 the land between Balkash and China.

In 1871 Japan took possession of the Liu-Kiu islands between China and Formosa. Burma was lost to Imperial China in 1886, the French republic annexed Indo-China the same year and engineered subsequently the separation of Siam from Chinese overlordship.

The China-Japan war of 1894 led to the loss of Formosa and the virtual cession of Korea to the victors. In 1898 Kiaou-Chaou was seized by Germany, Kwang-chau-wan by France, Wei-hei-wei by England, and Port Arthur by Russia. By 1899, as Brown remarks in *New Forces in Old China*, "in all three thousand miles of coast-line there was not a harbour in which she could mobilize her own ships

without the consent of the hated foreigner”.

During all this period the Chinese empire had of course to pay enormous indemnities to the powers for the least loss sustained by the aggressors as missionaries, merchants or travellers even in out-of-the-way places. All this is surely “foreign intervention in China” “to the point of actual destruction of independence.”

The only parallel is to be sought in the steps by which Turkey has been robbed of Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, Egypt, the Balkan States, Kuweitt, and recently Arabia and Mesopotamia.

THE STATUS OF CHINESE ABROAD.

Let us now look to external sovereignty from the other side of the shield, *viz.*, with reference to the treatment of China and her people abroad. Between 1855 and 1905 Imperial China had to enter into humiliating “treaties” with the United States and accept from that power the most precious discriminative laws against

the Chinese immigrants. Each of these laws was, moreover, a violation of treaties.

American citizenship was denied to persons of the Chinese race by the Burlingame Treaty (1868). The Treaty of 1880 compelled China to give the United States the right to restrict and suspend Chinese immigration. China was not in a position to retaliate the massacre of innocent men, women and children in Wyoming, Washington and California (1885-1886). The constant outrages on the person and property of her people "legally" living on American soil remained unindemnified by the state or federal governments.

The Scott Act of 1888 and the Geary Act of 1892 relating to the status of Chinese immigrants in America reduced the empire of China to the most contemptuous abyss in the international world. In 1904 the United States finally re-enacted all the previous restriction-laws excluding Chinese immigrants. America's treatment of China for half a century is comprehensible solely on the

postulate that China's independence was to be respected only on paper (A. C. Coolidge: *The United States as a World-Power*", pp. 335-37).

THE EMPRESS-DOWAGER'S PATRIOTIC EDICT.

It is clear, therefore, that towards the beginning of the twentieth century Imperial China descended to the nadir of sovereignty so far, as her external relations were concerned. We shall now study the state of her "internal" sovereignty about the same period, *i.e.*, the rights she exercised on her own territory without intervention from foreign Powers or their nationals.

Since the treaty of Nanking in 1842 China has been "opened" by over a hundred treaties with foreigners. Mostly commercial in character, these are documents of "concessions" which have deprived the Chinese in one way or another of their legitimate sovereignty over their own lands and waters. The military aggressions in Greater China coupled with the economico-political con-

cessions within China Proper could not but draw from the Empress Dowager's hands a most dangerous edict bitterly "anti-barbarian" *i.e.*, anti-foreign as it was. It ran thus :

"The various Powers cast upon us looks of tigerlike voracity, hustling each other in their endeavours to be first to seize upon our innermost territories. They think that China, having neither money nor troops, would never venture to go to war with them. They fail to understand, however, that there are certain things which this empire can never consent to, and that if hard pressed, we have no alternative but to rely upon the justice of our cause, the knowledge of which in our breasts strengthens our resolves and steels us to present a united front against our aggressors."

THE BOXER REVOLT.

In 1900 the Chinese were driven to do what little Serbia has since done in 1914. They made a desperate attempt to defend their sovereignty against the inter-

vention of the encroachers. The Boxer Uprising proved abortive, however, and left China not only ruinously indebted on account of indemnity but also completely humiliated and at the mercy of the Powers.

The treaty of 1901 forbade the Chinese (1) to import fire arms for two years, and (2) to hold official examinations for five years in the cities where foreigners had been attacked. It compelled them moreover (1) to add an important area of Peking to the already spacious grounds of the Legation Quarters to be fortified and garrisoned by foreign troops, (2) to raze to the ground the Taku forts which defended the entrance to Peking, and (3) to have the railway from the sea to the capital occupied by foreign troops. Under the terms of the same treaty, China had also (1) to execute the members of anti-foreign societies and (2) to summarily dismiss district officers and even provincial viceroys if they did not suppress anti-foreign outbreaks.

Germany, crushed as she is by the

War, has since 1918 been experiencing all these Chinese conditions under the military, economic, and political bonds imposed upon her by the peace of Versailles.

THE CHINESE BOYCOTT OF AMERICA.

The political nullity of the Chinese even within the limits of China Proper was thus categorically "declared" by the treaty of 1901. It became more clear in 1905 when the United States forced Young China to withdraw the boycott of American goods, ships and institutions it had decreed in retaliation of half a century's persecution suffered by the Chinese people at the hands of the Americans in the United States.

The Chinese government was reproached by the American minister at Peking for its 'extraordinary supineness' in the matter; and was ordered to deprive Tseng Shaoching, the head of the Fu-kien merchants' guild in Shanghai and chairman of the boycott committee, of his official rank of *taot'ai*, and punish him in

an exemplary manner. The boycott had thereupon to be disclaimed by the Chinese Foreign Office and at length suppressed by an Imperial edict.

MONARCHY NO SHIELD AGAINST INTERVENTION.

These are not facts of ante-diluvian history and no profound antiquarian scholarship is needed to excavate these items in human relations. Nor has human nature undergone any revolutionary change during the last two or three decades although it has certainly been enriched with the experiences of the Great War, Bolshevism and the so-called league of nations. One therefore does not grow any the wiser by shutting one's eyes to the methodology of powerful neighbours in regard to the integrity and sovereignty of weaker States.

It is clear that long before the establishment of the republic, the powerful nations found reasons to interfere in China. Republic or no republic, therefore, they may assume direct administra-

tion of its government whenever, to use Goodnow's words, "this is necessary to the attainment of the ends desired," provided, of course, the Powers can agree among themselves as to the partition of the spoil. The American expert's prescription of a monarchical form of government for China was therefore an absurd performance. It would be illogical and unhistorical to blame the republic for the misfortunes of China.

REPUBLICAN CHINA.

There was no improvement in China's international status between the events of 1900 (and 1905) and the abolition of monarchy in 1911. It is sheer blindness to the realities (on the part of Eur-American political theorists) or patriotic timidity to look facts in the face (on the part of the Chinese themselves) that is responsible for the false idea that China was an independent country in 1911. There has besides, been no change in her position among the Powers during the twelve or thirteen years of the re-

public (*Vide* the present author's *Futurism of Young Asia*, pp. 230-247).

Rather, like the revolution of 1906 in Persia and of 1908-9 in Turkey, the Chinese revolution has resulted in the enfeeblement of the Orientals and the increase of aliendom in Asia. Or perhaps, strictly speaking, Asian weakness has been brought up to the limelight just on account of these nationalistic, constitutional and republican upheavals. The world has been thereby made fully conscious as to how terribly incompetent Young Asia happens to be in the technique of modern life.

Only in one quarter has Kemal Pasha, luckily for Asia, succeeded in enhancing her reputation by the international standard. But in other quarters Kemal Pashas do not seem to be forthcoming,—not at any rate in China for the time being.

THE MAKING OF BOUNDARIES.

If the foreign interventions are normal or natural phenomena in China

not less so are the civil wars. Weakness in the fields of finance, industry and military equipment has thrown the Chinese up into the arms of the foreigners. The war between the provinces, although ostensibly a constitutional struggle, is a symptom of another weakness. That weakness of the Chinese people has to be sought in certain rather unexplored fields.

And here it is necessary to expatiate a little bit on the boundaries of states, the limits of nationalities, or the manufacture of nations. On this subject there is a fallacy long prevalent among the students of political science in Eur-America. This has been imbibed from them by the intellectuals of Young Asia also. The fallacy is quite simple. People have got into the habit of applying to vast continents like China or India the formulæ that barely explain the political jurisdiction of the latest types of more or less homogeneous "nation-states" in contemporary Europe.

Since the unifications of Italy and Germany, and under the influence of

John Stuart Mill, the nationality-idea has taken a firm hold on the imagination of mankind. But political theorists as well as practical statesmen are prone to forget two important considerations with regard to its application.

First, Mazzini's idealism embraced a population which in strength of numbers was less than the fifteenth of that of China or of India to-day.

Secondly, Bismarck's "blood and iron" triumph embodied itself in a territory which in its area is about one-fifth of China or of India. United Germany is not larger than the single Chinese province of Szechuen in the S. W. or the Hindi-speaking provinces of the north-Indian Punjab, Agra and Oudh.

Scientifically speaking, one should expect therefore, the same number of "modern" nationalities enjoying "sovereignty" in the Austinian sense of *danda-dhara*, i.e. sanction-wielding power in China or India alone as one finds in Europe. A China or an India in the singular number in the twentieth century

is as great an anachronism as the "Christendom" of Hildebrand and Innocent III, or the "Empire" of the Hohenstaufens, or Dante's pious dream of universal monarchy in *De Monarchia*.

THE MEANING OF THE CIVIL WARS.

One must not demand a higher standard of nationalism or political unity or state-making for Asia than what has yet been possible for Europe with its latest experiments in the Central and Eastern territories. It need, further, be observed that the chances for a "federation" in any of the Asian culture-zones (Chinese, Indian or Islamic) are as great or as small as among Latins, Slavs or Teutons of the Western world.

It is this "scientific" question that is being solved in and through the civil wars of China. There was a time when Tibet, Mongolia, Indo-China and other regions used to be known as veritable Chinas. The world knows the truth better to-day. Similarly the world is waiting to learn if Szechuen should be regarded as part of

China along with Honan, Che-Kiang, Chih-li and other provinces or if the so-called eighteen provinces of China constitute for themselves a world of independent sovereign states. Herein lies the deeper meaning of the civil wars in China.

THE BIRTH-THROES OF MODERNISM.

The recent revolutions are really phases in the modernization of the Chinese State. The disintegration of old China's limbs is the pivot of all these movements. Medieval Europe with its "indefinite incoherent homogeneity" had to be pulverized and transformed into a system of "definite coherent heterogeneity" in order to give shape to the modern states. By 1870 the vestiges of medievalism in state boundaries may be taken to have practically disappeared from Western Europe at least. Japan also bade adieu to the old state of things about the same time.

The dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire between 1878 and 1912 has likewise been a move in the direction of "modernism" in South-Eastern Europe so

far as the territorial limits of nationality are concerned. During the Great War the Bolsheviks embarked upon giving the dozen Russians of Eastern Europe a chance to find, determine or realize themselves on the "nationalist" principle. The Peace of Versailles has further operated along the same lines by manufacturing new states out of old.

It would be absurd to maintain that the boundaries of European states as they exist on the map in 1924, chequered as it is with irredentas and minorities, can be defended whether on grounds of "nationalism" or according to the principle of self-determination. One should not, however, ignore the fact that the principal feature in the European wars and treaties down to 1918 consists in this conscious attempt at regulating the frontiers on what may be roughly, and perhaps vaguely described as "modern" lines. But in China, medievalism has been persisting until to-day. China's size and form adapted to modern condition have yet to come.

WHITHER IS CHINA TENDING?

The world is waiting to see if the modernizing of China is to be effected along Indian lines, i.e., through slavery to alien domination or along the Western and Japanese lines of unhampered and independent development. Is China going to become half a dozen enslaved China or is she going to bring forth out of herself a bunch of free sovereign swarajes of the Mazzinian, Bismarckian or Leninian types?

Whatever be in the womb of the future, medieval homogeneity bids fair to be a thing of the past and a conscious heterogeneity to take its place. This is the real significance of the politics of Young China to students of social science whether as observers of the civil wars fought as they are over constitutional issues or of the foreign interventions that threaten its independence.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE NATIONDAY IN ITALY.

SEPTEMBER 20.

Italians celebrated the 20th of September with the utmost enthusiasm, as their greatest national holiday. It was on this day that just fifty four years ago—in 1870—Victor Emmanuel as king of United Italy succeeded in marching on Rome and annexing it to the Italian Kingdom.

Fifty four years do not constitute a long period of time on any count and there are many Italians in almost every town who can recall the fervour of their youth with which they as Garibaldians took part in one way or another in the regeneration of their fatherland. The processions and festivities which take place on this memorable day are made lively with the red shirts of the Garibaldis. To-day however, the "*piece de resistance*" is furnished not so much by the red shirts

which appear only few and far between but by the black shirts of the Fascists who are here and there and everywhere.

HOW TO CAPTURE ROME.

The importance of 20th September in Italian life cannot be overestimated and since the event is so recent as 1870 the emotional outbursts of the people as a young nation can be easily appreciated. Rome, the so called "eternal city," possessed no significance in the estimation of the people down to 1860. When in that year Victor Emmanuel with the assistance of Napoleon III succeeded in scoring victories over Austria the capital of the New Italy was transferred from Turin to Florence. Rome was still far from the ambitions of Italian patriots.

How to capture Rome or rather rob the Papacy of its Roman estates was the problem of the nationalists. Cavour died in 1865 before seeing the goal realized. Garibaldi was defeated in an expedition. Another expedition led by the Democrats was frustrated owing to the arrest of their

leader Mazzini. The Papacy was being supported by Napoleon. But destiny came to the help of Italy in the shape of the Franco-Prussian War in which Napoleon sustained a crushing defeat and was automatically compelled to withdraw his garrison from Rome and leave the Pope to take care of himself. Italian national unity was thus decided not within Italian borders but on the battle-fields of France,—at Sedan.

ITALIAN INDEPENDENCE.

In 1860 it was through French rivalry with Austria that Piedmont succeeded in becoming the nucleus of a new Italy. It was the defeat of France by Prussia (1870) that enabled this New Italy to take possession of Rome from the Pope and Venetia from Austria. And in 1918 Trentino (including Southern Tyrol, a German speaking province) has been added to the United Italy not on account of Italian military victories over Austria for it is well known that during the last war the Austrian army was never over-

powered by Italy but principally owing to the naval failure of Germany and the British, French and American successes against the German army.

From 1860 to 1918 Italy has profited on every occasion through "entangling alliances," secret treaties like the one of London (1915) and diplomatic intrigues with foreign powers. The story of Italian national independence and unification is but another testimony to the great principle that subject peoples can acquire the status of free nations solely when they are in a position to make the best use of the antagonisms which divide the great powers from one another,—the principle to which in our day Poland and Tchechoslovakia owe their freedom and Rumania and Jugoslavia the enlargement of their territories.

THE GERMAN IRRIDENTA IN ALTO ADIGE.

It need be pointed out, in passing, that the conquest of the Alpine territories, the Adige, Isarco and Sugana Valleys from Austria has necessitated the en-

slavement of 230,000 German-speaking men and women by Italy. The northern section of the new province of Trentino from Brenner to Salurn is known as *Etschtal* and *Eisacktal*, or more simply, Suedtirol (Southern Tyrol). But the name of this region has been officially Italianized into Alto Adige (Upper Adige Valley).

The German language has been forbidden in schools, offices, churches and other public institutions. The Italian Government, thanks to the extremism of Senator Tolomei, has been vigorously pursuing the policy of *Entdeutschung* i.e., de-Germanization. Even the name Tyrol has been penalized.

The process is entirely at variance with the spirit of idealism for which Mazzini fought. But in contemporary Italian estimation it is perhaps a military necessity. All the same, in diplomatic intercourse Italy has always to be painfully aware of her enfeeblement on account of the German irredenta in Northern Trentino or Southern Tyrol.

As soon as Germany becomes strong Italy will have to feel the pressure from beyond the Brenner Pass.

MODERN ITALY THROUGH FOREIGN EYES.

The "*risorgimento*" in Italy is, as has been said, only fifty to sixty years old. The result is that Italy, Italian public life, Italian politics, all exhibit the type of an inferior, junior, second class nation. In the estimation of England, America or France, for instance, the allies of Italy during the last war, this country does not rank higher in the scale of civilization than, let us say, Japan. The manner in which the tourists of "great powers" criticise the railway and hotel arrangements of Italy, the sanitary conditions of Italian cities and villages, and the morals of the business men, pedlers, servants, porters etc., is an evidence in point. And as for "modern" industries it is well known that Italy is almost as far behind the pioneers of industrialization as India.

A SECONDCLASS NATION.

Italians themselves are not unaware of their shortcomings in modernism.

But this awareness makes its appearance in a rather curious way. A traveling Congress of 300 Italian medical men came recently to visit Trentino, the German province conquered as has been stated above, from Austria as the result of the last war. Among other cities they visited Bolzano (Bozen) and Merano (Meran) the most attractively situated and world-famous Alpine cities of Southern Tyrol. The hospitals and sanatoriums belonging to these cities come down from Austrian days and maintain a standard of excellence in outfit and cleanliness with which German *Kultur* is credited even by its enemies.

Naturally, for the great doctors of Rome, Florence, Bologna, Milan, Naples, Genoa and Venice, all that greeted their eyes in these cities of their Austrian "dependency" appeared to be the very models of perfection in their line. And

the only remark that came out of their lips after the fit of admiration and wonder was over is to the effect that the Austrian institutions were fitted up with enormous luxury. In other words, what is considered to be a minimum of requirements in a modern hospital according to the Austrian conception of health and sanitary installations is too high for the Italian standard of efficiency.

ITALY AND INDIA.

But it is precisely for this reason that Italy is valuable for India. The institutions of Great Britain, America, France and Germany are too high, much too advanced and complex for the stage at which Indian developments have arrived. Neither in cultural work nor in industries and commerce can young India venture to be measured by the present standard of these four great civilizing forces.

Italy is conscious of her weaknesses and is struggling hard, thanks partly to the Fascists, to catch up to the highest. Indian patriots have much to learn by

observing the steps which Italy has been taking to educate out of a mediævally minded, feudalistic and agrarian people the type of a modernized industrial culture-state such as Western Europe, America and Germany have been able to develop since, roughly speaking the French revolution or rather since the employment of the steam-engine in manufacture and transportation. Italy's experiments in nation-making, economic development and modernism represent, so to say, the cultural bridges over which semi-primitive, semi-developed peoples will have to pass in their strivings after fuller and richer self-realization.*

* cf. "The transition in Italy to an Industrial State" in *Economic Development*

CHAPTER XVII.

AMERICAN-TURKISH TREATY.

Difficulties have arisen in the United States in regard to the ratification of the treaty with Turkey. It will be recalled that an agreement was entered into between the two Powers at Lausanne in August 1923. Ismet Pasha was Turkey's representative. Mr. Grew signed the document for the U. S.

The treaty has not yet been approved of by the Congress but is going to form the subject of discussion this autumn. There are grave doubts if the Congress will ratify it.

DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION.

The entire "democratic" party is opposed to it. Senator La Follette and his adherents have strong objections against it. Even Senator Lodge will have his say against it. Mr. Gerard, who had been American ambassador in Germany

during the first years of the war until the U. S. joined the allies against the Central Powers is at present secretary of the democratic party. A manifesto has been recently issued by him, writes a correspondent of the *Journal de Geneve*, in which the Americans are strongly advised to reject the document signed by Grew.

POLITICAL OBJECTIONS.

Should this treaty come in operation, says Gerard, the United States will have to abandon the "capitulations" in Turkey. The Christian missions and the American schools are to be at the mercy of Kemal Pasha's government. America will have no right to discuss the question of indemnity from Turkey in regard to war damages and losses suffered by the Americans during war. Finally the internationalization of the straits is not so much as even thought of in the provisions of the document.

THE SECRET OF THE CHESTER CONCESSIONS.

Nor are the economic clauses of the treaty more satisfying than the political

in Gerard's estimation. The Swiss reporter states that in March 1923 the American delegation was "bought" up by Ismet Pasha with the result that the Armenian question got hushed up. How did Turkey silence the U. S.? The economic concessions granted by the Turkish government to the American financier and industrialist, Chester, constitute the price for America's silence, says he.

Now, the pro-Americanism of Young Turkey was a tremendous affront to France who had been up till then the best friend against Greece and Great Britain. But Ismet Pasha could at that moment afford to sacrifice French sympathy and support and pay attention to American overtures.

A CHANGE IN THE SITUATION.

Since then, however, Turkey has^{*} found it convenient to abrogate the Chester concessions. Between September 1923 and January 1924 the Young Turk began to consider his position strong enough without American propping.

So the United States have been abandoned exactly as France on the previous occasion. In the autumn of 1924, therefore, the American-Turkish treaty does not possess the same significance in American eyes, economically speaking, as it did last year.

ANTI-TURKISH PROPAGANDA IN AMERICA.

But American speculators have not given up their interest in Turkey. In order to warn them against possible Turkish ventures a strong propaganda has been started in influential financial circles. Mr. Morgenthau, a multi-millionaire and an "expert" on Turkish affairs, is one of the leaders of this movement.'

"Turkey", says Morgenthau, "has a population of some six million of whom 80 per cent lives on agriculture. Not more than a Rupee and a half per day is the income per head. After meeting the daily expenses for the family there remains hardly anything with which the Turks can buy clothing, furniture and other articles conveyed by railways. Such a

poor country cannot be a good business proposition."

Financially, again, say the Americans, Turkey is in a very critical situation. The budget for 1924 drawn up by Fehmi Bey, the finance minister, shows a deficit of £3,000,000. The sum represents a fifth of the total expenses.

PROSPECTS OF TURKISH RAILWAYS.

The Turks propose to build about 2,000 miles of railway. But according to Morgenthau the railways can hardly be profitable because the people are so poor. Passenger traffic is likely to be very small. The shipment of goods cannot be expected to be bulky since the demand for such goods will be very limited. Oil certainly will have a market, but the railways will derive no benefit from this trade, because the transportation of oil will be effected not in waggons but in pipes.

DECREASE OF POPULATION IN ANATOLIA.

The most dismal feature in the life of Turkey to-day is said to be the increasing

diminution of population. In 1878 there were in Anatolia 9,500,000 Mussalmans. By 1914 the figure sank to 6,500,000, in spite of the immigration from Bosnia and the Balkans.

Kemal Pasha is attempting to remedy the situation by the law of compulsory marriage. But the real reasons of the trouble are well known. Under Abdul Hamid a report on the subject was prepared by Dr. von Düring. But nobody ventured to make it public.

A year or two before the war 756 Mussalman recruits are said to have been medically examined in the province of Adana. Among them 744, says the Swiss reporter, were tainted with venereal disease.

SWISS SENTIMENTS *re* TURKEY.

"Impoverished, burdened with taxes, ever at the mercy of brigands, tyrannized over by an opportunist dictator, steadily diminishing in numerical strength, and surrounded on all sides by irreconcilable enemies," thus continues the Swiss letter,

"Turkey is proceeding down to destruction, the inevitable and just reward of her crimes."

"American business men have already ceased to look upon Turkey as a field of action and wish rather that the Turkish territories should pass into foreign hands in order that economic exploitation may be possible and profitable."

THE MANTLE OF WILSON.

So far as the political issues are concerned, the American "democrats" believe that the Lausanne affair was due to the oil intrigues set on foot by the "republican" party under President Harding. In the estimation of the democrats there is absolutely no reason why the "capitulations" should be renounced. They consider the abandonment of Armenia to its own fate to be a serious economic blunder.

According to Dr. Bushnell Hart, Professor of Modern History at Harvard University, the ratification of the treaty would invite an "unjustifiable humiliation

on America." The democrats are not prepared to give up an iota from their demands on Turkey as formulated by President Wilson.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

As in other countries of Asia, in India also the Geneva League of Nations has failed to be a popular institution. But the fifth annual session of this international parliament, if one may so call it, according to its promises and ideals, is just over. And it may not be uninteresting, from an objective standpoint, to get an idea of the deliberations in which it has taken part during the few years of its existence as well as the kind of work it has sought to accomplish. Those who intend to be cynical in regard to the League as being but a tool in the hands of victorious imperialists, and colonialists are of course always at liberty to be so.

THREE FUNCTIONS.

The functions of the League may be classified under three general heads; political, technical or scientific, and humani-

tarian or philanthropic. This last comprises certainly features which should rather be comprehended as scientific. The political functions are no doubt the primary considerations of the League. They consist in the attempts on its part to place the disputes between nations before arbitration and thereby prevent wars.

The technical side of the League seeks to organize mankind into one unit. The co-ordination of the interests of the different parts of the world in such a manner that the very possibility of wars may cease to exist is its avowed aim in this regard.

Finally, the humanitarian functions of the League are oriented to the amelioration of such evils as arise among mankind from time to time and as could hardly be foreseen and prevented.

DIVERSITY OF ATTITUDES.

Up till now not all the functions of the League have appealed equally to the different nations of the world. Nor in

any nation that has taken interest in the affairs of the League do the three classes of functions seem to have struck the imagination of all observers in the same manner. The attitudes are different.

The "great powers" of Europe, as a rule, have been watching the League as a clearing-house of the petty difficulties that arise in the political world. Its functions as a court of conciliation or pacification loom large in the eyes of the dictators among the West-European nations.

The "little nations", on the other hand, the "new states", "the dominions", etc., are interested as a rule in the "nationality" questions which more or less mean life and death to them. In their eyes the technical organization of the world such as is being sought by the League is of supreme importance.

AMERICA AND ASIA.

The philanthropic work of the League appeals for the most part, curiously enough, to two diametrically

opposite notions or mentalities. For instance, the United States of America, which officially have nothing to do with it although spiritually its sponsor, are supremely interested in its humanitarian schemes and accomplishments. Similarly the Asians, who spiritually are the farthest removed from it and suspect it as the enemy of their freedom and right to armed resistance against aliens but some of whom officially have not altogether boycotted it, watch the progress of this body with great enthusiasm so far as these functions are concerned.

It is interesting to observe that the Americans happen to be the wealthiest and economically and scientifically the most developed, while the opposite pole in these respects is represented by Asia. Extremes meet,—on the international plane.

CO-ORDINATION AND UNIFICATION OF THE WORLD.

Let us first look to the technical functions of the League. The nations that

compose the institution are mostly "protectionist" in the politics of tariff. But the general assembly of the nations as assembled in Geneva happens to be pronouncedly "free-trader". The economic committee of the League has been seeking to organize some sort of union between the nations that are its members and of those that are not. The object is to abolish the restrictions to the free transit of goods and promote a more unhampered development of international exchange, thus fostering the "world-economy", of which Professor Harms speaks in the quarterly *Welt wirts chaftliches Archiv* (Kiel).

In regard to communications between nations the League has been trying to revise the Convention of London (1912) so that the new situation created by radio may be met. So far as intellectual co-operation is concerned, the League has accepted France's offer of an institute for the organization of international exchange of thought and culture. Italy has followed France in offering an institute

for the revision and codification of private law. An organization has been instituted to study the problem of scientific properties, patents, copyrights, etc., on an up to date world-basis. Another institution is seeking to co-ordinate bibliography, i.e., publications, libraries and reading rooms on an international scale. Further, the literature published by the bureau of labour is already considerable.

HUMANITARIAN WORK.

Hygienic and sanitary measures for the world constitute a bridge between the technical and the humanitarian functions. The war against tuberculosis has already been started so far as the purely theoretical or rather the investigational aspects are concerned. Opium conferences are on the anvil.

The international bureau of labour has been entrusted with the problem of succour to be administered to the Russian, Greek and Armenian refugees. The question of establishing the Armenians in Caucasus is being studied by Dr.

Nansen under the auspices of the League. Measures relating to the suppression of the trade in women—the “white slave” traffic—have likewise been undertaken.

As is well known, international law has never been codified. The League has addressed itself to this problem also, and although the work is not easy to accomplish, one must at any rate note the beginnings of a new movement as registered in the attempt.

THE POLITICS OF PETTY STATES.

Coming now to the political sphere, one notices that already fifty-five nations, great and small, including even the Dominican republic are registered as members of the League. The admission of Germany seems to be only a question of a few months at the present rate of discussions over it. The decision has been given in favour of Georgia *re* Russia. The establishment of direct relations not only between different states but also between different cities of the world is,

moreover, one of the objectives of its work.

The frontiers between Irak and Turkey have been studied by the League as well as those between Jugoslavia and Albania. The latter question has already been closed. Attention has been devoted to the problem of "minorities" in Greece, Bulgaria, Turkey and Albania. The League has undertaken to raise a loan on behalf of the Greek refugees. The conditions imposed on Austria have been modified in her favour under its auspices and it has also played a substantial part in the rehabilitation of Hungary. Last but not least the administration of the Saarregion, although a French occupied area, has had to accept a nominee of the League as one of its commissioners. Altogether, these activities, although not of major importance, are weighty enough to introduce a modification in the conception of sovereignty such as has been prevailing in the world under the Grotian theory of international law.

THE QUESTION OF DISARMAMENT.

In addition to these affairs affecting the lives of the smaller nationalities the League has bestowed its efforts on what is known as "disarmament." So far as the defeated powers of Central Europe are concerned the question of military control and the right of investigation by the League have been more or less satisfactorily solved from the standpoint of the victors, it seems, in any event.

The larger issues involved in world disarmament can hardly be avoided any longer, theoretically, at any rate. In this connection the trade in arms and explosives as well as the manufacture of war munitions in each nation, small as well as perhaps great(?), have not failed to invite the attention of the League. But practical measures or rather thorough-going deliberations remain yet to be undertaken.

ARBITRATION.

One of the last achievements of the League consists in the preparation of a

document (protocol) in favour of "arbitration" such as, it is believed, may render wars less possible, even when the parties be great powers. In order to appreciate the importance of this agreement of Geneva concluded a few weeks ago (September 1924), which, however remains to be "ratified" by the nations, one has only to remember that even seventeen years ago at the conference of Hague in 1907 the very idea was unentertainable on account of the opposition of powers, great and small.

The treaty of Versailles (1919) knows nothing of it as a matter of course. The memorandum of association by which the League of nations was brought into being did not dare mention the subject of arbitration in so many words.

In 1920 there was not a single great power available to accept even the "principle" of the competence of the international court of justice. Italy's overtures *re* the Corfu incident in 1923 proved to be the turning point.

To-day the great powers including

England represented by Ramsay-Macdonald as premier and France by Herriot and other great personalities have accepted the principle. They have also put down their signatures to the document. Not only the *Oeuvre* and the *Quotidien*, the socialist organs, but even the *Debats* and the *Temps* believe that "an atmosphere of mutual confidence" has been generated by the agreement. The *Journal de Geneve* considers the developments, so far as they go, to be epoch-making.

BRITISH INDIFFERENCE.

For the present, however, the fortunes of arbitration do not seem to be very roseate. The fall of Ramsay-Macdonald in England will militate against its ratification by the British parliament. One may understand a bit of the English mind from an observation of the *London Times* made as it was on the Geneva agreement. "It is difficult to understand what these people have been driving at over there on the Lake of Geneva." Such is the purport of an editorial. The

imperialists fear that under the provisions of the Geneva agreement the British navy might be placed under the command of the League!

JAPANESE OPPOSITION TO THE GENEVA PROTOCOL.

But perhaps ultimately a rather serious obstacle to the acceptance of the "compulsory competence" of an international tribunal is to come from the Asian side. Japan has instructed her representative on the League, Mr. Adachi, to inform that body that unless his Fatherland be granted the "right to develop its vital interests by peaceful means" it will not be possible for her to "sign" the document. The question of "ratification" by Japanese parliament is of course not to be thought of.

In this ultimatum one has to observe the aftermath or nemesis of the American Anti-Japanese land and immigration laws. Japan has hereby really raised once again the "racial equality" question,*

* See the chapter on "Leavings of the Great War" in *The Futurism of Young Asia*.

which had been broached at Versailles through Baron Makino and had to be withdrawn owing to the stubborn opposition of President Wilson and his crowd.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL.

Germany is seeking admission into the League of Nations as member. Japan has chosen not to sign the protocol on the question of compulsory arbitration while the document is being read in England with mingled feelings of scepticism and mistrust bordering, as they do, almost on nervousness. At this stage it will be interesting to observe how the Geneva association is being treated in Soviet Russia, or by the Congress of its spiritual stalwarts known as the Communist Third International, shortly the "*Comintern*."

THE TWO POLES OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMPLEX.

There is an association in Switzerland under the name of the "*Entente Internationale*" against the Third International. The president of this "inter-

national entente", M. Aubert, has taken the pains to study the psychology of the Soviet leaders from time to time and published a report of his findings in the "*Journal de Geneve*." The manner in which the Third International approaches the world-forces, says he, is diametrically opposite to that of the League of Nations. The two institutions are described as poles asunder in their methods and objects.

PEACE VS. WAR.

Arbitration, security, disarmament, international law for which a new code is in preparation under the auspices of the League, and co-operation between the classes in the interest of social progress such as the League's bureau of labour is seeking to establish,—these and other great lights which mankind is said to be hailing with enthusiasm are being militated against by one diabolical power bent on extinguishing them and rekindling the red fire of carnage and destruction.

And who is that mischief-maker?

The Third International that goes about inciting to massacres in Georgia and controls the destiny of millions at Moscow under the protection of the Soviets. And Aubert proceeds to demonstrate how the ideals of Geneva have their uncompromising enemy in the *Comintern*.

THE PROGRAM OF MOSCOW.

For, says the president of the entente internationale against the Comintern, this association of Moscow has in its last session resolved upon taking every measure that is calculated to promote a world-revolution. It is alleged to have established the methods of civil war in every country of the world and also to arrange for the financing of the enterprise. Certainly Moscow presents a veritable antithesis to Geneva with its program of arbitration, security, and disarmament.

THE CLASS-STRUGGLE.

The international spirit of the Geneva association is to be read in the words,

peace and concord. But Zinoviev, head of the Comintern makes no secret of the intentions of his international. The hatred against the bourgeoisie, the socialist traitors and the pacifists has been declared to embody the international spirit of Bolshevism.

THE RELIGION OF HATRED.

The Comintern is not alone in its open declarations of the spirit of war. The Red International of Women, the Red International for support of the revolutionaries, the associations which form satellites of the Comintern are said to have no less frankly and expressly stated their religion of hatred and class-struggle. Each one of these institutions, possessing as they do affiliations in every part of the world appeals to nothing but civil war and dictatorship of the proletariat. This philosophy is propagated broadcast from Vienna through the *Internationale Presse Korrespondenz*, the organ of the Comintern.

THE DAWES SCHEME.

Aubert then goes on to narrate the facts which support his contention that Moscow is the devil that is determined to crush the angel of light that Geneva purports to be. According to him the Conference of London and the Dawes scheme fit in so wonderfully with the League of Nations that it might be easy to admit Germany, reconstructed accordingly, as one of its members. But how does the whole affair appear through Soviet eyes? The Comintern is determined to see to it that the results of the London conference may fail to find an application. The communists of Germany in meeting assembled at Düsseldorf have condemned the Dawes scheme and pronounced it to be inapplicable. Such, says Aubert, are the results of the Comintern philosophy in the practical field.

GERMANY AND THE LEAGUE.

The League of Nations is willing to take in Germany as one of the members.

But, as is well known, the *Pravda*, the *Isvestia*, and other official organs of the Soviet are up in arms against the idea that Germany should join the League.

TROTZKY'S ARMY.

Disarmament is one of the main objectives of the League. But already the representative of Poland at Geneva has brought it to the notice of the other members that there is a tremendous danger on the eastern boundaries of Europe on account of the red army, the army led by Trotzky. The Soviet is armed to the teeth and is alleged to be perpetrating massacres in Georgia. The same story is being told by Finland. The Finnish premier thinks that it will not be expedient to introduce disarmament *as long as Russia is in arms. Sweden and Rumania's fears are finding expression in the same manner.

RECONSTRUCTION IN THE BALKANS.

The efforts of the League have gone a great way to re-establish economic order

and prosperity in Austria and Hungary. But what has the Comintern been doing? It is just at Vienna that the Soviets have organized their intellectual headquarters in order to convert Austria, Hungary and the entire Balkans to the creed of social revolution.

THE MINORITIES.

The problem of minorities is being solved under the auspices of the League through peaceful agencies. But the Comintern is said to know only one method for its solution, and that is war and revolt. And it is ready also to place funds at the disposal of the rebels and nationalists.

THE LABOUR QUESTION.

Economic problems are being solved by the League in a manner that is likely to promote friendly feeling and mutual co-operation among the parties concerned. But the *idée fixe* of the Comintern consists in the revolt of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and the socialists.

*
THE ETERNAL ANTINOMY.

The Third International, the organ of war and revolution, can never appreciate the League of Nations with its message of order and law. The antinomy of spirit is said to be eternal. It is, says Aubert, nothing short of the fight between death on one side and life on the other.

CHAPTER XX.

TURKEY FROM WITHIN AND WITHOUT.

EXCITEMENT OVER MOSUL.

During the last two weeks (October 1924) the Mosul question proved to be almost as disturbing an element in European diplomatic life as was the Sarajevo incident of July 1914. According to the *Temps* of Paris, it is well known that both Turkey and Great Britain are ready for an armed conflict. Preparations have evidently been going on both sides for quite a long time.

EUROPEAN COMPLICATIONS.

The British "ultimatum" to Angora has created an uneasiness in the political relations of Greece and Jugoslavia with Turkey. A stir has also been on in the industrial circles of Austria and Germany who are looking for a chance to sell goods to belligerents. Soviet Russia, as the professional ally in need of all oppressed

nationalities, has also been up and doing. Nor can Italy and France afford to be a mere on-looker in the game which is to unsettle the *status quo* in the Mediterranean and Western Asia.

MEDIATION OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

But the League of Nations has proved once more to be the safety-valve of nations. The League's Council met hastily at Brussels over the Anglo-Turkish difficulties. M. Fethy Bey, the president of the Angora parliament, who, besides occupies as great a position in Young Turkey as Kemal Pasha himself, came over hurriedly to Belgium to place the case before the arbitrators. And to-day comes the news that both Great Britain and Turkey have agreed to maintain the peace.

THE NEUTRALIZED AREA.

A provisional line has been decided upon beyond which neither Turkey nor Great Britain is to function in a military manner until the Mosul question is finally

settled. Between Turkey and Irak some sort of a "neutralized" area has been created and both Great Britain and Turkey have declared their willingness to give effect to this compromise on or before November 15. Each is to retire from those parts of the neutralized area which it may have occupied during the last few days.

THE COMPROMISE.

The fate neither of the city nor of the *vilayet* (district) of Mosul has thereby been decided upon. It will take weeks, may be, months for a peaceful settlement, should a peaceful settlement be possible. But in the meantime the compromise which has been arrived at in Brussels in 24 hours' time has served in no small measure to clear the atmosphere. The war may be said to be put off for the time being.

LE TANINE OF CONSTANTINOPLE.

Now that the crisis seems to be over it is well to see something of Turkey from

within. *Le Tanine* is a daily of Constantinople conducted in French language by M. Djahid Bey. He is an economist, a member of parliament, an inspirer of Young Turkey, and personally a friend of Kemal Pasha. Among his colleagues on the staff of the journal there is M. Muchtac, another prominent literary man of present-day Turkey.

TURKISH POLITICS.

The following extracts from an editorial in *Le Tanine* will speak for themselves. "It is strange", says Djahid, "that nobody in Turkey knows why the relations with Great Britain should have become so strained all on a sudden. The seriousness of the Mosul question could not of course be gauged by the lay public. But I do not exaggerate in the least when I say that not even the experts on foreign affairs among the members of our parliament had the least suspicion that the situation had become so acute.

"Even when Fethy Bey came back from Geneva and stopped at Constanti-

noble *en route* to Angora he seemed to be perfectly satisfied with the results of the negotiations. And yet over-night the Angora government is threatened with an ultimatum and the people are asked to undergo self-sacrifice for the Fatherland."

NO CONTROL OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

The mystery can be explained, according to the *Tanine*, only by the fact that the Government has not been taking the people, nay, the parliament into confidence in the development of foreign politics. Djahid says: "Once again we have been taught a serious lesson. We cannot afford to leave our foreign affairs absolutely uncontrolled in the hands of our Ministers or of the President. The nation has a right to be informed from time to time of the happenings in our relations with foreign powers. If the Government demands of the people generous acts of self-sacrifice when the fatherland is in danger the people have a right to demand and to know how and why the country is in danger. The parliament as well as the

Government must be made to feel their responsibility to the nation, and the Government must learn to take the parliament into confidence."

CONSTITUTIONAL TROUBLES.

Kemal Pasha has in fact been behaving like Mussolini, and democrats or liberals are uneasy over the manner in which things are getting done in Turkey at the present moment. They suspect that these "foreign dangers" constitute some of the dodges by which the Government seeks to crush all criticism of its internal politics and allow it infinite scope in the matter of establishing a regime of absolutism.

DANGERS OF REACTION.

The political thoughts that are passing through the Turkish mind can be read in the daily writings of the *Tanine*. People suspect that reactionary tendencies have already set in in Turkey. But, asks Djahid, what kind of reaction? And he answers in the following manner: "The

dangers of reactionary movements from the side of religious fanatics are no more. But the new reactionarism is coming from the side of the intellectuals, those who pose as students of social science. It is they who are trying to restore the paternal despotism of Abdul Hamid. Like that Sultan who after giving the constitution in 1878 withdrew it in a short time these intellectuals of to-day believe that the people of Turkey are not fit for democracy and should be bossed by their 'natural leaders' for some long time yet."

EFFICIENCY OF THE "ENLIGHTENED DESPOT."

Evidently there are idealists among prominent men in Turkey who raise powerful complaints against the absence of democracy and constitution in the administration of their country. But continental and American travellers who are returning from Turkey are all admiration for what this "enlightened despot" Kemal Pasha has been able to accomplish for his fatherland during the short breathing space he has had at his disposal. The

efficiency of the government is said to be unquestionable and patent on almost every side.

THE ADMINISTRATION PURGED.

"All the sine-cure offices which the old regime was compelled under the pressure of the powers to give away to foreigners or Turks have been abolished," said the other day an industrial expert who has been visiting Turkey off and on these twenty-five years. The administration has been purged of the elements that were liable to corruption from foreign sources. The *Banque Ottomane*, the source of Turkey's financial vassalage, has come into the nation's hands. The Anatolian railways have likewise become state enterprise. The expulsion of the foreign element in the *personnel* of these and other services has brought about a tremendous saving in public expenditure. The navy, the merchant marine, the railways as well as the schools are being manned by officers of the army.

SCHOOLS.

Private enterprise in educational work is a remarkable sign of the times. Philanthropists have started institutions in Anatolia for the protection and training of orphans. Madame Enver Pasha, the widow of the famous statesman-general, has devoted her fortunes to a high school for boys and girls at Constantinople. She is herself working as a teacher in the same institution.

In addition to the schools of general instruction the government has been able to establish six schools of agriculture in different parts of Anatolia. The French have been permitted to retain their schools on condition that they are not to propagate Christianity among the scholars nor use the cross in the buildings. The Robert College run by the Americans has never been molested by the Angora government since they have always kept aloof from religion and religious propaganda.

MILITARY STAYING POWER.

An export-import merchant belonging to one of the neutral nations is of opinion that Turkey's independence is safe in the hands of Kemal. About two months ago Mussolini is said to have wanted to surprise the Turks at Adana and demonstrate the might of the Italian navy. But he found the Young Turk quite prepared to meet the Italian aggression at a moment's notice and so had to shake hands and retire.

Turkey has made arrangements to have the *Goeben* repaired in her own waters and placed orders for submarines in German hands. The Anatolian coasts are impregnable against possible surprises from the Mediterranean side. This was proved during the Greek war. The munitions, stores, motor lorries and other military materials and implements left by Greece in Anatolia are also known to be enormous. It is said that most of this booty were "made in England."

And in any case Turkey is in a posi-

tion to place over two million men on the front, should this be necessary. The industrial experts of the United States and the continent are convinced of Turkey's staying-power as an economic and military unit.*

* See the chapters on Turkey in *Economic Development*.

CHAPTER XXI.

ITALY AND THE BALKAN COMPLEX.

The shuffling of political alliances has been going on all the time in the Balkans. The latest news relates to the possibility of Italy being associated with Yugoslavia and Rumania in a military union.

According to the *Pravda*, the daily organ voicing the opinion of the party led by Davidovich, the ex-premier of Yugoslavia, the Ministerial Committee of National Defence, presided over by the King himself has for sometime been studying the question. Both at Belgrade and Rome diplomatic negotiations are on. A convention is likely to be signed between the three parties before the "Little Entente" holds its half-yearly congress.

To what extent Italy's intimacy with the Balkan states is likely to be admitted by the Great Powers remains to be seen. But all the same the little states are

moving on along their own lines of advance.

TURKEY AND JUGOSLAVIA.

Jugoslavia is conferring with Turkey on important problems. The chief of the Jugoslavian diplomatic mission at constantinople has communicated to the headquarters at Belgrade that the Angora Government is ready to enter into an immediate pact—a treaty of peace. The Turkish consul is expected at Belgrade very soon, and until the direct relations are resumed, will remain attached to the Polish Legation which has so long been in charge of Turkish interests in Jugoslavia.

GREECE IN ISOLATION.

News from Athens indicates also some movements in international relations. For some time Greece has been isolated in foreign politics. The old alliance with Jugoslavia came to a close in May 1923 and has not been restored since then. Jugoslavia considers some of her

vital interests to be antagonistic to those of Greece. But some sort of a bridge has to be constructed between them, and both parties are once more trying to make amends for the past.

Greece can hardly afford to lose the friendship of Yugoslavia and this latter is naturally seeing to it that she reaps the greatest benefit out of Greece's overtures. One suspects that perhaps Greece is prepared to offer any concessions in order to be relieved of the terrible isolation in which she finds herself.

THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION.

The problem in any event is not simple. It is the age-long question of Macedonia once more. So far as the present situation is concerned, the relations between Yugoslavia and Greece are beset with the same old difficulties, which do not admit of a simple solution.

ACCESS TO THE AEGEAN SEA.

In the first place there are economic problems. There is the Saloniki question.

The so-called Jugoslavian zone on the Aegean side remains to be clearly defined. The railway line from Guergheli to the sea has yet to be decided upon. All this implies, of course, Jugoslavian authority on Greek soil.

SERBIAN MINORITY.

Secondly, purely political complications are not wanting. The regions of Macedonia belonging to Greece are inhabited by Serbs. So there is a "minority" question, which because of geographical propinquity constitutes an "irredenta" for Jugoslavia.

THE NATIONALITY PROBLEM.

Finally, as usual in such cases the question of "culture" makes confusion worse confounded. Jugoslavia demands that the language and religion of the Jugoslavian minorities in Northern Greece must be respected. The school question is not the least important of all those questions that remain to be settled.

GREECE LOSING SOVEREIGNTY?

On all these questions, each a constant source of inter-racial animosity, Greece happens to be on the defensive. Is it possible for Greece to submit to all these demands of her northern neighbour without depriving herself of a great part of her sovereignty? And yet isolated as she is, she does not see any way out of the difficulty except by agreeing with Yugoslavia. But it is a tremendous price that Yugoslavia demands. Greece has, therefore, to think a hundred times before she accepts Yugoslavian friendship.

JUGOSLAVIAN CHAUVINISM.

Greeks believe, and not without reason, that Yugoslavia can hardly be trusted in her friendly attitude. There is a section of Yugoslavian public life that is extremely chauvinistic. It has its eyes fixed on the Aegean Sea. And Greece naturally suspects that should she offer her neighbour the concessions demanded, she will have one day to face a powerful Yugoslavian both on land and on sea.

CHAPTER XXII.

THE POLITICS OF BALTIC STATES

The communist revolt in Esthonia has served to furnish the international world with another of those political interludes with which the contemporary social experience of mankind has begun to be enriched owing to the activities of Soviet Russia. But otherwise the happenings in this little Baltic State and in its neighbours to the north and the south belong to the normal order of the universe such as has been created by the Great War. In one word these may be said to acquire their significance as aspects of the larger problem of "small nationalities," "little states," new nations, buffer-states, etc.

FRENCH AND BRITISH SPHERES.

According to Rakowsky, representative of Soviet Russia in England, whose opinion has been recently published in papers the territories lying to the west of

Russia, or in other words, situated, roughly speaking, between the Germanic and Russian lands, constitute either British or French sphere of influence. Poland and Rumania are French while the Baltic States belong to the British sphere. The attitude of Russia in regard to these border lands depends primarily on the changes of her relations with France and Great Britain. This certainly is a clear-cut and precise statement in regard to all buffer-nations. Only, the position of Germany in the entire game remains untouched perhaps because as yet she happens to be an international non-entity.

RUSSIA'S REPLY TO THE BRITISH ELECTIONS.

As long as Poincaré was in power the Soviets had hardly any hopes of coming to terms with France. So the main brunt of communistic propaganda had to be borne by the French "vassals," Poland and Rumania. But since Herriot has been at the head of the administration in Paris, France has risen in Russian estima-

tion, says the *Journal de Geneve*, as the "mother of revolution."

In the meantime the labour ministry in Great Britain has been replaced by the conservatives who are threatening a diplomatic break with Russia. And this explains partly why all on a sudden one of the British vassals on the Baltic come to taste a bit of Russian energism. In diplomatic circles the Bolshevist activities in Esthonia are but a reply to the new British elections and indicate the manner in which Russia intends to behave with the British Empire should she be treated in the way in which Baldwin and Curzon intend to treat her.

THE BALTIC STATES AND SOVIET RUSSIA.

But not all is accounted for by considerations of diplomacy nor explained by the single term "buffer-state." The Baltic States form, geographically speaking, an indispensable part of Russia. An economic collaboration between the two is an absolute necessity. Occupying as they do the sea-coasts, Russia can hardly breathe

without them. And without Russia, again the little littoral states can perish in a day for want of market and raw materials. Naturally enough, small as they are they fear the Russian avalanche more than Russia has reason to fear from their side.

ECONOMIC SITUATION.

The last few years have not been very favourable to the Baltic lands in an economic way. Their political separation from Russia has destroyed the unity of the pre-war economic complex. Deprived of raw materials from Russia the Baltic industries have been compelled to work shorter hours and operate lesser hands. Certain factories have actually been closed. Workers in the textile and rubber line have often been out of employment. It is at great public expenditure that the government has sought to maintain the unemployed.

RIGA *vs.* REVAL.

All the Baltic States are not alike, however, although the economic and

financial difficulties are experienced more or less by each one of them. Lettland, for instance, the state to the south of Esthonia, has been enjoying a prosperous world-trade at Riga. Previous to the war this Baltic port was the third great port of the Russian empire. As soon as the international conditions became somewhat normal Riga was able to resume a part of her old shipping and commercial traditions.

It has not been possible for Esthonia to rival her southern neighbour in this respect. As the first state to renounce diplomatic and commercial relations with Soviet Russia she attracted indeed some special attention from the great maritime powers. But her port Reval has failed in competition with Riga. So there is nothing in Esthonia to make up for her weaknesses.

THE CURRENCY QUESTION

Add to this unemployment and general economic crisis the monetary difficulties which beset Esthonia. The

currency question has indeed been a universal post-war problem. The Baltic States, little as they are, could not avoid it.

In this regard, however, Lettland and Lithuania have been a little lucky, for even without external aid these states have been able to establish the stability of their monies. But Esthonia has not succeeded in achieving the success of her southern neighbours. The financial reform attempted by the Esthonian Government has not borne fruit. Perhaps an appeal for assistance to the League of Nations is in contemplation.

But the fact remains that the finances have been unstable for quite a long time. Further, a permanent army of 15,000 men has to be maintained regularly out of the budget.

PARTIES IN ESTHONIA.

Each one of these items is serious in itself to create a political disturbance. And when certain elements in the public life are nurtured on communism or even

on moderate doses of socialism a Bolshevik *coup de' état* is but a question of time.

In Esthonia, although containing not more than a tenth of the population of an ordinary Indian district there are as many political parties as anywhere else on earth. In order to be quite up to date one should say that there is the "right," there is the "left" and finally there is the inevitable "centre."

The present administration may be described as "centrist," that is, it satisfies, as usual under such circumstances, neither the "right" (conservatives) nor the "left" (socialists). The communists, of course, function outside of the group of socialists.

Now recently 137 of these communists have had to undergo some sort of a summary trial: One of them, a member of parliament has been executed, 6 women and 33 men have been condemned to life-long rigour, 28 to 15 years' imprisonment and 62 to various other terms. It appears that the case arose out of nothing more serious than the right of free thought and

discussion. Hence the revolution at Reval.

DORPAT, THE UNIVERSITY-TOWN.

There are idyllic elements too in these Baltic lands. The garden-city of Dorpat in Esthonia is described by a German traveller as a Baltic Heidelberg. It is here that Gustavus Adolphus, the Swedish "world-conqueror" of the seventeenth century, founded a university. Situated as it is on the Embach in the midst of hilly landscapes and dotted over with beautiful clinics and small institutes and laboratories the surroundings of Dorpat remind one of the German university-town of Jena, says a report in the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*. There is the observatory, there is the "national museum," there are the ruins of a cathedral, there are the characteristic wooden houses and there is the lively market-place. All the social features of an intellectual centre in Germany's *mofussil* seem to be quite in evidence.

A CULTURE-CENTRE OF "EASTERN EUROPE."

The city has population of 52,000. The students of the university number about 4,500. Esthonian, Russian and German, these are the three languages one hears in the streets and lanes, and all the three are patronized in the schools.

Old Russia owes many of her statesmen and civil and military officers to the general education that radiated from this culture-centre. To-day also some of the prominent medical doctors and surgeons of that *terra incognita* known as "Eastern Europe" as well as several literary men of high reputation are proud to call themselves "old boys" of Dorpat.

THE NATIVE PARIAHS.

Under Czarist Russia, the civil and military authorities of these Baltic Provinces were indeed Russian by race. But the teaching staff of the schools and colleges used to be recruited from among the Germans. The clergy came from this latter class as well as the medical men.

Even the expert artisans were mostly German and they preserve their social distinctiveness in and through the guilds.

There was hardly any room for the "natives," the Esthonian and the Letts, in their own land so far as the learned professions, higher services and the more lucrative occupations were concerned. They were pariahs in an empire of foreign might and culture.

GERMAN MINORITY.

In these regions the real ruler has been the Germans. It was the German *Zemindars*, who lorded it over the landed estates: The most important commercial undertakings were in the hands of German traders. And so far as literary education, and cultural tastes are concerned the indigenous Baltic population was way behind the minority of the Germanic race.

But both in Esthonia and Lettland the German "minority" was and continues to be infinitesimally small, almost non-

existent, so to say, from the standpoint of number.

THE BALTIC CONSTITUTIONS.

It was because of the preponderance in wealth and learning, however, that the chauvinists of the late German Empire used to nurse and cultivate a so-called "Baltic-problem" (*Baltentum*) in internal and foreign politics. To-day even the "nationalists" of Germany have learnt to take facts as they are, and although the German elements in the Baltic states are bound to remain influential because of economic and cultural power their political importance as an "irredenta" is virtually nil. All the same the interests of minorities are not being neglected, and the League of Nations has seen to it that the national constitutions provide for 3 German members on the Esthonian and 6 on the Latvian Parliament.

THE BALTIC UNION.

The League of Nations is functioning as one of the guardians, so to say, of these

Baltic states. Another guardian has evolved out of themselves in the form of an Inter-Baltic Congress. Twice a year this congress holds its sessions in one of the four states including Finland and Lithuania. Questions affecting the foreign relations, and especially the commercial policy of these nations are discussed between the delegates who are officially sent up by the governments to confer with one another on the more important problems.

Like the "Little Entente" of the Balkan states in the southern regions of "Eastern Europe" this Baltic Union of the states lying as they do to the north embodies another of the centripetal tendencies which should be regarded as undoubtedly a great formative force in post-war Europe. It is through these "international" agencies that "nationalism" has been slowly but steadily conquering fresh grounds on European soil and striking its roots deep wherever it has already acquired a footing.

CHAPTER XXIII.

REVOLUTIONS IN ALBANIA

Of late has Albania become once more the scene of revolutionary disturbances. And although the story is announced in the newspapers people hardly take note of them. One takes it for granted that Albania is the land of revolutions and does not care to bestow any more serious attention on it. Besides, there are very few people who know anything even by name about the country or its people.

ALBANIA IN WORLD POLITICS.

But Albanian disturbances cannot be so lightly passed over. One should only recall how the incident at Sarajevo has served ultimately to reshape the world in order to realize the significance of petty states and small nationalities. Indeed one has only to look back a few years previous to July-August 1914 in order to feel that this Albania had been one of

those storm-centres which even without a Sarajevo might have led the world on to a conflagration.

SEPARATION FROM TURKEY.

It is known that when the second Balkan War was closed in 1912 Albania became a sovereign state. Its separation from Turkey was accomplished through the terms of the treaty not because Albania had achieved success against the Turks but because the "Powers" wanted somehow to dismantle Turkey.

FEUDALISTIC-PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY.

Freedom was won. But how to construct a state? In this section of the Balkans as in other parts economic and social conditions are still primitive and patriarchal. The Beys and Pashas, as landlords or Zamindars, maintain a sort of pluralistic communal life almost independent of one another and without much concern for the common fatherland. This feudalistic decentralized patriarchate could not be crushed by the Turkish

Empire even in its days of military and political might. The leaders of the Albanian landed aristocracy were on the contrary pacified by the Sultan's government with high posts in the army.

KING WIED'S ADVENTURE.

Now that an overlord does not exist nor that modernism has spread far and wide the sovereignty of the Albanian people has proved to be the nursing-ground of adventurers with all sorts of predilections. The first constitution of free Albania was monarchy. King Wied's enterprise did not fail to excite international commotion. In those days, be it recalled, there were three colossal Empires intact, the German, the Austro-Hungarian and the Russian, to watch with anxious eyes the developments in the Balkans and contest the monopoly of influence exerted by "Western Europe."

Somehow or other the international relations were not yet ripe for a world-war, for perhaps in certain quarters "gunpowder was not dry enough," However

the Powers saw to it that King Wied retire.

A REPUBLIC.

In order to reconstruct Albania it was decided among the Powers that she should have a republic. So a parliament was established and every thing that parliamentarism implies came to have a place in the constitution. But not long and the Zamindars or Nawabs once more found an energetic leader in young Ahmed Bey Zogu. So Zogu became king and abolished the republic restoring all the pre-constitutional usages.

DICTATOR VS. DEMOCRATS.

But during the war and since Albania has grown in democracy with the rest of the world. The dictatorship of Zogu,— Yuan Shih-Kai to use a big name for a small thing, is not to be tolerated by the "people." There is already a peoples party among the Albanians who are bent on safeguarding the interests of the land against the Beys and Pashas of the

medieval-minded aristocracy. This new party, modern and enlightened as it is, has at its head, as everywhere else on earth, a number of intellectuals among whom the lawyers play a prominent part.

The advocate-leaders of Albania compelled Zogu to retire in May 1924 and re-established a democratic-parliamentary republic. Events have been taking an interesting turn since then.

THE ROLE OF THE MOHUNT

The Church, which as a rule is reactionary, has allied itself with these "liberals." It was really with the support of the priests, belonging to the orthodox Greek Church as they do, and with the powerful backing of their "Pope," the *Mohunt* Fan Noli, that the lawyers succeeded in driving Zogu out of the country.

The *Mohunt* became the prime minister of the new republic. It must be noted, however, that the people of Albania are mostly Mussulmans. The liberal Mussulmans were allied with the liberal Christ-

ians against the reactionary Mussulman landlords.

REDISTRIBUTION OF LANDS.

Noli's story has something more interesting to say. His liberalism has embodied itself in three very extraordinary measures or rather proposals. As soon as the *Mohunt* became premier he issued a *fatwa* to the effect that all landed estates were to be confiscated from the Zamindars and Nawabs and distributed among peasants and poorer people. The Beys and Pashas, and along with them some of the intellectuals, got furious at this.*

DISARMAMENT.

Secondly, Noli wanted to disarm the entire population. This sort of ultra-liberalism proved to be too serious a strain on the temperament of the people for in their traditional psychology not to bear arms is tantamount to not being a free

* cf. "The New Land-Laws in Central and South-Eastern Europe" in *Economic Development*.

man. So Noli succeeded in making himself hated by the people as much as by the aristocracy.

INTERCOURSE WITH BOLSHEVIK RUSSIA.

Nor is this all. To demonstrate his up-to-dateness in democracy Noli opened diplomatic negotiations with Bolshevik Russia. The ministers and plenipotentiaries of Sovietland actually arrived in Albania in response to the invitation. This was, however, the last straw that broke the camel's back. No sooner had the Russian representatives arrived than the *Mohunt* was compelled to request them to leave Albanian soil. This happened in last December.

NOLI vs. ZOGU.

Noli thought that he had perhaps submitted enough to the wishes of the people. But he was mistaken, for his position could not be saved, and the year ended with another revolution which saw Noli and the liberals in flight overseas,—across to Italy.

Revolutions are made and unmade in Kaleidoscopic succession in Albania. The Noli-party has been re-called to the fatherland. The situation as it stands to-day is one of give and take between Noli and Zogu. The latter, however, has already got the upper hand.

GREECE VS. JUGOSLAVIA.

In the northern regions of Albania, bordering as they do on the Jugoslavian kingdom, a part of the population is Slavic. In the southern sections, again, contiguous to Greece there is naturally a Greek element in the people of the land. Now Jugoslavia has for some time been the sworn enemy of Greece on account of racial, commercial, diplomatic and naval reasons. She is not going to tolerate any Greek influence in her southern neighbour. Zogu, therefore, as the opponent of Noli, has a natural patron in Jugoslavia.

The *Komitaji* (national volunteers) of Jugoslavia are reported to be serving in the army of Zogu in his efforts to re-establish monarchy in Albania. And he

is supported also with first class artillery and munition of the latest type.

ITALY'S ADRIATIC PROBLEM.

The fight between Noli and Zogu does not constitute solely a diplomatic problem between Jugoslavia and Greece. Italy is interested also in what is happening on the other side of the straits of Otranto. The question belongs to her problem of the Adriatic. Italy, however, is detested as much by Greece as by Jugoslavia. Neither the Corfu nor the Fiume incident is too old.

LARGER ISSUES.

These three states are physically the neighbours of Albania. And as long as there continue to be disturbances in the buffer-state each one will consider it part of its duty to "watch the interests of its nationals" in its own "sphere of influence." This implies at the same time that the other Powers, far and near, cannot afford to be indifferent. And since Bolshevik Russia has had a chance to set

foot on Albania even for a moment the entire world has got keenly interested in the old storm-centre.

BRITISH OILFIELDS IN ALBANIA.

To add to the picturesqueness of the whole show it is announced that Great Britain possesses some "special interest" in the fortunes of Albania. For, the petroleum fields of northern Albania belong to the English *concessionnaires*. During the few months of his premiership the same Noli who established official intercourse with the communists of Bolshevik Russia succeeded also in capturing the imagination of the capitalists of Great Britain in the development of his fatherland. Albania's affairs are being conducted by *pucca* diplomats indeed.

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE SITUATION IN GREECE

EXCHANGE OF POPULATIONS.

One of the most curious but interesting phenomena of post-war politics consists in the exchange of populations which has been taking place between Turkey and Greece. The transfer or repatriation of Turks from Greece and of Greeks from Turkey has been proceeding on such a large scale that perhaps these items constitute the most important problem in the public finance, economic reconstruction and sanitary arrangements of the Near East.

REPATRIATED GREEKS.

So far as Greece is concerned, it is estimated that 1,135,400 came back from Turkey as refugees. In addition Greece has received 200,000 Greeks in exchange for the same number of Turks returned

officially by the state to the Angora Government.

THE BUDGET OF REPATRIATION.

The Greek government pays 1 drachma (something less than an anna) per day to the refugees and repatriated Greeks for bread and butter. They are also provided with clothing and blankets. The burden of the state revenues is immense although the American Red Cross and "Save the Children's Fund" contribute large sums to the indigent people. The government budget down to March 1925 on this item is estimated at 160 million drachmes (Re 1=Drs. 18).

RENAISSANCE IN AGRICULTURE.

The work is not being carried on in a purely philanthropic spirit. The men and women are being employed in reproductive enterprises. It is said that 2,000,000 bighas of land have been brought under new cultivation with the help of these refugees. The reconstruction is being conducted under the supervision of

a national association established for the purpose.

The National Bank of Greece has up till now advanced 195 million drachmes to this association and it is in a position to report that the advance has been a profitable venture. The districts have grown considerably in productive capacity and in values. Improved methods of cultivation have been introduced. Greek agriculture is witnessing a renaissance.

AN AGRICULTURAL BANK.

The government has indeed been inspired by the results already achieved. It is in contemplation to found a new bank called the Agricultural Bank. Its object will be the support of peasants with loans. The properties of all sorts which belonged to the Mussulmans of the territory who have been now repatriated in Turkey will form the capital of this new credit institution.

LAW AGAINST UNDESIRABLE ALIENS.

The government is seeing to it that ~~no~~ undesirable aliens can exploit the advan-

tages offered to the real refugees of Greek nationality. A strict legislation is on the anvil in regard to the travel facilities of foreigners. Every foreigner visiting Greece has to satisfy the authorities that he is financially competent to maintain himself during the period of his sojourn and that he is not likely to be a public burden. The United States Immigration Laws have always had this proviso. Like the U. S. again, the Greek government is trying to exclude all those persons who are afflicted with contagious diseases. One of the objects of this legislation is to prevent the communists of all lands from entering the country and getting mixed up with the repatriated Greeks.

GRECO-TURKISH RELATIONS.

While the home affairs of Greece may be said to be advancing satisfactorily for the time being the situation in regard to foreign politics is not yet clear. In the first place, the relations between Angora and Athens on the question of the exchange of

populations have not been finally settled in all their economic and technical details.

COMMAND OVER THE AEGEAN.

In the second place,—and this more serious, Greece has been having very hard time with Yugoslavia. The relations may lead to the worst international complexities.

Yugoslavia demands that the Yugoslavian zone in Saloniki, although lying on Greek soil, should belong to her sovereign jurisdiction. The Yugoslavian railway which reaches up to the Aegean Sea and traverses Greek territory *en route* is to secure this jurisdiction as well as the command over the sea.

JUGOSLAVIAN MINORITY IN GREECE.

These demands are too much to satisfy for Greece. Then there is the question affecting the status, language, schools, etc. of the Serbians domiciled in Greek Macedonia over which the two states have long been fighting. Like all other "minority" questions this question of

Jugoslavian "nationality" in Greece is a problem beset with great difficulties.

Altogether the fortunes of Greece in South-eastern Europe* have been demanding close attention on the part of the Great Powers.

* See the chapter on "Economic Life in the Balkans" in *Economic Development*.

CHAPTER XXV.

WAR-SPIRIT ABROAD.

One never knows exactly when the next great war is going to break out. But every body is discussing openly in the journals how all the powers, great and small, are feverishly making preparations against the rainy day. And this not only in the metaphorical sense of industrial, agricultural and commercial preparedness such as constitutes the positive foundations of war-preparedness but in terms of men, officers, military training naval equipment, air organization and other direct combative operations as well.

Any one who cares to read the dailies of four or five European capitals together for a week or so can easily convince himself that the alleged mentality of being "tired of the war" is a thing of the past. A fresh and young war-spirit is abroad in every nation.

GRECO-TURKISH TENSION.

Even Greece that is supposed to have been crushed about two years ago in Asia Minor seems to have already recouped her vigour. A call to the flag is the topic of platform speeches in that land. Turkey has to be taught a lesson, declare the Greek patriots and statesmen.

The cause of the present excitement is quite simple. Christians are not less fanatic than members of some other religions are reputed to be. Angora has expelled the Patriarch, the Greek *Mohunt*, from Constantinople. The "Christian" subjects of Turkey regard this incident with alarm and dismay. The Patriarch is the Khalif of the "Orthodox Church," as the organized religion of Greek and Slavic Christians is called. Greece naturally takes the humiliation of her spiritual head to be a "national calamity."

CHRISTIAN FANATICISM.

The masses of peasants in Greece and in the Balkans are infuriated. Greece

believes that a united Christian front against the "infidel" Turk is perhaps more or less a question of practical politics. Greek patriots are up and doing adding fuel to the mob fury. Diplomats are at work in Belgrade trying to patch up the long-standing troubles with Jugoslavia and bringing about some sort of an *entente cordiale*.

But the great powers have more pressing claims nearer home. England and France, the patrons of Greece and Turkey respectively, have not yet advanced far enough in their antipathy to each other. Besides, Great Britain is hesitating to bring the Mosul issue to a head. A great conflagration is therefore out of the question for the time being in the Near East.

LAW OF TURKEY'S SIDE.

The Greek loan on the London money market has fallen. And in the mean while Turkey has law on her side. She says that the Patriarch is but one of those persons whom the Treaty of Lausanne has declared to be exchangeable.

THE BESSARABIAN QUESTION.

The Greco-Turkish relations constitute but one of the storm-plexuses in the Balkans. The Russian-Rumanian situation has all along been quite acute. Every now and then the cables report the straining of relations to just short of the breaking point.

The bone of contention is furnished by Bessarabia. The ambassador of the Soviet Republic in Rome has declared that his country is not going to submit to the annexation of Bessarabia by Rumania such as has been allowed by the peace-treaty of 1919. Nor is Russia prepared to accept as valid any *plebiscite* in that region such as might be undertaken to-day at the point of the Rumanian bayonets.

The Russian representative has spoken in no unmistakable terms. The more the Rumanian government seeks to Rumanianize Bessarabia, says he, the more is she making herself the objective of a war of reprisal from the Russian side.

A CROATIAN REPUBLIC ?

The Croatians of Yugoslavia constitute a powerful minority. And this minority has never been satisfied with the establishment of that hotchpotch "national state" known as the Yugoslavian Kingdom. The Croatians do not even care for a home-rule in this Kingdom nor for some sort of a federation with the Serbians and other members of the State. They have been seeking to establish an independent republic.

The problem of the contemplated Croatian republic has gone beyond the frontiers of internal or home politics in Yugoslavia. The Croat leader, Raditch, has been seeking external alliances. It has transpired on the strength of certain evidences in a court trial at Belgrade, that the Croat republicans have the backing of the Hungarian government as well as of Soviet Russia.

MACEDONIAN NATIONALISM.

Still another Balkan issue. Like many other questions of the nationality

problem left unsolved by the events of 1918-19, the Macedonian question has been the source of *interstatal* complications in the Balkans ever since. The propaganda centre of the Macedonian nationalists is located in Bulgaria. The ramifications extend as far as Vienna, Albania, and even Rome. The Macedonian ire displays itself chiefly against Yugoslavia. All these items are important as indicating the fact that a "concerted action" in South-eastern Europe is not easily to be accomplished.

RUSSO-JAPANESE TREATY.

In the meantime the world's attention is being focussed on what would appear to be more momentous questions. The Russo-Japanese Treaty bids fair to be an event of tremendous significance in the international diplomacy of the next decade. It is too early to read in it already the beginnings of a war against the British Empire or the U. S. or both combined. One need only remember the happenings in world politics in the decade previous to

1914 and be prepared for all sorts of shuffling in the grouping of states.

CHINA AND SAGHALIEN.

Both Japan and Russia have expressed solicitations for China. But mere friendliness for China cannot so easily force Chinese patriots into Russo-Japanese arms as long as the financial investments of Great Britain in China continue to preponderate. Besides, the almighty American dollar exercises a much too powerful influence on Chinese intellectuals to be counteracted by mere professions or certain acts of good will from the side of an anti-American group. On the other hand, there is no gainsaying the fact that the Japanese oil-concession in Russian Saghalien constitutes a formidable basis of friendship between the two powers. And Vladivostock, reconstructed with joint Russian and Japanese resources, may function as a somewhat effective reply to Singapore.

THE ROLE OF GERMANY.

The complications have not certainly been eased in any case. For, the New Germany, while *kowtowing* to Great Britain for any favours she may get from the British Empire in the shape of trade facilities, is yet fully conscious of the tremendous economical and political advantages which lie before her in Eastern Europe and Asia in and through an intimate understanding with Russia. Even although as but an on-looker and a passive agent the role of Germany in the Far Eastern developments is immense, and nobody need be cocksure that she could be won over to the Anglo-American side on easy terms. Germany is waiting for the highest bid.

GERMANY'S PREPAREDNESS.

One thing is clear that, to begin with, Germany has no navy. It is on this score that she might be regarded by Great Britain as not sufficiently dangerous to herself and in fact quite valuable as a "second fiddle" in the event of a British

war against France. One does not know as yet, however, as to under what circumstances the British Empire would be willing to accept the military assistance such as Germany may offer.

The latest "Allied" investigations have thrown out the suspicion that Germany has been making every preparation both in men and war material for a great war. To exploit such a power against France would be tantamount to having the Versailles map of Europe re-drawn and 1914-18 undone.

The Anglo-French Entente is still too strong for such an eventuality, and Great Britain would think thrice before seriously entertaining such a proposition. An aggressive anti-French policy on the part of Great Britain would serve as a spur to all the German "irredentas" in every nook and corner of Europe (Poland, Tchecko-slovakia, Rumania, Jugoslavia, Italy and France). And the results would be more than lies in British power to manage.

AUSTRIA'S PART.

To take one instance of new complications that are expected, the Pan-Germanists of Austria have been developing their plans slowly but steadily. The commercial, industrial and customs legislation of this little republic is being so reorganized, item by item, that the people may feel hardly any shock should an amalgamation with the "big brother" ever become an accomplished fact. The Austrian protagonists of the Great Germany-idea are enjoying ovations in Berlin and other German cities.

The consummation of this Austro-German fusion suits neither French nor British nor Italian nor Balkan politics. But, among other terms, this is perhaps going to be one of the minima demanded by Germany as price of her assistance to Anglo-America' against Asia.

ITALY'S DILEMMA.

Under Mussolini Italy has been attempting to play a real great power. As long as she achieves one or two little

successes somewhere in "dark Africa" the "civilized world" seems to be behind her "European mission." But she has a guilty conscience in regard to the 230,000 German men and women of Southern Tyrol which the Peace treaty has made over to herself. In the event of a Great Germany actually taking shape or even Germany trying to assert herself with Anglo-American aid, Italy will have to bear the brunt of a German invasion from the Alpine side.

The Italianizing of Southern Tyrol in language, school, law, commerce, social life, is being pushed with enormous rapidity, on account of the energetic propaganda of Senator Tolomei of Trient. The whole region is also being equipped with military safeguards against an invasion from the north. In other words, it is out of the question for Great Britain to exploit both Germany and Italy simultaneously against France or any other power. A strong Germany is bound to be the greatest enemy of Italy, as Italians may reasonably suspect.

FRANCE *vs.* ITALY.

Nor is Germany the sole source of anxiety to Italian statesmen. Unluckily for herself Italy cannot at all trust France as a friend.

The old Corsican question has never been solved. There are "Corsica societies", now called Tyrrhenian societies, in different parts of Italy, which cater to the anti-French feelings in regard to the occupation of Corsica by France. Corsica, be it noted, is like Sardinia, an Italian island.

TUNIS AND THE MEDITERRANEAN.

But more acute is the question of Tunisian North Africa. While politically Tunis is a French possession the majority of the European population over there is not French but Italian. Italy claims that it is a really Italian colony and that the efforts of France to Frenchify the Italians of Tunis can be interpreted solely as evidences of France's anti-Italian motives. On the Mediterranean issue, therefore, Italy is bound to be on the British as opposed to the French side, for the time

being, should the situation demand a casting of votes.

But neither Great Britain nor France considers it expedient to force the world developments to a categorically clear issue in any theatre of operations. The expulsion of Indian nationalists from French territory and their maltreatment at Chandernagor and Paris indicate rather the desire of France to go any length in order to satisfy England and maintain the *Entente* intact with a view to "higher politics." We have therefore enough time to coolly digest the news, however sensational they may appear to be.*

* See the chapters on "Six years of Allied Economic Policy" and "The Economic Rejuvenation of France" in *Economic Development*.

CHAPTER XXVI.

THE PROBLEMS OF SINGAPORE.

The *Corriere della Sera* devotes a long study to the "problems of Singapore". The article says that the British (Austrian, Chinese and Indian) naval heads have met in conference at Singapore (21 Feb., 1925) in order to study the strategic problems of Great Britain in the Far East. The object of their investigations is to find out if the British interests can be safeguarded on the strength of the fleet such as is at present stationed in the East of Suez or if it would be necessary to get reinforcements from the North Sea. The question will also be discussed as to whether the greater part of the British navy for the time concentrated in the Mediterranean should be moved further south-east.

THE PACIFIC *vs.* THE ATLANTIC.

In the meantime London announces that the government of Baldwin has

resumed the project abandoned by the Ramsay-Macdonald regime, namely, that of establishing a powerful naval base at Singapore. Commenting on the conference as well as the resumption of the project the *Daily Express* remarks: "Strategically speaking, the Atlantic does not count whereas a great British fleet in the Far East is a necessity of the future."

This statement has but brought into relief one of the results of the world-war that is becoming more and more prominent every day, the fact that the Atlantic has sunk in importance compared to the Pacific. This is a phenomenon that can be adequately appreciated if one remembers an analogous phenomenon of the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries when on account of the great geographical discoveries the Mediterranean was compelled to yield the palm to the Atlantic.

THE ANGLO-GERMAN WAR.

For thousands of years the Mediterranean was the centre of human activity. In recent centuries the Atlantic took that

place. Greece, Italy and Turkey lost their importance, and economic and political power was being fought over between Spain, Portugal, Holland, France and England. The last of that series of conflicts is registered by the war of 1914-18, which was really an Anglo-German war.

But this the last phase of conflicts over world-dominion was not confined within the circle of European states. Extra-European powers, the United States, Japan and the British Colonies were thrown into the whirlpool as active agents.

EXTRA-EUROPEAN POWERS IN WORLD POLITICS.

The end of the titanic struggle left these extra-European states relatively very powerful compared to the European, especially as the latter could not easily extricate themselves from the rivalries and distractions on the continent. To-day the U. S., Japan, and the non-European portions of the British Empire exercise a considerable influence in international

politics. It is much more weighty than what it was before the war. The centre of gravity in world-affairs has therefore been automatically shifted to America and Asia and to the ocean lying between these imposing continents.

The problem of the Pacific has come out as a consequence of the world-war. This was most eloquently testified to by the Washington Conference of 1921.

BRITISH NAVAL POWER.

It is England that naturally has most to interest herself in the new maritime and world-developments such as have recently taken place. First, because she is the greatest naval power, and also because she is the centre of a great inter-continental empire.

From the naval point of view the world-war has given the British government what it desired, namely, the annihilation of the German naval power which at one time ventured to menace the supremacy of England. The suicide (self-sinking) of the entire German navy in

Scapa Flow in November 1918 constitutes in British marine history the crowning incident in a series of triumphs over foreign menaces since the days of the Spanish Armada.

The disappearance of Germany from the naval field has led to a satisfactory solution of the North Sea question for England. But in the meanwhile two naval powers have made their appearance, Japan and the United States.

AMERICAN AND JAPANESE NAVIES.

During the world-war itself, in 1916 each of these states took steps to provide itself with an expansion of the navy. The object of the Daniels Scheme is to bring the U. S. in the course of a few years up to a tonnage of 1,118 thousand compared to the British 884. The Japanese plan seeks to create by 1928, in addition to a large number of small units, 16 giant battle-ships each superior to the 40,000 tonnage unit. The earth-quakes of 1923 do not seem to have affected the naval program in any sensible manner.

AMERICAN AMBITIONS IN CHINA.

These two enormous forces have been attitudinizing themselves to each other as rivals in the Pacific. The Americans, masters as they are of the Hawaii and Philippine islands, are bent on transforming China, disorganized and torn asunder as she is by civil war, into an instrument and tool of their wishes. To these American ambitions the front of opposition is presented by the "small, yellow, enterprising, tenacious, bellicose and enormously prolific Japanese, who conscious as they are, of success in three wars portend to be a menace to the Philippines from Formosa and aspire to an Asiatic hegemony thereby directing a resistance to the external forces that tend to penetrate and exploit the Far East."

THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC.

The Washington Conference failed appreciably to modify the situation and the possibility of a conflict between the two powers was left open. Since then the problems of the Pacific have grown into

world-problems the repercussion of which on British politics was inevitable. For England is in the first place a great power in Asia and in the second place she has to take into consideration the interests and fears of Canada, Australia and South Africa.

THE STRATEGY OF SINGAPORE.

From this arises the necessity of fore-arming,—the establishment of a naval base at Singapore and the strengthening of the naval forces on the other side of the Suez. Singapore, point of the only passage between the Indian Ocean and the Far Eastern waters, situated as it is near the Philippines and Formosa as well as contiguous to Dutch India, bids fair wonderfully to grow into the Gibraltar of the Orient. A great fleet having Singapore for base* has the possibility not only of opposing every menace to India coming from the East but also of hastening

* cf. The significance of the industrialization of India in the chapter on the "Data of Indian Industrialism" in *Economic Development*.

promptly to help in Chinese waters as well as in those of Australia and South Africa, and play a prominent part in the events on these seas.

The eventual formation of such a fleet has ample bearings on the position of the British navy in the Mediterranean. The problem of Singapore thus has a particular interest for Italy and of course becomes a grand general question of international politics.

THE CONCENTRATION AT MALTA.

When, last year, the British Admiralty diverted the weight of the naval forces to the Mediterranean and Malta grew into a prominent base the measure was described as a resultant of the disappearance of the German danger in the North Sea, and of the new Mediterranean situation created by the world-war. But it was also known that the measure had bearings on the situation developing east of the Suez and in the Pacific. It is much easier to manage the affairs in the

Orient from Malta than from Portsmouth or Gibraltar.

ITALY'S INTERESTS.

Now, the desire of the Australian government to have a powerful navy much nearer home than Malta and the creation of the base at Singapore might lead sooner or later to a modification of the British arrangement of the naval forces in the sense of a diminution of the fleet at Malta. A permanent enlargement of the Far Eastern Fleet at Singapore might be the consequence, and in that event there would arise the need for a relative redistribution of the naval forces among the powers on the Mediterranean. It will be of particular interest to Italy to follow the subsequent developments of this question.

CHAPTER XXVII.

NON-CO-OPERATION IN ITALY.

The trend of Italian politics is not clear even to the Italian publicists. The situation is dominated by the extremism of the opposition. For over half a year the extreme opponents of the government have been in a state of war with it. To use the familiar Indian expression, it is a state of passive resistance and non-co-operation.

THE AVENTINO "NO-CHANGERS."

In ancient Rome the politicians who for one reason or another felt disgusted with the powers that be used to retire to a hill hard by, known as Aventino. To be in Aventino implied what we should call *práyopaveshan*, or *dharná* i.e., personal physical torture in order to bring moral pressure on the authorities or in some other way compel the gods to submit.

The same tactics are being used by the extremists of the Italian opposition to-day. Although not many have literally taken recourse to *vanavás* (forest-life) in the valleys of Aventino they have all deserted the parliament. All the same, these boycotters are being conveniently described as the Aventino group. Italy is exhibiting an interesting phase in constitutional development.

Of course perpetual higgling has been going on with the Aventino from the side of all those members of parliament who are either pro-government or belong to the opposition although as moderates. But the Aventino group is obdurate.

A FASCIST THREAT.

The Fascist party is indeed trying to force the hands of the Aventinians by a threat affecting their bread and butter. Signor Farinacci of Cremona is its present general secretary and proprietor-editor of the daily *Cremona Nuova* (The New Cremona).

According to an article in this journal

from the pen of Farinacci himself the Aventinians should be deprived of their position as members of parliament and also declared ineligible to the parliamentary salary. In his way of thinking those members who refuse to sit in parliament on account of party feelings do not deserve the confidence of their constituencies and are unworthy of the material advantages accruing from their official position.

MUSSOLINI'S SICKNESS.

But in order to have this suggestion put to practice the government will have to pass a fresh law. Mussolini, however, has already raised too many ghosts and is at present not in the mood to try another practical joke on his opponents. Besides, the events of the last few months have told too much on his nerves, and he has of late been forced to declare himself ill or out of sorts—,sicknesses not unknown in high politics.

A MODERATE OPPOSITIONIST.

On the other hand, an Italian politician who although belonging to the opposition does not happen to be a "non-co-operator," said the other day as follows: "It is well and good that the Aventinians exhibit their moral indignation once in a while. But how is it possible for them to win their ends as long as they stay away from parliament?"

"PRO COUNCIL-ENTRY."

This attitude is represented by the *Giornale d'Italia* of Rome which has published several articles on the subject of "Non-co-operation vs. Council-entry." The *Giornale* argues thus: "Success against the government can be won only by an armed revolution. But the Aventinians are not prepared for it. The government is too strong, for the time being. On the other hand, if the Aventinians return to parliament they can crush the Fascists by purely constitutional methods and establish liberty in the place of Fascist despotism. It lies

within our power to prove to the world that we want peace and prevent the Fascists from using any pretext that might go against us."

The *Giornale d'Italia* is naturally not a Fascist daily. It is patronized by the "moderate" members of the Opposition. To it belong such great names as Salandra, Giolitti, Orlando and others.

EXTREMIST TACTICS.

Neither threat nor persuasion seems to have any influence on the "No-changers." Their attitude may be worded thus: "We shall return to parliament only when liberty and normal conditions have been restored. But as we know that Italy is passing through a critical period we do not wish to do anything unpatriotic by instituting an open revolution."

FASCIST MODERATION.

It seems that the firm attitude of the Aventinians has been having some effect on the Fascists. Sg. Farinacci has issued

a manifesto to his party asking the members not to be nervous over the tactics of the extremists. But in the same breath he says: "We must see to it that no violence be attributed to us. We must maintain discipline in the rank of all Fascist organizations in town and country. We do not want to do any thing except by constitutional means."

Words like "discipline" and "constitution" are being commented upon as new stuff in the language of Fascists. And to this extent they may be said to have come down,—thus indicating a victory, however slight, of the Aventino.

LIBERALS IN OPPOSITION.

More interesting things have occurred. It has been noted above that a Liberal like Salandra is now a patron of the *Giornale d'Italia*. It is necessary to add also that the Liberals as a party have gone over to the Opposition. This is an important development. For up till now the Liberals were more or less neutral, watching the affairs in a detached spirit.

FRIENDS DESERTING FASCISTS.

This is a great blow to the Fascists and to the government. Not less serious to Mussolini's position is the split that has taken place in his own camp. There is an association in Italy known as the "national association of soldiers." It was formed with the object of rendering economic assistance to ex-soldiers and their families. Although non-political in origin, it got mixed up with politics and for some time happened to function as a tremendous social help to Mussolini and his party. But of late Signor Viola, president of this national association, has joined the Opposition. He is supported by a large and influential following. The Fascists have troubles to encounter all along the line.

ELECTORAL LAW REVISED.

In the midst of all these shufflings and political complications one solid achievement has to be credited to the efforts of the Opposition. Mussolini has been compelled to recognise the iniquities

of the electoral law under which the present parliament was called into being. The law has been revised and placed on a more reasonable basis. The present parliament is to be dissolved and a new parliament to take its place, although nobody knows exactly when. The world has come to realize that there is a limit to dictatorship and absolutism. And although a little bit too early to say so, the Italian Opposition deserves a good recognition in the history of contemporary liberty (April, 1925).

CHAPTER XXVIII.

DEMOCRACY IN JAPAN.

The European press is devoting comments to the constitutional changes in Japan. A leading article has appeared in the *Journal de Geneve*.

The progress of the Japanese people in democracy is one of the most outstanding features in their post-war developments. The events of the year 1925 constitute an important landmark in this growth. The law of universal suffrage that has been recently adopted by the parliament brings this Island Empire into line with the go-ahead nations of the contemporary world.

THE ECONOMIES OF DEMOCRATIC EVOLUTION.

Japan's advance in democracy is but another evidence of the fact that mankind moves onward along uniform lines both in the East and the West. It is interesting, further, to observe that the democra-

tic evolution of the Japanese has been attended with or occasioned by the same sets of economic circumstances as have led the nations of Western Europe and America to the paths of popular self-determination. Not only the stages and processes but even the causes or formative forces of democracy happen to be identical.

Modern democracy is a very recent phenomenon. It can almost be described as an offspring of industrialism, in other words, a product of the nineteenth century.

The most marvellous fact is that Japan although she commenced her apprenticeship in modernization towards the beginning of the fourth quarter of the last century should still have been able in the course of forty to fifty years to catch up to the latest achievements of the pioneers of modern civilization. Even in 1915 there was no Factory Act in Japan to regulate the conditions governing the employment of labour. To-day almost the "entire" population has been en-

trusted with the right to govern itself. Japan has been advancing at a break-neck speed, it should seem.

THE CONSTITUTION OF 1889.

It was in 1889 that the modern constitution of Japan was founded. The system was to a certain extent representative indeed, i.e., popular, but the aristocratic element was none the less prominent. The tradition of the old feudal regime was thus not abruptly broken. The transition to modernism was mild, and New Japan could still feel in its daily life the continuity with the old.

The Japanese constitution-makers had before them the experiences of American and French republics as well as the British and German monarchies. Their problem consisted in constructing something that might smack of democracy without having much of the people's part in it. It was the German more than any other constitution that the Japanese approached in its essentials.

The result was not unsatisfactory. The Japanese experiment proved to be the nearest way out of an autocratic regime in its advance towards democracy. And so when in 1905 the Czar of all the Russias decided to confer on his people the blessings of democratic institutions he considered the Japanese parliament to be worth imitation.

The Russian Duma owed its form in a certain measure to the model exhibited by Japan.

Another example how in working out the transition from the medieval to the modern East and West learn and borrow of each other. The lines of evolution are the same for all mankind; late-comers have therefore but to exploit the experiences of the people who have just gone beyond them and step into their shoes.

AN OLIGARCHIC-MILITARY CLASS-HEGEMONY.

The Lower House used to be elected almost exclusively by the landed interests. Since 1889 the right to vote has indeed

been extended progressively to larger and larger numbers. But until to-day the entire electorate has consisted of 2,500,000 people. With a population of about 80,000,000, this works out at something about 4%.

And yet it must be remembered that there is virtually no illiteracy in Japan. The problem of suffrage has naturally therefore been very acute for some time. Japan presented the example of a country where everybody could read and write and yet about 96 percent was deprived of the right to participate however indirectly in the administration.

While the franchise was so restricted, democracy or popular self-determination, in so far as the Lower House as a representative body undoubtedly embodied the democratic principle, was counteracted or held in check from another side. The Upper House possessed the right of absolute veto in regard to every decision of the Lower.

And how is this body constituted? First, there are some 20 princes of the

royal family. More than fifty per cent of the members of this House come from the hereditary aristocracy, Zamindars and Nawabs. The third great element is composed of bankers, industrialists and representatives of other large economic interests. These "Lords" are elected for life. Finally, there are the representatives or nominees of the Mikado.

The constitution of 1889 thus placed all power automatically in the hands of the nobility of all sorts, royal, landed, industrial and what not. The military aristocracy, moreover, established its influence on the administrative system on account of the successes achieved in 1895 and 1905. During the last two decades the people of Japan were used to the despotism of an oligarchic-military class-rule. And it is against this class-hegemony that the people had all this time been fighting. The success with which their efforts have been crowned to-day is the result of strenuous struggles with the vested interests.

INCREASE OF POPULATION.

The old order could not last any longer. New circumstances had arisen and their impact on the political organization and public life cannot but have been momentous.

In the first place is to be noted the enormous increase in population. The present figure of 80 millions has grown from that of 60 millions such as it was about two decades ago. The density per square mile in Japan has reached almost the Danish and Dutch proportions, namely, about 480.

Naturally one of the prominent topics of discussion in Japanese public life as in German is the question of the "pressure of population on the means of subsistence." The problem can in other words be stated as follows: Is Japan over-populated? If so, wherein lies the remedy?

Now, a phenomenon like "over-population" does not exist in the thoughts of those dynamists who believe that

Mother Earth can be made to yield all that the children of the soil need. Whatever be the density of population, "economic development" should be able to take care of it, they would say.

THE PROBLEM OF EMIGRATION.

The Japanese consider emigration to be a legitimate method of economic development. In these days of "world-economy," one could easily believe, the sparsely populated regions of the earth's surface should receive the surplus manpower of thickly peopled areas. Mobilization of labour from regions of high tension to those of comparatively low might indeed be regarded as a normal world-process. In Germany, at any rate, the idea is established both in theory and practice.

But in regard to Japan the "World-economy" does not exist so far as the possibilities of emigration or colonization are concerned. The Japanese are forbidden, by the laws of neighbours, to settle and establish homes in other lands.

Anti-Japanese legislation is a powerful instrument operating against the functioning of natural economic forces.

INDUSTRIALIZATION.

The question of the density of population is therefore being attacked by the Japanese in other ways. Indigenous agriculture alone is not sufficient to maintain the entire people. Japan has to import plenty of food stuffs and raw materials for national consumption.

But imports can be bought only with exports. And this demand for exports has led to the growth and development of industries. Industrialism has thus virtually been to a certain extent forced upon Japan on account of "over-population" and hindrances to emigration.

The last two decades have led to the cumulative industrialization of Japan. To-day not more than 26 millions of men and women are employed in agriculture. That is, village life in Japan accounts for about one third of its total population.

How and where are the other two-

thirds employed? In towns or cities and as hands (and partly also brains) in workshops and factories. Urban Japan is to rural Japan as 2 is to 1. Japan has become modernized indeed.

TOWN-LIFE.

Urbanization is industrialization and industrialization is urbanization. Medieval ruralism is a thing of the past. In the place of scattered farms and homesteads in the country Japan is now dotted over with the nuclei of human concentration, the town-complexes. And these new centres of social life have brought along with them a new civic consciousness.

It is the towns that have enriched modern Eur-America with democracy and political self-determination. The same has been happening in Japan. It is in the towns that the Japanese men and women have learned to exchange views with one another,—fraternize, unionize and organize. It is in the towns that the industrial proletariat of Japan possesses its vital bee-hive. It is again in the

towns that the other pole of modernism, namely, the bourgeoisie bankers and industrial overlords have their *palais* and centres of activity. Wealth, culture, education, working-class, propaganda, all have their citadel in towns. Japan forms no exception to the evolutionary process.

WORKING-CLASS *vs.* VESTED INTERESTS.*

The struggle between town and country, the new and the old, has therefore been a normal feature in the Japanese constitutional developments of recent times. The men and women of the towns were not to be bossed by the representatives of the country, the old order of landed interests.

The Great War hastened this process of urbanization and along with it enhanced the value of the "townies." The *mofussil* has had to give way to the new order. One has but to remember the fight, say, between London and Lancashire or the South and the North in England prior

* See "Japan since the Earthquakes" in *Economic Development*.

to the Reform Bill of 1832. Strictly speaking, the situation in Japan is similar to the conditions prevailing in English life about 1885 (Third Reform Act and the establishment of Marxianism as a social power).

The advance of the towns-people in public life implies automatically the rise in importance of the working class, because it is this class that constitutes the majority in urban centres. And as soon as the voice of labour is heard it can mean only one thing, namely, crusade against vested interests, antipathy to capitalists and landowning classes, economic and social justice, equality, in one word, democracy or popular freedom.

The influence of the town-complex as well as the working men and women on political parties has of late been manifest in the increasing strength of the "left" wing in the Lower House. Japan has advanced inch by inch, or perhaps mile by mile,—but always in the perfectly natural, or as one may call it, historical manner.

UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE.

One of the minima of modern democracy is furnished by universal suffrage. The Japanese "left" has been demanding it for quite a while. It was voted out several times on account of the opposition of the "upper ten thousands." Even during the crisis of the earthquakes (1923) it could not be carried through.

But at last it has become law, thanks to the program of Baron Kato, who was shrewd enough to understand the signs of the times. Every Japanese of the male sex above the age of 25 possesses now the right to vote. The electorate becomes thereby fourfold in size, as the number of voters rises to 10 millions from the up-to-date 2½.

Whatever one may think of the real value of universal suffrage in the light of the latest experiences of mankind, it will have to be admitted that the present reform enables the Japanese people for the first time to participate, in a wholesale manner, in at least one great item of national administration. Formally, at

any rate, Japan must be credited with having won a vast area in political uplift.

CHANGES IN THE UPPER HOUSE AND THE ARMY.

Another aspect of Kato's reforms is important in this connection. The Upper House has long been the butt of popular attacks. But the reformers of to-day as of yesterday have failed to shear it of its privileges. The right to absolute veto remains intact.

Only, the hereditary nobility is no longer to be in the majority. The number of peers created by the Emperor, i.e., such as owe their elevation to life-peerage through the nomination or recommendation of the ministry has been enlarged. To this extent the House of Lords will have a chance to represent the new brains and energies of the nation and thus grow with the advance of the people in capacity and character.

Among the reforms tending, as they do, to introduce democracy in the Japanese constitution it is also necessary

to mention the new army regulations. One may leave aside the curtailment of the military budget because it does not mean any permanent measure. But an item of permanent value must not be overlooked. The corps of "officers" had up till now constituted a veritable caste of "superior men." Steps have now been taken by which the "lower orders" can get chances to contribute to the *personnel* of the higher military organization.

DEMOCRATIZATION AND FOREIGN POLITICS.

In Japan as everywhere else democracy has come in through the endeavours of the working-class, the proletariat and the "labour party" or the "left wings" of public life. This is an internal achievement of the highest order. And the strengthening of the nation such as can be accomplished through this democratization of law-making, national finance, and public services including the army will not fail to make its influence felt in external politics.

At a time when the problem of Singapore and such other foreign affairs are weighing heavy on the shoulders of Japan it is a lucky consummation that the people have been able partially to democratize the state and thus commence functioning as responsible agents in the matter of obligations no less than of rights. Japan, democratized as she is, may be expected to bear the burden of the coming international complications in a reasonably satisfactory manner. For, democracy or government by public discussion, criticism and party-spirit, temporarily and superficially a source of weakness although it is, furnishes in the long run the surest foundations of a people's well-ordered and richly diversified energism.

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